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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Psychoanalysis and Modernity: A Failure to Find Relief from Existential Terror  
by 
Erin Liat D. Claridge 
 
 
Advisor: Elliot Jurist, Ph.D., Ph.D. 
 
This project considers the ways in which culture—the symbols and institutions that guide 
behavior and provide meaning to the individuals living within a community—serves a defensive 
function against conscious awareness of existential terror. The term existential terror refers to the 
cognitive and emotional experience of recognizing the inevitability of death, which is often 
accompanied by feelings of angst, isolation from others, and awareness of meaninglessness. In 
this dissertation, I will argue that the broad shift from traditional culture based on Judeo-
Christian religious beliefs and communal forms of social life to modernity represents a slow but 
destabilizing deterioration of the defensive function of culture vis-à-vis existential terror. The 
reflexivity inherent in modern stores of knowledge (i.e., the chronic revision of information) 
makes certitude impossible and challenges the legitimacy of social institutions that provide an 
anchor for meaning in a society. The focus of this project is to analyze the effects on individuals 
and society living at a time in which the efficacy of the cultural defense has been weakened. I 
will argue that psychoanalysis emerged during a time of tremendous cultural flux and represents 
the de facto model of psychological defense in modernity, replacing religion as the primary 
cultural mode of meaning-making. I will argue that as system, psychoanalysis is doomed to fail 
in its mission, and will outline the reasons for this line of thought.   
Keywords: psychoanalysis, culture, modernity, existential terror 
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Introduction 
Existential terror, at its core, is the conscious and unconscious fear of nonexistence. As 
we will see, this fear involves a host of cognitive and emotional components that make it a 
nuanced phenomenon. Our review of existential philosophy in chapter one will reveal the 
complexity of existential terror: it is not only a fear of death, but also a feeling of estrangement 
from others and a search for meaning for our lives. Additionally, it is a feeling of angst that 
defies concise articulation; an anxiety lurking beyond the surface that never fully abates; a 
numbness that seeks conformity with the masses; and an urge for freedom that presses for 
individuation.  
Chapter one will continue with a focus on the work of writers such as Irving Yalom 
(1980) and Ernest Becker (1971, 1973), who utilized the concept of existential terror to 
formulate theories that explain the impact of human vulnerability on individual development and 
culture in the modern era.  For those who privilege the role of existential terror in shaping the 
human experience, as do Yalom and Becker, the search for safety from death and groundlessness 
in our lives is the primary project of the self and the ultimate driving force of human behavior.  A 
basic premise of this project is that the need to allay anxiety and gain mastery over these 
existential concerns prompts human beings to seek authority - individuals and social institutions 
that make one feel safe by living in accordance with the ideological and behavioral norms 
espoused by these figures and/or traditions. A second premise is that the reflexivity inherent in 
modern culture has made reliance on traditional forms of authority problematic, even impossible, 
leaving modern individuals in a state of existential crisis.  
 Chapter two will examine how Western civilization evoked models of authority based on 
the prototype of the child’s earliest relationship with caregivers as described by Becker and 
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Yalom. Freud (1927) articulates a similar theory to account for the psychological origins of 
religion, which had been the dominant cultural paradigm of authority (and defense against 
existential terror) for centuries. Rieff (1966) explains how modernity led to changes in the 
symbolic needs of culture. Unlike ancient “political man” who submitted to the rule of a political 
leader, or pre-modern “religious man” who committed himself to the controls of religious 
authority, modern “psychological man” must grapple with the crumbling notion of certitude and 
the ever-expanding role of subjective experience as a meaningful marker of reality that 
influences our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Giddens (1990, 1991) shows how discontinuous 
the modernity of psychological man is from pre-modern culture and how the conditions for 
ontological security have changed as a result. If the Enlightenment promised an alternative to 
religious faith by means of objective reason that would provide certainty through the acquisition 
of knowledge, we are now able to see the ultimate failure of this position. Far from providing 
certitude, the ever-changing, reflexive (i.e., subject to chronic revision) nature of contemporary 
culture lays bare the plight of modern men and women first recognized by existential philosophy: 
there is no absolute system to quell our anxiety; the notion of certainty is obsolete. Furthermore, 
the reflexive nature of modernity has wreaked havoc on tradition, emptying it of context and 
leaving little comfort in the act of looking to the past, just as it has weakened the ability of a 
localized authority figure to ease anxiety through absorption of our projections. Finally, Sass 
(1992) explores the impact of these changes on the lives of individuals through his juxtaposition 
of modernism and the modern illness of schizophrenia. In his work, we not only gain the texture 
of lived experienced of modernity, but find further evidence for the notion that historical models 
of defense against existential terror, however revamped, will continue to fail in the current social 
milieu.   
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 Chapter three will explore the traumatic effects of the dislocation in the cultural paradigm 
of defense against existential terror by returning to existential philosophy and its intersection 
with emotional trauma as described by Stolorow (2011). This will be followed by a detailed 
inquiry into the cognitive process by which emotional trauma impacts the individual and society 
in Terror Management Theory. Finally, the cumulative impact of centuries of cultural change 
will be explored from the perspective of Elizabeth Young-Bruehl (2012), who suggests that the 
rise of tyranny in the 20th century was a response to this trauma (and a trauma-inducing 
phenomenon itself) as described by Mark Edmundson (2007). 
Chapter four will examine the emergence of psychoanalysis in the early twentieth century 
in the context of a culture grappling with the increasingly reflexive nature of modernity in a 
world where the prior defensive structure against existential terror (i.e., religion) no longer 
functioned as an effective anxiety buffer.  We will examine the diminished status of 
psychoanalysis in contemporary culture since the mid twentieth-century. Strenger (2015) 
suggests that psychoanalysis has an important message to deliver about the complexity of the 
self, but that in order to reach its audience, psychoanalysis as a discipline must find a way to 
reintegrate itself into mainstream culture. Beyond the practicalities of how psychoanalysis can 
stay relevant, I argue that psychoanalysis has already failed for three reasons. 
First, psychoanalysis fails because all systems of meaning are doomed to fail. 
Psychoanalysis cannot eradicate the anxiety inherent in living, and thus will always be limited, as 
all systems are, by its ability to turn diffuse anxiety about human vulnerability into a concrete 
problem that can be addressed. The work of psychoanalyst Adam Phillips (1995) will show how 
the psyche functions as a “concrete” location to act out the psychoanalytic solution to existential 
anxiety.  
4 
 
 
 
The second reason psychoanalysis fails is that it does not provide an effective buffer 
against existential terror in the form of externalized authority. Although Freud recognized that 
the need for authority stemmed from contact with vulnerability, he thought that with the right 
form of treatment people could rise above this need and assume a stance of “maturity.” 
Whitebook (2017) examines the limitations of Freud’s “project of modernity”—mourning the 
loss of internalized authority figures for the purpose of living a more authentic life—by showing 
how his preoccupation with rational forms of self-knowledge denies the deep-seated pull for 
merger with an external source of authority.  
The third reason psychoanalysis fails has to do with the difficulty associated with 
achieving a state of “maturity,” and the question of whether such an accomplishment is desirable. 
Eva Illouz (2008) will provide a critique of the therapeutic narrative of self-help that evolved out 
of Freud’s articulation of the self as a subjective and knowable entity. She argues that an 
Americanized version of therapy has become synonymous with a self that is sick, and that failure 
to be cured is a failure of the self. The role, then, of psychoanalysis in the contemporary social 
milieu, I argue, is to help individuals live in society with as few constraints as possible in 
constructing a meaningful and satisfying life, while allowing for the fact that no person or system 
of meaning can unriddle the meaning of life or protect us from its hazards.  
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Chapter One: Existential Terror 
 Questions about the nature of human existence have been posed in myriad forms 
throughout history. Porter (2000) makes an astute observation about the progress of human 
reflection in response to the distressing state of the human condition:  
Homeric man was not the introspective self-conscious being who populates 
Socrates’ dialogues a few hundred years later—indeed, The Iliad has no word for 
‘person’ or ‘oneself’. Living and conduct, normal and abnormal alike, were rather 
seen as being at the mercy of external, supernatural forces, and humans are 
portrayed as literally drawn to distraction with wrath, anguish, or vengefulness. 
(p. 13) 
 The Greeks lived at the mercy and the whims of the gods until the naturalistic, reason-
oriented thinking of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle emerged in the fifth century BC. The 
inclination to create order and meaning continues centuries later. Man’s fundamental 
vulnerability in the face of nature is perhaps the most perennial of human issues, and our starting 
point. Of course, humans are not the only vulnerable creatures; all of nature is vulnerable in 
some way to other aspects of nature. What makes the human predicament unique is our 
awareness of this struggle coupled with our efforts to overcome it by taming nature. This effort 
has been a work-in-progress since human evolution necessitated collaboration to care for 
prematurely born offspring, which substantiated the need for communities, language, and 
increasing self-reflective capacities. Human history then is the story of our ever-evolving 
attempts to continue this effort. In the external world, this project has been carried out with awe-
inspiring feats in architecture, engineering, medicine, physics, the arts and technology. 
Internally, the quest for safety developed in the context of naturalistic and religious views of 
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humanity that gave us minds and souls we could use in a multitude of ways to cope with our 
corporeality and transcend its attendant vulnerabilities.  
 The aim of this introductory chapter is to lay the main problem of our vulnerability, 
experienced as existential terror, as a real problem at our feet, and to understand how we cope 
with existential terror as individuals and in the realm of culture. To do this, we must define the 
parameters of existential terror, explain its origins, and examine our response—as individuals 
and within culture—to this terror. We will start with a brief review of existential philosophy to 
explain why human existence is necessarily bound up with terror. From there, we will explore a 
contemporary psychoanalytic approach to existential terror by reviewing Yalom’s (1980) 
application of existential ideas to the work of psychodynamic psychotherapy. Then, to 
understand the origins of existential terror, we will turn to the work of Ernst Becker (1973), 
whose synthesis of existential and psychoanalytic theory provides a compelling narrative of the 
individual’s struggle to manage existential terror in the context of early development. Becker 
explains how and why transference developed as a necessary psychological tool for managing 
the overwhelming anxiety associated with human vulnerability and how the defensive 
construction of symbolic identity that originates in childhood is perpetuated by culture. Finally, 
we will review the empirical evidence that explains the cognitive processes that activate and 
maintain adequate defense against existential terror.  
Existential ideas emerge in the nineteenth century 
 Existentialism is popularly known as a cultural movement that flourished in the café 
culture of artists and intellectuals in Paris following the Second World War. Although its roots 
can be traced back to nineteenth-century philosophy, especially that of Søren Kierkegaard and 
Friedrich Nietzsche, existentialism reached the height of its influence in the twentieth-century 
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through the works of Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, Jose Ortega y Gasset, and others. The term existentialism is 
notoriously difficult to define, in part because of the way the lines between its cultural and 
philosophical components are blurred: Many individuals affiliated with existentialism wrote 
works of fiction, poetry, and theatre with existential themes in addition to philosophical treatises. 
The influence of existentialism on the creative disciplines can be seen in the writings of 
Dostoyevsky and Kafka, the work of playwright Samuel Beckett, and the artwork of abstract 
expressionists Jackson Pollock and Willem de Kooning. To claim that existentialism belongs to 
one domain or another would do injustice to its reach of influence during the period when 
existential ideas flourished.   
  The philosophical problem of existence. The works of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, 
despite their many differences, are considered precursors of existentialism and were first 
synthesized into an existentialist perspective by Karl Jaspers (1938) in his Existenzphilosophie.  
 In Kierkegaard’s view, classical modern philosophy (represented as Hegelian 
philosophy) is ill-equipped to grasp the problem of human existence because its focus on reason 
and universal systems obfuscates the personal, lived experience of the individual (Kaufmann, 
1956/1975). His aim was to reconcile Christianity with the emergence of “the single individual,” 
one who must grapple with the question of existence (vis-à-vis faith) in a deeply personal way 
(Kierkegaard, 1846). For Nietzsche, the problem of existence arises when one realizes that the 
world is in a state of perpetual flux that defies fixed meaning and the possibility for order. 
Nietzsche is critical of absolute systems that lay claim to ordering the chaos (morality, science or 
philosophical metaphysics) or offer a transcendent reality (religion). With his famous declaration 
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that “God is dead,” (1883/2001, pg. 108) Nietzsche not only debunks the Judeo-Christian 
concept of god specifically but reveals the futility of all such meaning-making systems. 
 The similarity found in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is the conclusion that the 
philosophical problem of existence cannot be answered in terms of absolute systems. Essentially, 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche draw attention to the isolation, meaninglessness and freedom inherent 
in human existence. If science, religion, or any other external system of meaning is in fact 
meaningless, as they claim, how do individuals cope with the despair this knowledge evokes? 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche responded to the question of despair, or nihilism, in different ways, 
but both emphasize the role of personal choice (based on subjective experience) as the only 
means for crafting a life that can feel meaningful, even joyful, when lived in the spirit of 
authentic creation.   
Major Themes of Existential Philosophy 
 Existential philosophy illuminates the vulnerability inherent in the human condition by 
emphasizing the significance of personal experience and the fact that human beings are 
fundamentally meaning-making creatures. To articulate some of the main themes in this vein of 
thinking, we will review those most salient to our ongoing discussion about the development of 
existential thinking and their influence on psychoanalysis.  
 Freedom. If a single concept could be said to represent the cornerstone of existential 
thinking, freedom might be its seminal idea. According to Sartre (1943/1972), the human 
condition is one in which each of us is inherently free because we always have a choice about 
how to perceive and respond to every situation. To him, consciousness itself is freedom. The 
ability to take perceptual stimuli and interpret them in more than one way indicates a multiplicity 
of options, and this multiplicity has implications with respect to freedom. 
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 Of course, the arbitrary familial and social circumstances that one is born into constitute a 
field of limitations over which one has no control. Sartre (1943/1972) refers to these 
circumstantial aspects of our lives as our ‘facticity;’ Heidegger (1927/1962) used the term 
‘thrownness’ to describe a similar sentiment, and noted that even the fact of our birth (existence) 
is not of our choosing. Sartre and Heidegger agree that within the confines of these 
uncontrollable facts, we are always faced with the choice of how to respond to them.  
 That we have freedom, however, does not mean that any of our choices can be justified or 
that any casual explanation can be attributed to them. In the absence of an absolute system to 
guide our behavior and give meaning to life, the existential notion of responsibility for the 
creation of meaning becomes one of life’s greatest gifts and most burdensome challenges. We 
are, as Sartre (1943/1972) maintains, “condemned to be free.” Contact with this responsibility 
can produce a dizzying affect, a sense of groundlessness that Yalom (1980) suggests is worse 
than the anxiety one feels in anticipation of death. In response to this groundless feeling, human 
beings are naturally inclined to seek relief. Ironically, the impulse to seek relief from 
responsibility often gives rise to the creation of absolute systems. For existential thinkers, 
abdication of responsibility is a dangerous, if not understandable response, because it leads to an 
estrangement of the self, or, inauthenticity.  
   Authenticity. Alongside freedom, existential thinkers are almost universally preoccupied 
with the notion of authenticity. To represent oneself through living is to live authentically. These 
deceptively simple words imply a rather strenuous process of evaluating the way one lives 
through active self-reflection. For Heidegger (1927/1962), this means adopting a 
phenomenological stance that utilizes subjective experience to guide action. However, Heidegger 
is emphatic in reminding us that human existence (Dasein) can only be defined in relation to 
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living in a concrete world that is populated by others (Being-in-the-world). Authentic living 
acknowledges the role of others in the construction of our world without yielding authority over 
our life choices.  
 The notion that the external world is responsible for creating meaning in our lives is what 
Sartre (1943/1972) refers to as “bad faith” and Kierkegaard (1844/1980) considers falling in with 
the “herd.”  When we live according to the expectations of others (the “herd”) rather than 
following our own desires, we have misrepresented our true self. For Heidegger (1927/1962), 
being part of the herd, or the “they,” is a natural state-of-affairs, one we are all subject to, and 
that requires a conscious effort to extract oneself from:  
The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the 
authentic self—that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. 
As the they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the “they”, and 
must first find itself. (p. 167, emphasis in original) 
 In this sense, inauthenticity is something of a starting point; without a crowd to stand 
back from there could be no individuality. But authenticity, like freedom, is a double-edged 
sword. The benefits derived from living in a way that is an expression of one’s true desires is 
tempered by the distress that is evoked by leaving the “tranquilizing” (p. 222) safety of the 
crowd (Heidegger, 1927/1962).  
 Angst & death. The term “angst,” often translated into English as anxiety or dread, was 
first described by Kierkegaard (1844/1980) to denote the unpleasant mental state that arises 
when we are confronted with certain realities of human existence (among them: freedom, 
responsibility, authenticity, and the absurdity of life) . Kierkegaard is clear that angst is not fear, 
for fear, like anxiety, is a fear of something specific. On the contrary, angst is a nebulous feeling; 
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a nonspecific anxiety rooted in the desire for something of which we are not yet aware. 
Kierkegaard explains that angst is closely linked to the awareness of possibility and freedom of 
choice: 
Anxiety may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down the yawning 
abyss becomes dizzy. But what is the reason for this? It is just as much in his own eye as in the 
abyss, for suppose he had not looked down. Hence, anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which 
emerges when the spirit wants to posit the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own 
possibility, laying hold of finiteness to support itself. Freedom succumbs to dizziness. 
(1844/1980, pg. 61) 
 Feelings of angst reveal our freedom and the consequence of choice as well as the 
absurdity of our existence when we realize that there is nothing, per se, that keeps us from 
making one choice or another. Heidegger (1927/1962) suggests that angst serves to bring us back 
from our absorption in the everyday concerns, of being part of the “they” that masks our 
situation as Being-in-the-world. Angst jolts us back into awareness of our need to shape our 
existence, and thus it promotes individuation: When the ordinary world “falls away” and 
“everyday familiarity collapses” (p. 233) we are forced to concede the outside world as an 
arbitrator of reality, which negates the role of the “they” in defining our world (Heidegger, 
1927/1962). As Sartre put it in Being and Nothingness (1943/1972), angst reveals “a being which 
is compelled to decide the meaning of being” (p. 556). Angst then is a powerful emotion that 
renders the day-to-day activities of our lives meaningless and forces us to confront the fact that 
we are individuals who cannot rely on the external world for self-definition. In revealing the 
absurdity of life, angst awakens us to the freedom inherent in human existence and our 
responsibility to make choices that reflect our individuality.   
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 If angst activates freedom and brings us back from unself-conscious living, death 
represents a “boundary situation” that makes meaningful living possible. Jaspers (1932) used this 
term to define those situations, including illness and death, which highlight the inevitable 
finitude of life. When failure is the only outcome, as in death, we are forced to confront the 
ramifications of this reality, and so the knowledge of death serves as a catalyst for contemplating 
freedom and our responsibility for creating meaning through authentic living. For Heidegger 
(1927/1962), death similarly serves as an anchor for meaning; without finitude, the act of 
sculpting our life into an authentic whole would have no value. There would be no purpose in 
contemplating our desires or the future, no reason to emerge from a state of forgetfulness, to 
individuate from the “they.” The anticipation of death helps us maintain a self-aware attitude 
with respect to our life that is essential for authenticity. 
Influence of Existential Philosophy on Psychoanalysis 
  Psychiatrists working in the post-war era who sought to incorporate the ideas of 
Heidegger, Sartre, and others into Freud’s psychoanalytic theory developed what they called 
‘existential psychoanalysis.’ The general impetus for this synthesis can be traced to a critique of 
Freud’s theory as being overly positivist and (therefore) reductionist. The following reviews the 
development of existential psychoanalysis from its beginnings to a contemporary theory.  
 Phenomenological psychiatry in Europe. In the years before World War II, European 
psychiatrists were exposed to a wide range of theories and clinical practice which led to a cross-
fertilization of ideas. The beginnings of existential psychoanalysis can be traced to a few 
individuals who trained under Freud and his associates and were also familiar with the work of 
Heidegger and phenomenology, who tried to reconcile these unique but complementary ideas 
into a coherent theory and practice.  
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 Daseinanalyse. Trained by Eugen Bleuler and C.G. Jung, the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig 
Binswanger met Freud in 1907 and developed a lifelong friendship that endured despite later 
theoretical differences (Reppen, 2003). Binswanger’s primary critique of Freud consisted of the 
view, shared by many existentialists, that Freudian psychoanalysis endorsed the Cartesian 
subject-object split that assumed behavior could be objectively observed and classified 
(Needleman, 1967/2006). Influenced by the work of Edmund Husserl (1900-1901, 1913) and 
Heidegger (1927/1962), Binswanger married Freudian theory and phenomenology to create an 
existential psychoanalysis he called Daseinanalyse.  
 Medard Boss was also a Swiss psychiatrist with ties to Bleuler, Freud, Jung and other 
prominent analysts throughout Europe, and was introduced to Heidegger’s work by Binswanger 
before the Second World War. Boss was later mentored by Heidegger for a considerable period 
of time; under Heidegger’s influence, Boss (1982) adopted an existential perspective with 
respect to psychoanalysis and made significant contributions to the development of 
Daseinanalyse (Jenner, 2006). 
 As its name suggests, Daseinanalyse is based on a Heideggerian understanding of human 
being as Being-in-the-world: “Existential analysis ... does not have in mind the solidity of the 
structure of the inner life-history, but rather the solidity of the transcendent structure preceding 
or underlying a priori all psychic structures, as the very condition of their possibility” 
(Binswanger, 1958-1959, p. 80). Binswanger’s conception, while different from Freud’s, 
maintained loyalty to psychoanalytic technique, as summarized in the following: 
Existential analysis, instead of speaking in theoretical concepts such as, for 
example, pleasure-principle and reality-principle, investigates and treats the 
mentally ill person regarding the structures, structural articulations, and structural 
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alterations of his existence. Hence it has not by any means consciousness as its 
only object, as uninformed quarters have often reproached it with, but rather the 
whole man, prior to any distinction between conscious and unconsciousness, or 
even between body and soul; for the existential structures and their alterations 
permeate his entire being. Obviously, the existential analyst, insofar as he is a 
therapist, will at least in the beginning of his treatment not be able to dispense 
with the distinction between conscious and unconscious deriving from the 
psychology of consciousness, and which is bound up with both its merits and its 
drawbacks.  
 Taking stock then of the relationship between existential analysis and 
psychotherapy, it can be said that existential analysis can over long stretches not 
dispense with the traditional psychotherapeutic methods; that, however, it can as 
such be therapeutically effective, only insofar as it succeeds in opening up to the 
sick fellow-man an understanding of the structure of human existence and allows 
him to find his way back from his neurotic or psychotic, lost, erring, perforated or 
twisted mode of existence and world into the freedom of being able to dispose of 
his own capacities for existence. This presupposes that the existential analyst, 
insofar as he is a psychotherapist, not only is in possession of existential-analytic 
and psychotherapeutic competence, but that he must dare to risk a committing of 
his own existence in the struggle for his partner-the patient's-freedom. 
(Binswanger, 1958-1959, p. 83, emphasis added) 
 Binswanger advocates use of psychoanalytic technique to help the patient confront the 
ways his or her world is currently structured, inviting him to examine how this construction 
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denies or conflicts with certain realities of human existence. Freedom, for the existential analyst, 
was measured by the capacity for self-creation in the face of his ultimate vulnerability.  
  Logotherapy. Viktor Frankl was an Austrian psychiatrist who developed a form of 
existential psychotherapy he called logotherapy. A student of Freud and then Adler, Frankl’s 
path eventually diverged from his mentors as he began to articulate the view that human beings 
are fundamentally meaning (logos) seekers. Following the war, Frankl’s ideas were received by a 
wide audience through his book, Man’s Search for Meaning (1946/2009), which described 
logotherapy in the context of Frankl’s real-life experience as a prisoner in a concentration camp.  
 Logotherapy operated with the understanding of a human being as constituting three 
layers of experience: somatic, psychic, and noetic (of the soul). While medicine could treat the 
soma and psychology the psyche, logotherapy endeavored to address the problems of the “unity” 
of an individual who is all these things at once. Following Nietzsche, Frankl did not believe that 
suffering in and of itself was necessarily a problem, if the individual could derive some meaning 
from it. Furthermore, he believed that self-fulfillment was a corollary of successfully finding 
meaning in one’s life and that neurosis represents a crisis of meaning or “existential frustration” 
in which the individual experienced conflict between values (Frankl & Batthyány, 2010). This 
crisis of meaning, what Frankl called a “noogenics neurosis,” was also a spiritual matter related 
to the health of the soul. The therapeutic aim of logotherapy is to aid the patient in finding 
meaning through developing a responsibility toward one’s life, without influencing the direction 
or form this meaning takes: 
It is not Logotherapy’s concern that we therapists give the patient a meaning to 
his existence, but only that we enable him to find such a meaning, that we, so to 
speak, broaden his field of vision so that he will become aware of the full 
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spectrum of the possibilities for personal and concrete meanings and values. 
(Frankl & Batthyány, 2010, p. 89) 
 Despite this seeming neutrality on the part of Frankl regarding the development of his 
patient’s values, he was nonetheless criticized by Rollo May and others for promoting theistic 
ideas about God that gave logotherapy an authoritarian tone (Pytell, 2006).    
 American influence on existential psychology.   
 Rollo May. May is credited with introducing European existentialism to America at a 
time when Freud’s ideas were being reevaluated within the field of psychoanalysis (Yalom, 
1980). Although May is associated with the tradition of humanistic psychology, he and 
colleagues such as Gordon Allport, Carl Rogers, and Abraham Maslow were influential in 
disseminating the ideas of existential thinkers, especially Viktor Frankl, within academic 
institutions in the United States (Pytell, 2006).  May himself wrote about topics such as anxiety 
with existential ideas in mind, describing anxiety as “our human awareness of that fact that each 
of us is a being confronted with nonbeing” (1950/1977, p. 363 emphasis in original). However, 
as Yalom’s (1980) commentary suggests, the difference between European and American 
existential thought was substantial:  
“The European focus is on limits, on facing and taking into oneself the anxiety of 
uncertainty and non-being. The humanistic psychologists, on the other hand, 
speak less of limits and contingency than of development of potential, less of 
acceptance than of awareness, less of anxiety than of peak experiences and 
oceanic oneness, less of life meaning than of self-realization, less of apartness and 
basic isolation than of I-Thou and encounter” (p. 19).  
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 Not surprisingly, the cultural differences in European and American perspective found its 
way into their respective interpretations of existential thought and the application to clinical 
practice.  
Existential Psychotherapy: A Psychoanalytic Application of Existential Themes 
 Yalom is an American psychiatrist widely known for his contribution to contemporary 
existential (and group) psychotherapy. Yalom posits that most psychotherapists intuitively work 
with existential concerns but lack a cohesive set of principles and coherent model for addressing 
these issues concretely. He wrote Existential Psychotherapy (1980) to provide a theoretic 
framework for an existential model of dynamic psychotherapy. Yalom hoped the 
recommendations for technique he described would encourage clinicians to rethink the focus of 
their therapeutic attention and integrate a more classically psychoanalytic understanding of 
unconscious conflicts with what he called the four “ultimate concerns” – death, freedom, 
isolation, and meaninglessness.  
 Although Yalom is in full agreement with the psychoanalytic understanding of dynamic 
forces and the interplay of thoughts, feelings, and behavior, he disagrees with classical Freudians 
regarding the content of such forces. From Yalom’s perspective, existential sources of dread are 
more deeply-rooted relative to conflicts emanating from instinctual drives. In other words, the 
conflicts that psychoanalysts are used to working with are themselves manifestations of more 
primordial concerns. Regarding these “fundamental sources of dread,” Yalom (1980) writes: 
“The individual’s earliest experiences, though undeniably important in life, do not 
provide the answer to this fundamental question. In fact, the residue of earliest life 
creates a biological static that serves to obscure the answer. The answer to the 
inquiry is transpersonal. It is an answer that cuts beneath any individual’s 
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personal life history. It is an answer that applies to every person: it belongs to the 
human being’s ‘situation’ in the world” (p. 11).  
 Yalom suggests that an individual’s ability to confront such profound and disquieting 
themes would likely come about only in times of extreme distress. 
 Like other psychoanalytically based theories, Yalom (1980) stresses the role of anxiety in 
psychic adaptation to awareness of existential concerns. However, he alters the dynamic 
structure (drive  anxiety  defense mechanism) in two important ways. First, he substitutes 
“awareness of ultimate concern” for drive as the potential trigger of anxiety and defense. Second, 
he recognizes two forms of defense: “conventional” defenses that ward off anxiety as it arises 
from any source, and defenses those which are activated in response to existential concerns. 
While his model aims to differentiate between anxiety that belongs to the individual’s life history 
and that which is an inevitable part of the human condition, Yalom is careful to point out the 
subtlety with which this differentiation is perceptible in treatment:  
“The clinician working with a troubled patient is rarely able to examine primal 
conflicts in pristine form. Instead, the patient harbors an enormously complex set 
of concerns: the primary concerns are deeply buried, encrusted with layer upon 
layer of repression, denial, displacement, and symbolization” (1980, p. 6)  
 Despite the complexity involved in teasing apart the threads of primary (existential) and 
secondary (conventional) anxieties, he emphasizes the healing potential of this work when the 
clinician remains attuned to the ultimate concerns and can encourage therapeutic change through 
“psychic phenomena” such as “willing, assuming responsibility, relating to the therapist, and 
engaging in life” (Yalom, 1980, p. 485). 
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 Death. Yalom summarizes a fundamental tenet of existentialism by reminding readers 
that “death is the condition that makes it possible for us to live life in an authentic fashion” 
(1980, p. 31, emphasis in original). For Yalom, death is the ultimate concern. The fact that life 
requires death so that we might joyfully (per Nietzsche) experience it as an act of self-creation 
requires its omnipresence; death is always lurking under the surface. The implication of this fact, 
however, makes awareness of death an unwelcome phenomenon and one we spend a significant 
portion of our psychic energy denying. Denial however comes at a price. When we deny this 
fundamental aspect of our condition it inevitably leads to restrictions of experience to maintain 
the denial. Further, because death awareness is experienced as a vague dread of no-thing (per 
Kierkegaard) that cannot be located, the mind seeks to transform dread about death into anxiety 
about something. Recalling Rollo May’s (1950/1977) treatise on anxiety, Yalom (1980) reminds 
us that “anxiety seeks to become fear” (p. 207) of something concrete. For this reason, death 
anxiety in its purest form is rarely observed by the clinician.  
 Defensive paradigms. Yalom (1980) asserts that children are aware of death from a 
young age and are pervasively occupied with death and its attendant threat of annihilation. He 
suggests that fear of death is the original source of anxiety and that a child’s primary 
developmental task is to find an adaptive way of coping with the fear that its life will end. By 
latency, children have developed sophisticated modes of denial, adopting one of two main 
paradigms of defense – the ultimate rescuer fantasy and the belief in a personal specialness – 
which shape the general development of their character and serve as a foundation upon which 
other secondary (conventional) defenses are established.  
 Yalom (1980) argues that the child has a “deep belief both in his or her personal 
inviolability and in the existence of a uniquely personal, ultimate rescuer” (p. 95) that act as the 
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two primary defenses against the terror of death. The “ultimate rescuer” defense is based on the 
wish for fusion or merger with an omnipotent other that provides security and meaning. The 
prototype of the ultimate rescuer is the parental figure of the infant’s first years, but the role is 
easily transferable in later life to a host of external religious figures or deities, teachers, authority 
figures and social causes. In this structure, “safety” is assured by maintaining contact with the 
transference object, which generates the sense of feeling “tucked in” to the power of the other as 
described by Becker (1973).  
 The second major defense, the “belief in personal specialness,” is a state in which “one is 
templated with a sense of specialness, and summons this ready belief as a shield against death 
anxiety” (Yalom, 1980, p. 96). In this defense, the individual is completely preoccupied with 
himself and holds an “irrational belief” (p. 96) that he is exempt from the laws of nature that 
apply to all others (namely, death). In this way, there is “freedom” from nature, an attempt to 
deny nature and escape into the embellishment of the self. Each of these defensive structures is 
adaptive in that it assuages intolerable anxiety, but, as with all defenses, when adopted with 
rigidity it has the potential to generate maladaptive behaviors as well as a vague sense of not 
living one’s life authentically. 
 Of course, the sense that one is failing to live authentically, what Yalom calls existential 
guilt, is not likely to surface while shopping for groceries. Employing Jasper’s (1932) concept of 
death as a “boundary situation,” Yalom (1980) explains that experiences of terminal illness, 
near-fatal accidents or other severe disruptions in our general wellbeing jolt us out of the 
everyday and force us to confront the reality of death.  
 Freedom. As described above, the feeling we are likely to experience when 
contemplating our freedom is intolerable for most and results in what Yalom (1980) calls 
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“anxiety of groundlessness.” For many of us, this anxiety is combated by evoking the ultimate 
rescuer defense, which allays the discomfort by allowing us to feel tethered to something real. 
However, “as Heidegger and Sartre suggest, appearances enter the service of denial: we 
constitute the world in such a way that it appears independent of our constitution. To constitute 
the world as an empirical world means to constitute it as something independent of ourselves” 
(Yalom, 1980, p. 222, emphasis in original). So, a psychological defense is erected, perhaps to 
good effect, but Yalom argues that the existential guilt of surrendering one’s existence in this 
way has deleterious effects. The emptiness, stuckness and general malaise that prompt many 
individuals to seek psychotherapy is the result of abdicating responsibility for one’s life and the 
goal of the therapist, per Yalom, is to influence the will in such a way that the patient will be able 
to reclaim his or her desire and act based on emotional directives.  
 Isolation. Yalom differentiates among three types of isolation: interpersonal, 
intrapersonal, and existential. Interpersonal isolation is the kind of loneliness we experience 
when we are physically and emotionally distant from others. Intrapersonal isolation occurs when 
we have blocked a part of our experience from conscious awareness defensively, such as in 
dissociation or fragmentation of the self. Existential isolation, however, is the kind of 
separateness encompassed by the dictum “we are born alone and we will die alone.” Existential 
isolation is also connected to freedom and responsibility by the fact that in the end, if we can 
muster the strength to face reality, we must accept the “loneliness of being one’s own parent” 
(Yalom, 1980, p.357). Coming to terms with this reality by giving up the state of imagined 
fusion with a powerful other and engaging in the process of individuation is another major 
developmental achievement. When others no longer function as tools for avoidance of existential 
loneliness, the capacity for true mutuality and “need-free” love can develop (1980). In this 
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scenario, love is an expression of mutual recognition, support of and empathy for another that 
helps alleviate the pain inherent in existential isolation. As Yalom points out, successful 
therapeutic engagement with the issue of existential isolation helps heighten the patient’s 
capacity for intimacy while increasing his or her tolerance of limitations.  
 Meaninglessness. Existential philosophy exposes the unsolvable dilemma that even as 
humans progress in their search for meaning, “the only true absolute is that there are no 
absolutes” (Yalom, 1980, p. 423). Instead of prescribing a specific path, existential philosophy 
argues for the idiosyncratic development of meaning coupled with full engagement in the world. 
Yalom suggests that altruism, creativity, and self-actualization offer different avenues for 
engaging in activity that can feel pleasurable and provide meaning. Yalom (1980) connects these 
modes of meaning-making to Viktor Frankl’s work, noticing the role of internal (drive-oriented) 
pursuits as well as external (strive-oriented) activities in the achievement of self-transcendence. 
The Origins of Existential Terror: A Developmental Perspective 
 Ernest Becker, a renowned anthropologist and Pulitzer-prize winning author of The 
Denial of Death (1973), incorporates the work of Freud, Otto Rank, Norman O. Brown, Erich 
Fromm, Kierkegaard, and others to hypothesize a developmental trajectory regarding the 
individual’s struggle with existential terror. Becker concludes that an existential fear of death is 
pervasive and that the active (and often unconscious) denial of death is a ubiquitous human 
striving that originates in the first months of life and continues to shape our developmental 
experience.  
 Becker’s treatise is a creative synthesis that emanates from the basic supposition that 
humans are terrified of their biological nature and find the task of integrating the reality of their 
animal self with their symbolic self impossible. According to Becker, deep and sustained 
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apprehension of death and its inevitability is fundamentally intolerable to human beings, so we 
turn away from the body as a defense against this knowledge and invest all our energies in 
promoting our symbolic identity.  Becker argues that the symbolic self is a grand effort to 
transcend the physical reality of human life. 
 Becker (1973) traces the developmental path by which the individual’s investment in 
authority unfolds. He argues that an initial “fear of life” in which the totality of the infant’s 
helplessness and dependency threatens to overwhelm him is initially ameliorated by a 
rudimentary denial of separateness from the mother (i.e., narcissistic withdrawal), and finds a 
more sophisticated and permanent defense in the solution of transference. By transferring all the 
infant’s awe and terror to the person(s) of the parent(s), he can construct a source of power to 
bestow a sense of safety and comfort from the terror of vulnerability. The fear of life then 
morphs into a fear of death, or loss of the authority figure, and the child learns to conduct himself 
in accordance with the demands and preferences of his parents to keep them close. Over the 
course of development, the child constructs a sense of symbolic identity through which he can 
identify with important figures of his childhood, allowing him to repress the reality of his animal 
nature. The model of authority established in infancy perpetuates itself vis-à-vis culture, which 
exists to structure the symbolic identity by offering self-esteem in the form of sanctioned modes 
of being. In short, culture prescribes acceptable forms of self-esteem and articulates the 
appropriate means for achieving them. Culture thus serves as a primary defense against our 
animal nature and existential concerns by providing a sense of belonging and safety. 
 Fear of life / fear of death. According to Becker, the emergence of the symbolic self 
happens as a chain of events that begins with the infant’s first encounter with life. Becker’s work 
evolves many of Rank’s (1930, 1932, 1941) ideas regarding the significance of pre-Oedipal fears 
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regarding the infant’s initial “fear of life,” which is a precursor to the development of 
transference as a psychological mechanism that helps the infant manage the terror associated 
with its helplessness, that has as its consequence, a “fear of death.”  
 Drawing from an evolutionary perspective, Becker reminds his readers that the biological 
underpinning of fear is the threat to continuity, and that self-preservation is based on accurate 
appraisal of threats in the environment. Becker claims that rudimentary awareness of our 
biological vulnerability is prematurely thrust upon us when we discover that we do not, in fact, 
control our bodies or the world of others. In the face of an immature ego, Becker understands 
primary narcissism as a necessary function of biology that reinforces the survival instinct: 
The child is overwhelmed by experiences of the dualism of the self and the body 
from both areas, since he can be master of neither. He is not a confident social 
self, adept manipulator of symbolic categories of words, thoughts, names, or 
places—or especially of time, that great mystery for him; he doesn’t even know 
what a clock is. Nor is he a functioning adult animal who can work and procreate, 
do the serious things he sees happening around him: he can “do like father” in any 
way. He is a prodigy in limbo. In both halves of his experience he is dispossessed, 
yet impressions keep pouring in on him and sensations keep welling up within 
him, flooding his body. He must make sense out of them, establish ascendency 
over them. Will it be thoughts over body, or body over thoughts? Not so easy. 
There can be no clear-cut victory or straightforward solution to the existential 
dilemma he is in. It is his problem right from the beginning almost of his life, yet 
he is only a child to handle it. . . . [W]hen they try to master the body, pretend it 
isn’t there, act “like a little man,” the body suddenly overwhelms them, 
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submerges them in vomit or excrement—and the child breaks down in desperate 
tears over his pretense at being a purely symbolic animal. (1973/1997, p. 28). 
 Narcissistic withdrawal. It is important to note that Becker wrote at a time in which the 
idea of primary narcissism as an undifferentiated state with respect to the mother (and others) 
was still widely accepted in psychoanalysis, before infant research demonstrated the ability of 
babies to recognize difference, even indicate preferences for various smells, sounds and images 
(Stern, D.N., 1985). While the spirit of Becker’s discussion on the topic of narcissism is directed 
towards an understanding of the child’s early recognition of the duality of his 
biological/symbolic nature and the abject terror helplessness evokes, he nonetheless describes the 
earliest period of infancy as “the stage before the child is fully differentiated from his mother in 
his own consciousness, before he is fully cognizant of his own body and its functions—or, as we 
say technically, before his body has become an object in his phenomenological field” (p. 36). 
Given what we know now about early development, it is worth evaluating Becker’s statements in 
the context of a current understanding of narcissism to consider how the concept of narcissistic 
withdrawal from reality relates to the earliest experience of existential terror.  
 Writing from the perspective of a contemporary Freudian, Alan Bass (2000) suggests that 
some patients, those he refers to as “concrete patients” (p. 14), reject interpretation in analytic 
psychotherapy because it represents a level of differentiation that generates intolerable anxiety. 
The need for merger in these patients is so strong that self and object remain fused unconsciously 
so any perception that challenges the reality of separateness must be thwarted (i.e., reality is 
organized in service of defense). For these patients, “interpretation can be a differentiating 
trauma” (Bass, 2000, p. 8) which must be defended against. In Bass’ view, narcissism is 
explained as the “the potentially traumatizing impact of otherness or difference” (p. 53) that 2 
26 
 
 
 
that is later disavowed. Citing Lawrence Brown (1985), Bass posits a cognitive (if unconscious) 
recognition of differentiation coupled with affective rejection of the boundary between subject 
and object.  
 If we think for a moment about Becker’s (1973/1997) conception of narcissism as “the 
ballooning of the self in fantasy, the complete megalomaniac self-inflation as a last defense, as 
an attempt at utter symbolic power in the absence of lived physical power” (p. 220, emphasis in 
original), while keeping the mechanics of cognition described by Bass in mind, we can turn our 
attention to a more productive question about the origin of anxiety that induces narcissistic 
retreat in response to existential terror. Becker and Bass both refer to Freud’s (1926/1959) 
discussion of signal anxiety as a response to the danger of separation from the mother who 
manages the infant’s needs, without which, he would be exposed to “a growing tension due to 
need, against which [he] is helpless” (p. 67, emphasis in original). Freud goes on to say that 
“anxiety is seen to be the product of the infant’s mental helplessness which is a natural 
counterpart of its biological helplessness” (1926/1959, p. 68). With this understanding, we can 
argue that Bass’ conceptualization of narcissism refers more directly to the emotional resonance 
of helplessness described by Freud whereas Becker attempts to address both, emphasizing of 
course the biological helplessness and its role in promoting repression in response to physical 
danger and recognition of dependence vis-à-vis the mother. 
 The symbolic self. Following an initial period of narcissistic withdrawal from reality, 
Becker articulates the developmental process that leads to the emergence of the symbolic self by 
reformulating some of Freud’s concepts regarding infantile sexuality from the perspective of 
existential terror. To do this, he incorporates the work of Norman O. Brown, whose critique of 
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psychoanalysis in Life Against Death (1959) influenced Becker’s thinking about the individual’s 
struggle to overcome the terror of his animal condition.  
 Following Brown, Becker argues that “anality and its problems arise in childhood 
because it is then that the child already makes the alarming discovery that his body is strange and 
fallible and has a definite ascendancy over him by its demands and needs” (1973/1997, p. 30). 
Anality then is a microcosm for the problem of the dual nature of the human animal; one cannot 
escape basic physiology. In this way, the body becomes a horrifying reminder of our animal 
status. The mother—whose corporeality is more pronounced because of pregnancy, 
breastfeeding, and menstruation—comes to represent “biological dependence” (Becker, 
1973/1997, p. 39) in the child’s eyes; a menacing status that encourages a devaluation of the 
mother in a self-protecting step designed to deny his own biological dependence: 
The wish for the phallic mother, the horror of the female genitals, may well be a 
universal experience of mankind, for girls as well as boys. But the reason is that 
the child wants to see the omnipotent mother, the miraculous source of all his 
protection, nourishment, and love, as a really godlike creature complete beyond 
the accident of a split into two sexes. The threat of the castrated mother is thus a 
threat to his whole existence in that his mother is an animal thing and not a 
transcendent angel (Becker, 1973/1997, p. 225). 
 This psychological maneuver, which essentially constitutes Becker’s reformulation of the 
castration complex (as set out by Brown, 1959), suggests that the child’s repudiation of the 
mother is necessitated by the intense vulnerability he encounters when confronted with the fact 
of his dependence (on the mother but more significantly, as an animal creature), a situation he 
solves by defensively focusing on the trauma of sexual difference. The mother, who is at first 
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imbued with all the power and majesty of creation, becomes the locus of the child’s horror when 
the narcissistic blow of her corporal fallibility is dealt (Becker, 1973/1997). 
 In response to this frightening discovery, per Becker, the child’s next thought is about his 
constitution and the possibility that he might be similarly flawed. The resultant identification of 
the child with the father is designed to neutralize the anxiety engendered by the dualism of 
human existence. Essentially, the child wants to evade the passive role his mother embodies and 
the inevitability of destruction that her biological role conjures up. For Becker, the Freudian 
oedipal project is rewritten such that the child triumphs over death (as opposed to castration) by 
rejecting the physicality of the mother and turning to the world of the father in search of 
symbolic transcendence.  
 Transference. With that in mind, Becker views transference as a strategy for allaying 
anxiety about the biological situation of the child. Becker suggests that use of the mother as a 
transference object reveals a sophisticated method of organizing potentially overwhelming 
perceptions by locating them all in one place: “The child takes natural awe and terror and focuses 
them on individual beings, which allows him to find the power and the horror all in one place 
instead of diffused throughout a chaotic universe” (Becker, 1973/1997, p. 145). In this way 
transference has the effect of “toning down” the potentially overwhelming effect of perceptual 
stimuli by locating its effects in the person of the parent. This protects the child (and later adult) 
from that dizzying feeling Yalom (1980) described when one lacks an anchor for his fears and 
meaning. In addition to toning things down, the transference object “beefs things up” by 
inducing a feeling of security, allowing the child to feel merged or “tucked into a larger source of 
power” (Becker, 1973/1997, p. 134).  
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 Once the child has made use of his mother as a transference object to quell the initial 
terror of life, a new fear arises regarding union and merger and the necessity of maintaining 
proximity to the much-needed authority figure. Noting the irony of exchanging one set of 
troubles for another, Becker comments on the problem inherent in the “solution” of transference 
for managing existential terror:  
He binds himself to one person to automatically control terror, to mediate wonder, 
and to defeat death by that person’s strength. But then he experiences 
“transference terror”; the terror of losing the object, of displeasing it, of not being 
able to live without it. The terror of his own finitude and impotence still haunts 
him, but now in the precise form of the transference object. (1973/1997, p. 146) 
 Becker expounds on the authority of the transference object as a developmental 
achievement of sorts whose raison d’être is to keep conscious awareness of existential terror at 
bay. This conclusion, which owes much to the work of Rank in connecting existential concerns 
with early development and later psychological functioning, is the cornerstone of Becker’s 
argument about culture and the primary importance of symbolic identity.  
 Twin ontological motives of the hero system. Although most of Becker’s discourse 
revolves around the fear of death, he is careful to highlight the life-affirming urge toward 
individuation inherent in the human psyche. In a complex and nuanced discussion of 
transference, Becker examines the “twin ontological motives” (1973/1997, p. 150) that underlie 
this ubiquitous phenomenon, namely the defense against death (discussed above) and the search 
for personal meaning. Essentially, Becker uses his insight into the fear of death and the human 
need for self-expansion to determine that transference is a necessary phenomenon that has the 
potential to make creative living possible.   
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  Self-expansion. Transference is a mechanism that bolsters our sense of feeling safe and 
in control of our world; it is the scaffolding that makes the hero project possible. Becker argues 
that transference allows one to find meaning for one’s life “through heroic self-expansion in the 
‘other’” (1973/1997, p. 157). Becker subtly differentiates between the sense of belonging and 
safety that is obtained from surrender to various transference paradigms (individual, cultural) and 
the platform it provides for making ourselves feel worthwhile through development of our 
individual hero project. In other words, Becker’s (1973/1997) conception of the hero system 
provides the individual, by means of “transference heroics” (p. 156), a sense of belonging that 
feeds the human need for connectedness and merger that simultaneously allows him to develop 
self-esteem and a sense of personal meaning in a safe environment. This “safe heroism” (p. 155) 
is just as life-affirming, according to Becker, as death-denying. Becker writes: “On the most 
elemental level the organism works actively against its own fragility by seeking to expand and 
perpetuate itself in living experience; instead of shrinking, it moves toward more life” 
(1973/1997, p. 21). 
 Expanding his discussion of transference to Eros, Becker explains that “the impulsion to 
stick out of nature and shine” (1973/1997, p. 153) is just as much a part of the human repertoire 
as the need to seek safety and control. This poses a problem because ‘sticking out of nature’ 
makes humans vulnerable and isolated, the very things we expend so much energy trying to 
evade. For Becker, the push and pull between safety and individuation is the primary 
preoccupation of human life. He concludes that, “how a person solves his natural yearnings for 
self-expansion and significance determines the quality of his life” (1973/1997, p. 156) and 
suggests that “to become conscious of what one is doing to earn his feeling of heroism is the 
main self-analytic problem of life” (1973/1997, p.6). The implications of this statement occupy 
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the rest of Becker’s thoughts in Denial of Death and invite us to think about the ways 
transference both fosters and inhibits human flourishing.   
 Clinically speaking, Becker accepts that transference is a distortion of reality, but 
understands it as a phenomenon necessary for living, one that reflects “the whole of the human 
condition” (p. 158). From this vantage point, he is less concerned with dismantling transference 
or resolving it as transforming it to meet the human need for creative living. The main problem 
of transference for Becker is not that it exists, but that it exists reflexively. However, as Becker 
(1973/1997) points out, such reflexive living is born of necessity: 
Most people play it safe: they choose the beyond of standard transference objects 
like parents, the boss, or the leader; they accept the cultural definition of heroism 
and try to be a “good provider” or a “solid” citizen. In this way they earn their 
species immortality as part of an agent of procreation, or a collective or cultural 
immorality as part of a social group of some kind. Most people live this way, and 
I am hardly implying that there is anything false or unheroic about the standard 
cultural solution to the problems of men. It represents both the truth and tragedy 
of man’s condition: the problem of the consecration of one’s life, the meaning of 
it, the natural surrender to something larger—these driving needs that inevitably 
are resolved by what is nearest at hand. (p. 170) 
 What I find most compelling about Becker’s treatment of this issue is his compassion for 
the human condition. Becker humanizes the struggle for psychic equanimity in the face of 
existential terror by calling our attention to “the sheer terror of individuation, of difference, of 
being alone, of losing support and delegated power” (1973/1997, p. 211) and reminding us that 
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even Jung and Freud, for all their genius and accomplishment, could faint buying tickets to 
Rome. 
Culture as a Defense against Existential Terror   
 Becker argues that self-esteem is essential for operating with a sense of security and 
comfort in the world, and that culture represents the primary vehicle by which self-esteem is 
constructed and maintained. Individual heroism, or causa sui, is the basic vehicle by which self-
esteem is acquired, self-esteem being an essential ingredient for operating with a sense of 
security and comfort in the world. The culture one belongs to maintains the standards and values 
that allow one’s individual causa sui project to have meaning, and so the individual and the 
cultural are deeply interwoven and reinforce one another. In the service of denying our animal 
nature and the inevitability of annihilation, the individual’s heroism project becomes the 
fundamental problem of life: 
It doesn’t matter whether the cultural hero-system is frankly magical, religious, 
and primitive or secular, scientific, and civilized. It is still a mythical hero-system 
in which people serve to earn a feeling of primary value, of cosmic specialness, of 
ultimate usefulness to creation, of unshakable meaning. They earn this feeling by 
carving out a place in nature, by building an edifice that reflects human value: a 
temple, a cathedral, a totem pole, a skyscraper, a family that spans three 
generations. The hope and belief is that the things than man creates in society are 
of lasting worth and meaning, that they outlive or outshine death and decay, that 
man and his products count. (Becker, 1973/1997, p. 5) 
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 Here Becker draws our attention to the power of symbols as a means of defending against 
mortality and the function of society as a stage upon which the multiplicity of roles that make up 
an individual’s hero system are played out. 
 Some remarks on Yalom and Becker. I would like to pause briefly to consider some 
elements of Yalom’s and Becker’s work before proceeding further. Contemporary readers of 
both will find several aspects of their theory outdated or problematic and I wish to add some 
context to my use of their theories before proceeding further. This will allow us to extract what is 
central to their work and relevant to our discussion as well as making a case for why their ideas 
occupy a position of retired interest in the field some fifty years later. 
 Existential concerns in early development. Yalom and Becker claim that young children 
are aware of death from a young age, albeit in disguised form. Both articulate a developmental 
trajectory by way of explanation, Becker’s being much more detailed and nuanced than Yalom’s; 
however, neither can offer concrete proof for their claims. The truth is that we simply do not 
know the degree to which pre-verbal children have awareness, whether conscious or 
unconscious, of death and/or fears of annihilation that stem from awareness of their physicality. 
While Yalom’s defensive paradigms of the Ultimate Rescuer and Personal Specialness are in 
keeping with psychoanalytic notions of transference and narcissism, there is little evidence to 
affirm their uniqueness to existential concerns beyond an individual’s interpretation of psychic 
events.  
 Similarly, Becker’s notion of narcissistic withdrawal in early infancy may strike 
contemporary readers as dated at best, and inaccurate in light of contemporary infant research. 
Becker asserts that the infant’s lack of differentiation from his environment, specifically the body 
and care giving function of the mother or primary caregiver, constitutes his first strategy for 
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managing the terror associated with the dependency and helplessness of early infancy. This 
assertion, widespread in early psychoanalytic literature, was challenged in the 1980s and 90s by 
infant research which demonstrated infants’ innate capacities for interpersonal involvement from 
the beginning of life (see Morgan, 1997 for review). Becker wrote in the 1970s and was unable 
to profit from these advances in cognitive developmental psychology. To correct for this, I have 
incorporated Bass’ work on disavowal to highlight the importance of the emotional resonance 
that infantile helplessness has on the individual (that motivates the repression of such 
awareness). While infants are capable of more differentiation than Becker could have known, 
many psychoanalytic thinkers still consider the vulnerability of infancy to have an indelible 
impact on psychic development.  
 Yalom – existential ideas to what aim? Something that is bound to cross the reader’s 
mind is the question: What is the potential clinical benefit of viewing early development in terms 
of existential concerns? First, I would like to clearly state that this dissertation is not advocating 
for an existential psychotherapy in the sense that perhaps Yalom hoped his work would inspire. 
While I find the notion of existential concerns compelling, indeed a bedrock of the human 
experience, the potential for integration of these ideas into clinical work is far less determined. 
Most would agree that a great disservice is done to patients when their therapist’s philosophical 
ideas (which are different in this case from theoretical ideas that drive clinical intervention) 
frame the clinical encounter. While we may wonder about the degree to which an individual is 
struggling with any of the existential concerns mentioned above, it is important to keep in mind 
the fact that one rarely, or at least infrequently, engages with these “core” problems directly (a 
point that Yalom himself acknowledges). In fact, addressing existential concerns directly could 
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be quite detrimental to the treatment and the patient’s stability; other times, it could potentially 
enrich the treatment, if led by the patient’s inquiry.  
 Part of the problem with the notion of an existential therapy as its own model of 
treatment is that we would have a hard time distinguishing it from all-around sensitive and 
thoughtful psychotherapy (Phillips, 2015), which is another likely factor in its failure to draw 
increased interest in recent decades. Existential psychotherapy has not joined the ranks of 
evidence-based modalities for delivering treatment to specified clinical populations. Whether it 
would even be possible (or desirable) to do so is a separate question beyond the scope of this 
project.  
 Becker – patriarchal notions of the female body and development. A second critique of 
Becker’s work is the representation of the female body in early development. His depiction of 
the female body as a passive vessel juxtaposed with the (phallic) male figure as the primary 
carrier of symbolic identity, while consistent with classical theories of psychoanalysis, are 
problematic. Becker suggests that the child responds with horror to recognition of his mother’s 
“biological dependence” (demonstrated by menstruation, pregnancy, and breastfeeding), which 
coincides with the anal stage of development when the child begins to comprehend his own 
corporality, triggering awareness of his own frailty and finitude beyond his emotional 
dependence upon the mother. Again, we simply have no evidence for this. Further, given that 
Becker wrote in the 1960s and 70s when the feminist critique of classical psychoanalysis was 
already established, it is curious that Becker does nothing to incorporate a more nuanced view of 
sexual difference and gender in his theory.  
 The value of an existential perspective. That being said, I do not want to throw the baby 
out with the bathwater. I have chosen to utilize Yalom’s and Becker’s work because both make 
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excellent arguments for the pervasive pressure of existential terror on the individual and society. 
This is the basis of my argument. For culture to be required to serve such an important defensive 
function, existential terror must be intrinsic to the human experience that requires significant 
effort to contain. My focus is on the defensive function of culture against existential terror, and 
analyzing the effects on individuals and society living at a time in which the efficacy of the 
cultural defense has been weakened.  
 Diminution in stature. Beyond some of the obvious criticisms of Yalom’s and Becker’s 
work, I believe that their ideas have diminished in importance over time for two reasons – First, 
because the generations most impacted by Becker’s work were still processing the events of the 
Second World War. This is the time in which theories of cultural and social change, especially 
Critical Theory, were at the height of their influence (and clearly influenced Becker). The project 
of that time was to address the cultural paradigm shift and the social changes that followed.  
 Since that time, we have, at least in a cursory way, acknowledged the broad change in 
Western society. More recently, the rapid changes in society brought on by advancing 
technology and a globalized economy have created other concerns that may seem more pressing. 
Contemporary intellectuals and popular culture alike are immersed in the problem of modernity’s 
rapid pace of change and its inherent reflexivity – the chronic revision of information that makes 
certainty impossible. What I hope to address is the way in which existential terror, which was 
present before this change has 1) become heightened because of the diminished capacity of 
modern culture to manage it, and 2) how this fact has been largely overlooked by psychoanalysis 
and culture more broadly. I will argue that the latter problem has arisen because it must – 
because full contact with existential terror is impossible for any individual, let alone culture.  
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 This leads to the second reason why, I believe, the ideas of existential thinkers such as 
Becker and Yalom have diminished in importance over time. Becker urges his readers to 
consider how they go about earning a sense of safety in the world, that this is the “analytic 
project” of one’s life. If acknowledging one’s ultimate vulnerabilities, physical and symbolic, is 
indeed as frightening as Becker contends, then it would make sense that people shy away from a 
theory that does not have much to offer in the way of a cure for the crippling recognition of our 
finitude. Traditional culture contained existential anxiety with a robust belief system and model 
for social relations. Contemporary culture has failed to offer an adequate sense of distance from 
existential concerns, and so a theory that does not allay our anxiety in any meaningful way, but 
rather highlights it, is unlikely to gain favor with the majority. Theories that propose the option 
for transformation by way of explanation are more likely to garner favor in a world dominated by 
a kind of manic or hypomanic frenzy of activity meant to drive humanity forward, perhaps trying 
to outrun the terror.  
Empirical Support for Existential Terror 
 Empirical support for the impact of existential concerns on human attitudes and behaviors 
is found in the research of Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & 
Solomon, 1986). TMT operationalized the construct of existential terror through studies that 
investigate the outcome of mortality salience induction on a wide range of attitudes and 
behaviors. The literature utilizing this methodology is robust with over 300 experiments 
conducted (586 publications) in 12 countries and includes investigation into a wide range of 
topics including: prejudice, intergroup conflict and political attitudes (Greenberg, Landau, 
Kosloff, Soenke, & Solomon, 2016; see Greenberg & Kosloff, 2008, for a review); gender 
(Passalacqua, 2016); integrative psychotherapy (Major, Whelton, & Duff, 2016; Lewis, 2014); 
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awareness of death, anxiety and psychological wellbeing (Juhl & Routledge, 2016); post-
traumatic stress disorder (Abdollahi, Pyszczynski, Maxfield, & Luszczynska, 2012; Chatard, 
Pyszczynski, Arndt, Selimbegovic, Konan, & Van der Linded, 2012; Kesebir, Luszczynska, 
Pyszczynski, & Benight, 2011); personality (Landau, Sullivan, & King, 2010); mindfulness 
(Kashdan, Afram, Brown, Birnbeck, & Drvashanov, 2011), the psychological function of art 
(Landau, Sullivan, & Solomon, 2010), the appeal of fame (Greenberg, Kosloff, Solomon, Cohen, 
& Landau, 2010); creativity (Routledge & Arndt, 2009); and a growing number of meta-analyses 
(Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013; Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Martens, Burke, Schimel, 
& Faucher, 2011). TMT began with a small team of social psychologists in the early 1990s and 
has captured the attention of researchers across the globe in countries such as Austria, Canada, 
Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The readiness with 
which TMT can be utilized to inquire into the ever-changing social landscape has allowed the 
theory and research model to remain relevant and expanded its reach over the past 25 years.  
 Terror Management Theory. TMT was developed by social psychologists, Jeff 
Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski, and Sheldon Solomon to explore two general hypotheses about the 
process of defense in response to awareness of death: the first was an exploration into the 
ubiquitous need for self-esteem and the second a question about the prominence of cultural 
worldviews and the tendency for individuals to vehemently uphold their worldview when 
confronted with a competing version (each of these hypotheses is discussed in further detail 
below). Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon were deeply influenced by the work of Ernest 
Becker and incorporated ideas from a variety of existential and psychoanalytic thinkers including 
Kierkegaard, Freud, Otto Rank, Yalom, Norman O. Brown and Robert Jay Lifton. TMT rests on 
a central tenet of existential thinking, namely, that self-awareness enables human beings to 
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contemplate their mortality and that awareness of one’s vulnerability in the face of death has the 
potential to generate profound terror. TMT understands the potential for such terror to be, as 
Yalom (1980) suggests, lurking under the surface at every moment, and closely tied to the deep 
discomfort aroused in us by our animal nature. TMT argues that cultural worldviews function as 
a buffer against this terror (i.e., contribute to the denial of death) by providing meaning and self-
esteem to those who uphold its beliefs and modes of conduct.  
 Review of study findings. While the focus of the discussion below will be on explaining 
the rational for TMT research and describing how studies were able to measure effect size of 
their target variables, it should be noted that the body of TMT research represents a significant 
and ongoing area of inquiry within social psychology. The following is a brief review of the 
literature, as reported by Greenberg, Koole and Pyszczynski (2004), to represent the scope of 
TMT research. 
 Two hypotheses. As described above, the authors of TMT proposed two general 
hypotheses to test their theoretical model. The first is broadly referred to as the “self-esteem as 
anxiety buffer hypothesis” which sought to test the effect of raising self-esteem on levels of 
anxiety following exposure to death-related stimuli. The second “mortality salience hypothesis” 
was developed to test the idea that cultural worldviews function as a defense against death 
awareness. In all studies, individuals were asked to contemplate their own death (i.e., mortality 
salience) before completing a condition related to the hypothesis under evaluation.   
 Self-esteem. Regarding the self-esteem hypothesis, one study demonstrated that when 
investigators raised a participant’s self-esteem artificially by providing fabricated data from an 
IQ or personality test prior to viewing videos of an autopsy and an electrocution, the physical 
arousal (measured by skin conductance) of the participants was lower than the control group 
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(Greenberg et al.,1992a). A second study showed that participants who similarly received an 
artificial self-esteem boost prior to the prime were less likely than the control group to rate 
themselves as more or less emotional when informed by the investigators that a particular 
tendency is associated with longevity (Greenberg et al., 1993). In these studies, self-esteem was 
found to moderate the effects of anxiety after mortality salience induction, suggesting that self-
esteem acts as a barrier between the individual and death awareness. 
 Mortality salience. TMT researchers evaluated the second hypothesis utilizing the 
following approach: individuals were asked to participate in a study about personality attributes 
and interpersonal judgments. Following administration of basic personality assessments, those in 
the mortality salience condition were asked to respond in writing to questions about how the 
thought of their own death would make them feel, and what they imagined will happen to them 
as they die and when they are dead. Participants in the control groups were asked to write about 
their experience with benign activities such as watching television or eating. Following this 
exercise, all participants were asked to rate target individuals who upheld or violated valued 
aspects of their worldviews (e.g., religious affiliation, pro-American bias).  
 Significant mortality salience effects on attitude were found across numerous studies 
whereby conscious contemplation of one’s mortality resulted in the affirmation of a worldview 
as measured by positive attitudes regarding those who affirm such views and negative attitudes 
for those who do not (Mikuliner & Florian, 1997; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, 
& Lyon, 1989). Behavior effects of mortality salience were also found. For example, Greenberg, 
Simon, Porteus, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1995c) found that participants asked to use items of 
symbolic importance (e.g., American flag, crucifix) to do menial tasks following mortality 
salience induction performed the tasks slower and felt more uncomfortable than the control 
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group. Mortality salience was also shown to positively influence charitable giving, especially in 
cases of in-group affiliation (Jonas, Greenberg, & Frey, 2003).  
 A recent meta-analysis conducted in 2010 by Burke, Martens, and Faucher reports a 
moderate effect size (r = .35) for mortality salience manipulations across 164 empirical studies 
that utilized 277 experiments.  Analyses of these findings provide convergent validity for the 
TMT data as the reported effects were consistent across a variety of populations and cultures and 
a range of methods for inducing mortality salience. Further, discriminant validity was established 
by showing how varying the operationalization of mortality salience did not alter the findings 
(i.e., participants could be asked directly about death, shown graphic footage of a car accident) 
and that the same effects were not found when participants were asked to think about other 
potentially distressing situations or topics that were not related to death, such as public speaking, 
a visit to the dentist, physical pain, etc. 
 Relationship between self-esteem and mortality salience. With support for the idea that 
self-esteem and cultural worldviews provide a defensive function in relation to death awareness,  
TMT researchers sought to better understand the relationship between self-esteem and mortality 
salience. Seven such relationships were shown to be significant (the following is taken directly 
from Greenberg, Koole, & Pyszczynski, 2004): 
1. If self-esteem serves to buffer anxiety, then worldview defense following mortality 
salience should be significantly reduced (or eliminated) (Harmon-Jones, Simon, 
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & McGreggor, 1997; Arndt & Greenberg, 1999). 
2. Self-esteem-related psychological resources, such as hardiness (Florian, Mikulincer, 
& Hirschberger, 2001) and secure attachment styles (Mikulincer, Florian, & 
Hirschberger, 2003) reduce the effects of mortality salience, and deficits in such 
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resources, such as neuroticism (Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, McCoy, Greenberg, & 
Solomon, 1999) and depression (Simon, Greenberg, Harmon-Jones, & Solomon, 
1996) increase mortality salience effects. 
3. Mortality salience induction increases efforts to procure self-esteem (Greenberg, 
Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992b) 
4. Mortality salience increases or decreases identification with entities that impinge 
positively or negatively upon self-esteem (Goldenberg, McCoy, Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000). 
5. Mortality salience leads people to alter their levels of identification with their own 
ingroups (gender, ethnic, and school affiliation) to protect and enhance self-esteem 
(Arndt, Greenberg, & Cook, 2002; Dechesne, Greenberg, Arndt, & Schimel, 2000; 
Dechesne, Jassen, & van Knippenberg, 2000). 
6. Mortality salience influenced behavior likely to bolster self-esteem: mortality salience 
increased participants’ desire to amass wealth and possessions (Kasser & Sheldon, 
2000); increased generosity toward favorite charities (Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & 
Pyszczynski, 2002); increased fitness intentions for individuals who valued personal 
fitness (Arndt, Schimel, & Goldenberg, 2003). 
7. Mortality salience leads to self-esteem bolstering in the form of a self-serving bias. 
Specifically, Mikulincer and Florian (2002) found that mortality salience increased 
the self-serving attributional bias and Dechesne et al. (2003) showed that mortality 
salience leads to increased belief in the validity of positive information about the self, 
whether it came from horoscopes or personality tests.  
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 Dual defense model. With sufficient data to support their initial hypotheses, TMT 
researchers set out to understand the cognitive processes at work when individuals are 
confronted with reminders of their mortality. Specifically, they were interested in the effect of 
unconscious primes regarding death on the effectiveness of self-esteem and cultural worldviews 
as anxiety buffering constructs. Pyszczynski, Greenberg and Solomon (1999) suggested a dual-
defense model whereby different defensive processes are activated depending on the nature of 
the perceived threat (i.e., conscious vs. unconscious, situation-specific vs. universal). They 
hypothesized that in the case of conscious mortality salience induction, proximal defenses would 
be activated to buffer anxiety related to immediate and conscious death awareness whereas distal 
defenses would be utilized in the case of subtle or subliminal primes. 
 Proximal defenses were conceptualized as vulnerability-denying defensive distortions 
that are activated in response to an immediate threat that is within conscious awareness. 
Individuals were found to engage in three such modes of defense following conscious mortality 
salience induction: participants avoided activities that required self-focused attention such as 
looking in a mirror (Arndt, Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1998), suppressed 
thoughts related to death (Cook, Arndt, & Goldberg, 2003), and engaged in cognitive and 
motivational rationalization that reduced the participant’s sense of vulnerability (i.e., convincing 
oneself that what happens to others will not happen to them, at least not in the foreseeable future) 
(Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000).   
 Distal defenses address the unconscious awareness of death by promoting behavior and 
beliefs that reinforce symbolic modes of death-transcendence, namely, reinforcements of self-
esteem and/or exaggerated affirmation of cultural worldviews or rejection of different views. In 
support of the dual-defense model, Greenberg et al. (2000) found that following mortality 
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salience induction, (1) participants exhibited proximal defenses and not distal defenses, and (2) 
after a delay, distal defenses were detected but proximal defenses were not. Further support for 
this model was provided by a study conducted by Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & 
Breus (1994) in which the cultural worldview (distal) defense was not detected when participants 
were made to keep thoughts of death in conscious awareness following mortality salience 
induction. Further, when mortality salience was initiated using subliminal stimuli of death-
related content, the distal defense was immediately detected (i.e., no delay was required) 
(Dechesne, Jassen, & van Knippenberg, 2000). Taken together, the TMT literature demonstrates 
strong support for the notion that unconscious awareness of death encourages adoption of 
symbolic beliefs and behavior.   
Existential Terror: A Definition 
 In this first chapter, we have traversed much ground to arrive at an understanding of the 
ways in which basic human vulnerabilities influence lived experience. The vulnerabilities we 
have defined include the awareness of our mortality; the inevitability of freedom and our 
responsibility for creating meaning; our separateness from others that cannot be bridged; and the 
knowledge that absolute or universal systems of meaning do not exist. In short, we have come to 
understand that the nature of these vulnerabilities is fixed, there is no solution. When confronted 
with the fact that our attempts to overcome these deeply scary and painful vulnerabilities are 
futile we are liable to feel terror. Existential terror, then, is defined as the awareness—conscious 
or unconscious—of the unsolvable nature of our basic human vulnerabilities and the futility of 
our efforts to counteract them.  
 We have seen how the affective resonance of helplessness in the first months and years of 
life that arises out of extreme and prolonged dependence, informs the developmental path that 
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leads to the use of transference as a psychological mechanism to defend against existential terror. 
Our psyche protects us from this terror by using anxiety as a signal that activates defenses that 
prevent such thoughts from reaching conscious awareness. Existential thinkers, including Yalom 
and Becker, modify Freud’s (1926/1959) theory of anxiety and repression from its focus on 
instinctual drives that could lead to object loss (and castration) to the child’s nascent awareness 
of his biological nature and the omnipresent nature of death more directly. In Becker’s model, 
the infant’s initial solution to this terror can be seen in the denial of cognitive and emotional 
recognition of separateness that helps the infant’s immature ego cope with the reality of its 
helplessness and dependence. We have refined this model by incorporating Bass’ concept of 
disavowal, which helps account for the infant’s capacity to differentiate (as demonstrated by 
infant research), but maintains the affective consequence of the infant’s need to feel merged with 
his primary caregiver. Ultimately, as development progresses the child begins to develop a 
symbolic identity that is based on transference to one’s parents and subsequent identification 
with their authority through culture. Yalom’s ‘ultimate rescuer’ and ‘belief in personal 
specialness’ paradigms of defense against death awareness share similar qualities in that the 
individual incorporates aspects of early relationships into his or her personality – either merged 
with the power of the parents, as in the case of the ultimate rescuer model - or narcissistically 
withdrawn from the environment (belief in personal specialness) to deny the inevitability of 
nature and its consequences. 
 As the theory and empirical research we have reviewed show, there are many ways to 
deny the vulnerabilities associated with existential terror and some are more effective than 
others. Among the most effective is the use of cultural worldviews. Cultural worldviews are 
essentially symbolic beliefs and behaviors that combat existential terror by making us feel 
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grounded in a world that is populated by other likeminded individuals. This allows us to feel 
safe, makes the behavior of others perceptible, and gives us the sense that we are part of 
something that will be around long after we are gone.  
Chapter Two: Cultural Shift to Modernity Evokes Crisis of Authority   
 In the previous chapter, we explored how the denial of human vulnerability as 
exemplified by the ubiquitous fear of death is a pervasive element of the human condition. We 
examined the etiology of the cultural worldview as a defense against existential terror through 
examination of Becker’s (1973) theory that individuals cultivate the authority of caregivers to 
repress existential anxiety and craft a symbolic identity that is mediated by culture. Experimental 
Existential Psychology (EEP) further elaborated the cognitive process by which individuals use 
cultural worldviews to reinforce self-esteem, provide meaning, and ultimately defend against the 
anxiety that arises in response to conscious and unconscious awareness of death.  
 Our aim in the current chapter is to understand how existential terror operates at the level 
of culture. The argument I will make is that the shift from pre-modern or traditional culture to 
modernity represents a period of dramatic cultural upheaval in which the technological, 
economic, social and psychological changes that characterize modernity gradually eroded the 
effectiveness of religion (i.e., Christianity) as the incumbent cultural worldview defense against 
existential terror in the West.  
 Our first goal is to identify the psychological changes that occurred during this transition 
and understand why a new cultural paradigm of defense against existential terror became 
necessary. We shall see in Freud’s (1927) The Future of an Illusion how religion provided an 
elegant solution to the terror of nature in pre-modern culture because it recreated the infantile 
situation of dependency vis-à-vis the caregiver that could be readily projected onto a localized 
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figure of authority in the form of a deity and its affiliate clergy. Next, Rieff (1966/2006) 
describes how culture can only remain therapeutic (i.e., provide an effective buffer against 
existential terror) insofar as its symbols provide a compelling sense of self that can be 
maintained through adherence to a cohesive social identity. In the shift from traditional (i.e., 
religious) culture to modernity, individual subjectivity became an increasingly important facet of 
a rapidly changing world that required a new set of symbols to craft a meaningful social identity 
as the tradition of communal life began to fade. Then, Giddens (1990, 1991) explains how 
modernity represents a radical departure from traditional culture, and how the basis for 
ontological security has been transformed as a result of modernity’s increasing reflexivity. 
Strenger (2004, 2011, 2013) brings our discussion into the realm of contemporary culture and 
explores how the cultural emphasis on subjectivity – rather than freeing the individual and 
allowing them to live a life of authentic self-expression, has the potential to enslave the 
individual to a pursuit of “limitlessness” that breeds painful feelings of inadequacy that often 
results in isolation from others and a general sense that one’s life, however successful in 
objective terms, still lacks significance. Finally, the work of Sass (1992) will show how the 
reflexivity of the modern era has impacted the individual and culture through his analysis of the 
affinities between schizophrenia and modernism.  
Freud: The Psychological Origins of Religion 
 From a perspective that privileges the fear of death and its attendant existential concerns 
as a basic motivating force in human behavior, the value in reviewing Freud’s interpretation of 
religion lies not only in his explanation of how religious belief functions for individuals and 
society, but in showing how deeply embedded the human need for authority is as a means of 
maintaining psychological equilibrium in the face of human vulnerability. 
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 In Future of an Illusion, Freud (1927) takes up the issue of infantile helplessness and its 
role in organizing the psyche and promoting communal forms of social organization. 
Specifically, he emphasizes the terror of nature, calling it the raison d’être of civilization and the 
underlying factor in the ubiquitous human need for authority (and by extension, religion): 
There are the elements, which seem to mock at all human control: the earth, 
which quakes and is torn apart and buries all human life and its works; water, 
which deluges and drowns everything in a turmoil; storms, which blow everything 
before them; there are diseases, which we have only recently recognized as 
attacks by other organisms; and finally there is the painful riddle of death, against 
which no medicine has yet been found, nor probably will be. With these forces 
nature rises up against us, majestic, cruel and inexorable; she brings to our mind 
once more our weakness and helplessness, which we thought to escape through 
the work of civilization. (Freud, 1927, pp. 15-16) 
 Freud goes on to elaborate on the psychological underpinnings of religion, suggesting 
that religious belief provides relief from an inescapable helplessness that has, at its root, an 
infantile prototype. Expanding on his explanation of infantile longing for the father initially put 
forth in Totem and Taboo (1912-13), Freud claims that the adult utilizes the same psychological 
mechanism to gain a sense of agency with respect to nature by utilizing the mechanism of 
transference to mitigate its helplessness:  
When the growing individual finds that he is destined to remain a child forever, 
that he can never do without protection against strange superior powers, he lends 
those powers the features belonging to the figure of his father; he creates for 
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himself the gods whom he dreads, whom he seeks to propitiate, and whom he 
nevertheless entrusts with his own protection (1927, p. 24). 
 Just as the helpless infant transforms his father into an authority figure whose power is 
absolute, the adult creates god in the image of the father, thereby reproducing an infantile 
illusion of protection. The construction of god becomes necessary when the father’s authority 
eventually wanes due to developmental processes of individuation and recognition of his 
fallibility (i.e., he is only human). Unlike the human father, who is personally flawed and subject 
to physical decay, the authority of a celestial god endures and provides a timeless stability to 
which the grown child can faithfully submit. In exchange for this faith and its accompanying 
prohibitions: 
The gods retain their threefold task: they must exorcize the terrors of nature, they 
must reconcile men to the cruelty of Fate, particularly as it is shown in death, and 
they must compensate them for the sufferings and privations which a civilized life 
in common has imposed on them (Freud, 1927, p. 18). 
Of course, the problem with this type of authority as described by Freud is that it is 
“nostalgically and oppressively patriarchal” (Edmundson, 2007, p. 150). In developing 
psychoanalysis, Freud aimed to free individuals from the need to submit to such rigid authority 
by deconstructing absolute systems of authority in the sphere of inner life. However, he was 
realistic about his chances for success at the level of culture, noting it would be a “hopeless” 
cause to dismantle religion by force, “and even if this did succeed it with some it would be 
cruelty” (Freud, 1927, p. 49). Freud likens religion to a narcotic or intoxicant that could not be 
taken away unless a substitute of equal potency was delivered in its place. For Freud, the 
development of one’s intellect and the scientific pursuit of knowledge (among other forms of 
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sublimation) provided a superior alternative to the oppressive nature of religious authority. While 
he admits that science and the intellect also carry the risk of becoming an illusion, he suggests 
that religion is ultimately a suboptimal solution to the problem of authority because it is 
“incapable of correction” (1927, p. 53) and verges on the delusional, whereas psychoanalysis, as 
a proxy for science, is open to revision and correction. Freud writes: 
Observe the difference between your attitude to illusions and mine. You have to 
defend the religious illusion with all your might. If it becomes discredited—and 
indeed the threat to it is great enough—then your world collapses. There is 
nothing left for you but to despair of everything, of civilization and the future of 
mankind. From that bondage I am, we are, free. Since we are prepared to 
renounce a good part of our infantile wishes, we can bear it if a few of our 
expectations turn out to be illusions. (1927, p. 54) 
Finally, it is worth noting that despite Freud’s ability to recognize helplessness and 
vulnerability as a prime motivating force within the psyche and social organization, one that 
preceded and undoubtedly informed the work of Becker and Yalom, he remains decidedly 
focused on the coercive element of culture that protects society from the lapses of instinctual 
renunciation by individual members. He suggests that civilization, or culture, has two 
interdependent trends:  
It includes on the one hand all the knowledge and capacity that men have acquired 
in order to control the forces of nature and extract its wealth for the satisfaction of 
human needs, and, on the other hand, all the regulations necessary in order to 
adjust the relations of men to one another and especially the distribution of the 
available wealth (Freud, 1927, p. 6). 
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 By 1930, when he published Civilization and its Discontents, Freud’s writing about 
civilization emphasized this latter trend; his primary aim was to explain the origin of aggression 
from a psychoanalytic perspective vis-à-vis his theory of the death instinct. To his view, culture 
serves as a protective shield not against existential terror but against the innate passions of 
humankind, of which aggression was the most problematic and required extensive self-awareness 
to master. What Freud correctly identified was the shift in the perceived locus of these passions. 
With the development of modern culture, sexual passions and the individual’s capacity for 
destruction took on a distinctly personal and intimate nature. He recognized, as we will see in the 
following section, that religion no longer provided adequate containment of these human 
instincts, as he saw them, and offered an alternative path to self-understanding through 
psychoanalysis. 
Cultural Change 
 A cultural preoccupation with the distinctly personal experience of human existence and 
symbols of the ‘self’ emerged as incumbent symbols of religious authority began to fade in the 
early modern period. The void created by the decline of religious authority prompted adaptation 
of new solutions to buttress a sense of safety in the world.  
 Philip Rieff wrote two prominent books on the cultural significance of psychoanalysis in 
Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (1959/1979) and The Triumph of the Therapeutic (1966/2006). 
In the latter, Rieff articulates a theory of culture as “therapeutic” that shares some fundamental 
points of view with Becker, though each develop their ideas to different ends. If Becker shows us 
why and how culture functions as a defense against existential terror from the perspective of the 
individual, Rieff explains the social function of culture and describes how and why cultural 
paradigms shift over time. Rieff—who wrote earlier than Becker—anticipated a central tenet of 
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Becker’s thinking when he describes culture as a platform for expansion of the self: “another 
name for a design of motives directing the self outward, toward those communal purposes in 
which alone the self can be realized” (Rieff, 1966/2006, p. 3). Although Rieff (1966/2006) 
acknowledges the defensive function of culture as a vehicle for “the control of panic and the 
filling up of emptiness” (p. 3) inherent in the human condition, his treatment of this issue ends 
with his comment that culture is a response to “the religious question: How are we to be 
consoled for the misery of living?” (p. 23). Rieff’s somewhat pithy engagement with the etiology 
of culture seems less like disregard than his taking it for granted, preferring to focus on the ways 
of coping with these “facts” rather than dwelling on their origin.  
 Culture as therapeutic. The function of culture, according to Rieff, is twofold. It exists 
first and foremost as a system of symbols, an implicit code of morals and communal goals that 
govern behavior, making the world of human relations mutually comprehensible and organized 
that is reflected in the institutions that represent its highest values (e.g., the church, the 
courtroom). Second, it must provide some relief from these controls by the way of sanctioned 
releases that reduce the pressure placed on individuals for conforming to prescribed value 
systems. Ideally, while in stasis, culture maintains an optimal tension between the requirements 
of regulation and reprieve that the majority of its members find acceptable. Culture, through its 
symbolic system of controls and remissions provides safety – and this security and comfort, in 
Rieff’s view, is inherently therapeutic. Culture changes when its symbols are no longer 
therapeutic for a growing number of its constituents, when personal safety and a compelling 
sense of self cannot be maintained through adherence to the collective identity. A similar idea is 
evident in Becker’s work, specified to Becker’s view of the individual as struggling between the 
need for safety and freedom vis-à-vis the cultural hero project: 
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We enter symbolic relationships in order to get the security we need, in order to 
get relief from our anxieties, our aloneness and helplessness; but these 
relationships also bind us, they enslave us even further because they support the 
lie we have fashioned. So we strain against them in order to be more free. 
(1973/1997, p. 56) 
 For Rieff (1966/2006), in times of culture change, the remissions become more 
compelling than the controls: “As cultures change, so do the modal types of personality that are 
their bearers” (p.2). Rieff laid out four types or leitmotifs of cultural character that describe 
broad periods of history in Western civilization: political man, religious man, economic man, and 
contemporary psychological man. The “political man” of antiquity relinquished personal 
freedom to the state in exchange for order and justice; whereas “religious man” subjugated his 
sensuous desires for future rewards in heaven; “economic man” is described as a kind of 
prototype of psychological man associated with early modernity and the emergence of 
Enlightenment ideals.  
 From positive communities to negative community. Rieff argues that the “positive 
communities” of political man and religious man represent cultural paradigms whereby members 
were guaranteed salvation (safety) by subordinating personal desire for the benefit of the 
community. The therapeutic experience of positive communities, also termed “commitment 
therapies,” (p. 57) is transformative; the therapists of positive communities are the clergymen 
who prescribe morality and offer themselves as models for acceptable living: “The function of 
the classical therapist is to commit the patient to the symbol system of the community, as best he 
can and by whatever techniques are sanctioned (e.g., ritual, or dialectical, magical or rational)” 
(1966/2006, p, 57).  In contrast, “negative communities” do not promise salvation through 
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adherence to the collective good and thus the therapeutic experience is not transformative. 
According to Rieff (1966/2006), the psychoanalyst does not prescribe anything other than 
adherence to the “analytic attitude” (p. 23), which is accomplished through prolonged 
introspection and nonjudgmental exploration of the patient’s subjectivity: 
The assumption of the analytic therapy is that there is no positive community 
standing behind the therapist. The therapist, therefore, can be neither sacral nor 
exemplary, but is rather an analyst. The resolution of the transference relation 
circumscribes the modal relationships to which the patient may aspire in his 
extratherapeutic relations, lowering his erotic illusions to a level where he is less 
vulnerable to fixation and disappointment. In sociological terms, commitment 
therapies are authoritarian, whereas analytic therapies are anti-authoritarian. (p. 
64) 
 Rieff suggests that the analytic attitude was Freud’s gift to modern man; an alternative to 
the religious one, which had become defunct.  
 Psychological man. Rieff (1966/2006) argues that the changes in nineteenth-century 
Western culture necessitated a new therapeutic paradigm to suit the emerging individualism of 
modern society. When a cultural paradigm is on the edge of a tectonic shift, Rieff claims that 
adherence to the old paradigm becomes sickness-inducing. A fundamental mismatch in cultural 
controls and remissions became glaringly apparent during the eighteenth-and- nineteenth-
centuries when the economic surplus of an industrial and technical civilization in the West no 
longer required the communal structure of strictly positive communities (i.e., those which 
demand subordination of personal or idiosyncratic needs for the benefit of the community, in 
exchange for the promise of salvation or safety). Once the definitive authority of the Church and 
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its structure for living was called into question, an emergent psychological ‘man’ could not 
maintain the split between a projected Christ and Devil as it became increasingly evident that 
both resided in his own psyche. Freud’s true genius, per Rieff, was articulating this massive 
revolution of culture. Stephen Gardner (2006) summarizes the most salient aspects of Rieff’s 
conclusions regarding psychological man in a critical essay published alongside the fortieth-
anniversary edition of Rieff’s work: 
The central faith of psychological man, a man who has rejected all other faiths, is 
the belief in his own freedom. In a world predicated on radical equality, he is 
compelled to maintain his own individuality, his power to be the master of 
himself. The idea of “uniqueness” is a defense-mechanism of democratic man, a 
main prop of the cultural revolution of democracy. (Gardner, 2006, p. 242) 
 The consequence of this fundamental shift from a community-based mode of social life 
dominated by patriarchal power structures to a society which privileges individual subjectivity 
represents a major paradigm shift in Western culture.  
Modernity represents a crisis of authority  
 The sweeping paradigm change in Western culture described by Rieff is not just a phase 
or stop along an otherwise progressive line of cultural development; rather, it represents a radical 
departure from previous cultural models that rely on figurehead or patriarchal authorities to 
absorb the anxiety associated with existential terror. Modernity is the story of the gradual 
deconstruction of such localized authority in favor of diffuse systems of authority that are 
governed by ever-changing stores of knowledge that belong, in essence, to everyone and no one.  
 Unlike previous changes in the cultural paradigm described by Rieff in which the shift 
represented a transition from the surrender of one type of desire to another in exchange for 
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security (e.g., personal freedom for justice; sensuous desire for salvation)—mediated vis-à-vis 
relationship to a localized authority (e.g., political leaders, religious deities)—contemporary men 
and women must contend with a world that lacks such obvious exchanges and authority figures. 
In other words, existential anxiety in contemporary culture is not clearly defined – it has not yet 
become a concrete problem that can be managed through appeals to obvious forms of authority. 
This crisis of authority is perhaps the defining characteristic of modernity, something that 
continues to play out with tremendous geopolitical consequence as the increasingly globalized 
world must grapple with an intolerable sense of being stuck in a state of perpetual psychic limbo. 
 Modernity is a distinct and discontinuous cultural paradigm. Perhaps no 
contemporary scholar has written more extensively on modernity than Anthony Giddens, a 
renowned sociologist and prolific commentator on the development of modern social institutions. 
According to Giddens (1990, 1991), modernity does not reflect the continuous evolution of prior 
historical periods. He rejects the approach of social evolutionism, with its linear and unifying 
construction of history as a viable means for grasping the importance of this major cultural 
transformation: 
The changes occurring over the past three or four centuries—a tiny period of 
historical time—have been so dramatic and so comprehensive in their impact that 
we only get limited assistance from our knowledge of prior periods of transition 
in trying to interpret them (p. 5). 
 Instead, Giddens (1990) argues that the modern era represents a period of profound 
transformations from which a unique social order that is fundamentally discontinuous from pre-
modern culture has emerged. As a result, the conditions in which ontological security can be 
obtained and maintained have undergone radical transformation as well. Understanding this 
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aspect of the transition from pre-modern (traditional) to contemporary culture will be the focus 
of our inquiry in this section.  
 The discontinuities of modernity. To begin, we must develop a sense of what 
differentiates the social institutions of modernity from traditional forms of social order, and how 
this variation has been so impactful with respect to ontological security. Giddens (1990) defines 
the basic parameters of modernity as “modes of social life or organisation which emerged in 
Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or 
less worldwide in their influence” (p. 1). From here, Giddens highlights three discontinuities 
central to the distinct nature of modernity: the pace of change, the scope of change, and the 
nature of modern institutions. The pace of change refers to the extreme speed in which 
conditions change in the modern world, a velocity of change that was unknown and 
unimaginable in traditional culture. Second, the scope of change has become global, meaning 
that innovations in modes of transportation and communication have created a world that is 
interconnected, and, as a consequence, “waves of social transformation crash across virtually the 
whole of the earth’s surface” (Giddens, 1990, p. 6). Finally, Giddens suggests that the “intrinsic 
nature” of many of the institutions derived from the conditions of modernity—the political 
system of the nation-state, dependence upon inanimate power sources (e.g., nuclear energy, oil 
and gas), and the commodification of goods and services—are unique to this historical period 
(1990). These discontinuities are notable for their extensionality and intensionality – that is, the 
degree to which they promote their globalizing influence, and the way in which they modify the 
nature of daily life at the most basic levels. Above all, Giddens (1991) stresses the extreme 
“dynamism” of modernity, noting: 
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The modern world is a ‘runaway world’: not only is the pace of social change 
much faster than in any prior system, so also is its scope, and the profoundness 
with which it affects pre-existing social practices and modes of behavior (1991, p. 
16). 
 Understanding this runaway quality of the modern world is central to perceiving the 
fundamental shift which lies at the heart of the radical dislocation of authority and the struggle to 
attain ontological security in our time.  
 The dynamism of modernity. Giddens (1990) accounts for the dynamic quality of 
modernity in terms of three elements or influences: the separation of time and space, 
disembedding of social systems, and the reflexive ordering and reordering of social relations. 
The first, separation of time and space, refers to the displacement of time and space from 
“place.” In traditional culture, social activity was organized in the context of a localized place. 
With increased mobility and the invention of widely distributed mechanisms for keeping track of 
uniform measures of time (e.g., mechanical clock, calendar), time and space took on an 
increasingly standardized, and thus interchangeable or swappable, quality.  
 The second element of modernity’s dynamism, the disembedding of social institutions, is 
characterized by Giddens (1990) as “the ‘lifting out’ of social relations from local contexts of 
interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space” (p. 21). One no longer 
needs to personally deliver a message, or physically provide goods in exchange for delivery of 
other goods or services (i.e., barter). Much of what we do is accomplished by proxy, based on 
symbolic tokens, such as money, that infer a particular meaning that allows us to interact with 
our environment in a predictable yet completely impersonal way. The same goes for expert 
systems, such as the postal service (or the internet), which we rely upon to circulate messages on 
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our behalf. Money and the postal service are designed to work the same for everyone, in every 
context, and together, represent single elements of countless “abstract systems” that make the 
modern world go round.  
  Trust is critical to the working of these disembedding or “abstract” systems in a way that 
is distinctive of modern culture (Giddens, 1990). For example, the exchange between consumers 
and proprietors of goods and services relies on the trust each party has that the other side will 
reliably fulfill the obligation that the exchange of money represents (and trust in the legal system 
designed to enforce such obligations). Similarly, the use of transportation systems (e.g., rail, air) 
or seeking a medical consultation requires trust in the experts who operate, maintain, and 
interpret these specialized systems. Trust in the context of modernity is a special topic we will 
address at more length in the forthcoming section regarding ontological security.  
 Modernity’s reflexivity. The third, and most important element of modernity’s dynamism 
for our discussion, is its inherent reflexivity. Per Giddens, “modernity’s reflexivity refers to the 
susceptibility of most aspects of social activity, and material relations with nature, to chronic 
revision in the light of new information or knowledge” (1991, p.  20). This reflexive quality of 
modernity, the constant updating and upgrading of our knowledge base and social institutions is 
perhaps the most salient departure from pre-modern life. Let us consider this in greater detail: 
Social behavior in pre-modern culture was monitored in terms of the habits and rituals that had 
been handed down from generation to generation. The consistency of doing what had always 
been done, with minor revisions to accommodate gradual developments in culture, organized 
social activity and suffused it with meaning. With the advent of writing, the printing press and 
widespread literacy, knowledge became like time and space in the sense that it was displaced 
from the local context and could be examined in its own right. As a result, the legitimacy of ideas 
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and behavior could be ascertained vis-à-vis inquiry that was no longer tied to the authority of a 
tradition rooted in the past (i.e., it became objective), even if the habituating tendency of 
tradition has allowed its influence to linger. The modern world has therefore become 
increasingly preoccupied with “objectivity” while adopting a forward-looking stance with 
respect to the development and application of knowledge.  
 Consequences of reflexivity. The advantage inherent in this shift is the meaningful 
enhancement in the quality of human life that such reflexivity affords by mitigating nature’s 
hazards through manipulation of the material world. Unlike individuals living in pre-modern 
societies, advances in medicine, engineering, and many other fields have made us relatively 
impervious to the once unpredictable and unmanageable forces of nature (e.g., weather, disease, 
childbirth). The price of this reflexivity, however, is not inconsequential for it exposes the 
underlying uncertainty inherent in all forms of knowledge: 
What is characteristic of modernity is not an embracing of the new for its own 
sake, but the presumption of wholesale reflexivity—which of course includes 
reflection upon the nature of reflection itself.  
Probably we are only now, in the late twentieth century, beginning to realise in a 
full sense how deeply unsettling this outlook is. For when the claims of reason 
replaced those of tradition, they appeared to offer a sense of certitude greater than 
that provided by preexisting dogma. But this idea only appears persuasive so long 
as we do not see that the reflexivity of modernity actually subverts reason, at any 
rate where reason is understood as the gaining of certain knowledge. Modernity is 
constituted in and through reflexively applied knowledge, but the equation of 
knowledge with certitude has turned out to be misconceived. We are abroad in a 
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world which is thoroughly constituted through reflexively applied knowledge, but 
where at the same time we can never be sure than any given element of that 
knowledge will not be revised (Giddens, 1990, p. 39). 
 Succinctly put, the reflexivity of modernity underscores the reality that knowledge does 
not equate certitude. By shoring up security in the physical world, an undoubtedly beneficial 
achievement, we have nevertheless inherited another form of insecurity in the form of 
incertitude: Nothing can be taken for granted in a world in which everything is subject to 
revision. Existential thinkers realized this at a cognitive level far earlier than Western culture was 
able to assimilate this massive revelation in thought vis-à-vis incremental changes in lived 
experience.  
Conditions for ontological security undergo fundamental shift in transition to 
modernity. Giddens’ primary argument is that the discontinuities of the transition from pre-
modern or traditional culture to modernity have fundamentally altered the contexts of trust and 
risk that promote ontological security. Furthermore, the evolution of modern society from its 
traditional mores as they relate to social and familial ties to the rise of the individual and a focus 
on the importance of interpersonal relationships has radically altered the conditions in which 
modern men and women can achieve a sense of ontological security in contemporary society. 
 Environment of trust. As mentioned above, the overriding theme of trust in modernity, 
according to Giddens, is trust in abstract systems. The shift from trust based on localized 
relations of kinship ties and local community that predominated in pre-modern culture to one that 
emphasizes abstract systems and personal relations built on intimacy illustrates the extensionality 
and intensionality Giddens (1990) refers to in his initial description of modernity. Due to the 
increasingly global milieu of the modern world, the significance of ties to one’s locality and 
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place of origin (be it family of origin, nationality) lose their binding nature. While kinship ties 
and local community remain important with respect to the development of self-identity, they are 
no longer fixed aspects of one’s life trajectory.  
 Similarly, religion and tradition no longer structure social experience or the physical 
world through steadfast belief and time-honored ritual as they did in pre-modern culture. Instead, 
the reflexivity of human-generated knowledge and modern social institutions have created a 
world in which self-determination reigns as the defining method for creating a sense of security 
and reliability in relation to the social and physical world. This makes modern men and women 
perpetually future-oriented because the past no longer tells us anything definitive about the 
present or future; quite the opposite, focus on the future helps us feel secure because the 
inevitability of change is the only thing we can reliably anticipate. Because of this radical shift in 
trust, the environment of risk— the danger human beings must concern themselves with in 
relation to elements of trust—has also undergone significant change.  
 Environment of risk. In pre-modern culture, the primary danger to human beings 
involved nature – natural disasters and diseases that were often unpredictable and largely outside 
the realm of human containment or control. Modern men and women, on the other hand, enjoy 
relative security from these dangers. On the contrary, the greatest dangers faced in modernity are 
the direct result of human intervention, or the reflexivity of modernity itself. For example, the 
risk of human violence that existed in pre-modern culture was localized in the sense that violent 
outsiders (e.g., armies, invaders) aimed their aggression at specific territories or peoples; the 
propensity for violence in one territory might look quite different from that of another. 
Modernity, however, faces what Giddens (1990) calls “high-consequence risks” that are unique 
in the sense that they apply to all the earth’s inhabitants (i.e., are global in nature) and are the 
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direct result of human intervention (i.e., the result of reflexive knowledge). These risks include 
the threat of ecological disaster, nuclear warfare, the collapse of economic markets, and the rise 
of totalitarian “superstates,” to name a few. The global nature of these risks has created an 
environment of risk that bears an apocalyptic feel: “high modernity is apocalyptic, not because it 
is inevitably heading toward calamity, but because it introduces risks which previous generations 
have not had to face” (Giddens, 1991, p. 4).  
 As a result of this secularization of risk, religion no longer offers the same protection, or 
poses the same threat that it did in traditional culture. When the key dangers that face humankind 
are in fact man-made, the danger associated with a fall from grace loses its primacy as a major 
threat to ontological security. Considering this reversal, the threat of personal meaninglessness 
becomes a far more prominent concern in modernity. When religious beliefs and rituals no 
longer provide the bedrock of meaning for social life and confronting nature, a void becomes 
apparent, one that must be filled by continuous interpretation and renewal of the self. This is 
what Giddens (1990) terms the “reflexive project of the self.” 
 The insecurities Giddens describes engendered by modern reflexivity and the project of 
the self draw sharp lines of contrast between traditional and modern society. One domain in 
which the implications of these radical shifts can be readily seen is in the realm of interpersonal 
relationships, specifically the evolution of gender relations.  
 Environment of interpersonal relationships. In The Transformation of Intimacy, 
Giddens (1992) explains how the reflexivity of modern society, beginning in the eighteenth-
century, set in motion new patterns of relating between men and women that transformed 
personal relationships and social structure in contemporary culture. Over the course of the past 
several centuries, modern society has moved from its use of the surveillance of sexuality as a 
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means of maintaining gender-based power dynamics to one in which sexual autonomy and 
emotional intimacy became the basis for contingent relationships in which multiple permutations 
of sexuality can flourish.  
 The construction of female sexuality as a social control. With the second industrial 
revolution, women from lower classes were driven by economic necessity to join men in the 
workplace, while the bourgeois women of Victorian society were confined to the home and 
tasked with raising children (Zaretsky, 2004). In the context of this and other major economic 
and social developments, family size contracted and sexuality was freed from its historical 
connection to reproduction (Giddens, 1992). The discovery of “plastic sexuality” (Giddens, 
1992)—sex for the sake of pleasure—coincided with the increasing presence of women in the 
public domain and instigated the surveillance of female sexuality as a means of maintaining 
patriarchal structures of power in Western society. As a result, a woman’s sexual “purity” 
became her primary currency while men maintained the freedom to engage in episodic sexuality. 
This double standard was justified by the notion of biological essentialism and retained its 
influence so long as it remained unchallenged by women (Giddens, 1992).  
 Giddens (1992) claims that the simultaneous rise of romantic love as the primary driver 
of heterosexual coupling helped maintain the double standard of patriarchic authority even as it 
hastened its demise: “Romantic love presumes that a durable emotional tie can be established 
with the other on the basis of qualities intrinsic to that tie itself” (1992, p, 2, emphasis added). 
Although though the ideal of romantic love existed largely in fantasy, disseminated through 
romantic novels, Giddens interprets its robust presence during the nineteenth-century as a signal 
of hope regarding women’s desire to become active agents in the creation of self-identity vis-à-
vis the romantic relationship: 
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The women in modern romantic novels are mostly independent and spirited, and 
have consistently been portrayed in this way. The conquest motif in these stories 
is not like the male version of sexual conquest: the heroine meets and melts the 
heart of a man who is initially indifferent to and aloof from her, or openly hostile. 
The heroine thus actively produces love. Her love causes her to become loved in 
return, dissolves the indifference of the other and replaces antagonism with 
devotion. (1992, p. 46) 
 Per Giddens description, the woman’s agency is concentrated in her emotional prowess, 
she “captures the heart” (p. 46) in an active demonstration of her power in the realm of affective 
experience: “The heroine tames, softens and alters the seemingly intractable masculinity of her 
love object, making it possible for mutual affection to become the main guiding-line of their 
lives together” (p. 46). In this way, Giddens shows how women used deprivation as a source of 
generative power, developing strength in the realm of emotional life that was then utilized in the 
struggle for gender equality.  
 Autonomy reveals “problematic” male sexuality. Women’s power in the realm of 
emotional life translated into power in the public domain during the twentieth-century as the 
availability of contraception increased alongside a growing female workforce during the World 
Wars. The rise of economic and sexual autonomy eventually sought expression in the way 
women were no longer content to play strictly functional domestic roles. Instead, they sought 
enhanced emotional intimacy with their partners and the quality of the relationship (intimacy) 
began to gain prominence over marriage as an institution of social life. Giddens (1992) locates 
the advent of “confluent love” in this emancipation of women from the strictly domestic sphere 
of life. Confluent love is based on emotional equality; it “only develops to the degree to which 
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intimacy does, to the degree to which each partner is prepared to reveal concerns and needs to 
the other and do be vulnerable to that other” (p. 62). While this development was driven by the 
expansion of women into previously male-dominated domains of public life and the emotional 
competencies they had cultivated during their time in rigid domesticity, men were not as well 
prepared for the shift in gender relations: 
In Western culture at least, today is the first period in which men are finding 
themselves to be men, that is, as possessing a problematic ‘masculinity’. In 
previous times, men have assumed that their activities constituted ‘history’, 
whereas women existed almost out of time, doing the same as they had always 
done. (Giddens, 1992, p. 59, emphasis in original) 
 Giddens argues that while women were able to overcome the problematic nature of their 
sexuality, namely, its restriction, men are just starting to address the problematic nature of their 
sexuality, which lies in an ‘underdeveloped’ capacity for emotional intimacy. It is important to 
note the fact that Giddens is describing overarching transitions in culture that necessitate an 
overgeneralization with respect to individual experience and does not take into account theories 
of gender construction and identity that developed in tandem over the past 25 years.  
 Moving towards a “pure relationship.” Giddens (1992) argues that the appreciation of 
plastic sexuality in its episodic form, that is, a preoccupation with the body that represents 
creative expression of self-identity, is inherently subversive to the reign of male sexuality as the 
dominant position in society. Autonomous female sexuality devoid of stigma, and 
homosexuality, are examples of plastic sexuality that push against oppressive notions of 
“correct” sexual behavior and identity (Giddens, 1992). A second subversive element comes in 
the form of the “pure relationship,” which Giddens defines as:  
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A situation where a social relation is entered into for its own sake, for what can be 
derived by each person from a sustained association with another; and which is 
continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough 
satisfactions for each individual to stay within it. (1992, p. 58)  
 The pure relationship is the result of the transformation of intimacy that promotes 
emotional equality as well as sexual freedom. Although the pure relationship is far from 
representing the norm in contemporary culture (Jamieson, 1999), we see evidence of its 
flourishing in growing pockets of society. What’s more, and to Giddens’ (1992) main point, the 
development of the pure relationship demonstrates the reflexive nature of modern society in our 
cultural journey towards a freedom based on equality.  
 Although remnants of patriarchal society and the effort to control nature are still present 
in our social institutions, tremendous change has nonetheless come about as a result of the 
changes in personal relationships between men and women outlined by Giddens. At this point I 
would like to turn our attention to the modern preoccupation with the self and the accompanying 
sense of heightened anxiety and loneliness that are its inevitable companions.  
 Giddens notes that modern culture is not inherently more or less anxious than traditional 
culture; rather, the content and expression of anxieties have changed. A major challenge for the 
modern individual is the reflexive project of the self, that his or her own psyche requires constant 
attention in ways that were unnecessary or ritualistically accomplished in traditional culture. In 
conclusion, ontological security is no longer achieved, as in pre-modern culture, through 
participation in communal forms of life; rather, it depends upon development of a sense of self 
that is simultaneously stable and capable of adaptation to the inevitable changes in context that 
define our contemporary social world.  
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 Extreme reflexivity and the project of the self in contemporary society. Carlo 
Strenger, a Tel Aviv-based psychoanalyst and philosopher, has written extensively (2004, 2011, 
2013) about the influence of existential concerns on contemporary culture. Building on Becker’s 
work, Strenger (2011) argues in The Fear of Insignificance that the individual’s project of 
building self-esteem has become increasingly difficult in a culture that values the “illusion of 
omnipotence” (p. 2) above all else. Specifically, Strenger takes issue with the fallacy of 
limitlessness endorsed by contemporary society and our obsession with celebrity, which he sees 
as is a thinly-veiled projection of the fantasy that we can be loved simply for the sake of our 
being (as small children are loved by their parents). For Strenger (2011), freedom is not found in 
the absence of limits; rather, it is achieved through “active self-acceptance” (p. 89), which 
involves facing the failure inherent in human existence and grappling with the complexity of our 
individuality. In this vein, Strenger (2011) argues that contemporary culture’s focus on 
limitlessness breeds “permanent instability of self-esteem and doubt about the sense of leading a 
significant life” (p. 2) that has created a much more isolated individual who has difficulty coping 
with basic human vulnerability. 
 New Cosmopolitans. Strenger describes how globalization of the world economies and 
culture—vis-à-vis the revolution in communication technology—has created a new social and 
economic class of New Cosmopolitans (2013; Homo globalis, 2011) whose identities are defined 
by their standing in a global network of professionals, and who prioritize creative work and 
financial success over commitment to their national, ethnic or religious communities of origin 
(2013).  
 These individuals place a high value on their subjectivity and seek professional and 
personal outlets that give them the opportunity and freedom to create that which feels 
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intrinsically meaningful to the them: “The development of individuality was no longer toward a 
cosmic truth but toward authenticity and a connection with an inner truth to which the individual 
needed to be true to live a life truly worth living” (Strenger, 2011, p. 75). In addition to freedom 
and subjectivity, experimentation with the self is a quality highly prized by the New 
Cosmopolitan. Echoing Giddens’ (1992) discussion regarding plastic sexuality and episodic 
sexuality as a forum for experimentation with the self through preoccupation with the body, 
Strenger (2004) comments: “Anything from one’s professional career, to one’s hair color, to 
one’s body shape, to one’s sexuality is subject to experimentation. Lives and selves are there to 
be designed, and contemporary culture presents a wide array of styles that can be used” (p. ix).  
 The “permanent instability of self-esteem.” In the context of a global community that 
exacts high standards for achievement and personal success, Strenger suggests that New 
Cosmopolitans experience a heightened fear of insignificance in a world in which “the sky now 
seems to be the limit” (2013, p. 270). From the perspective of self-esteem and Becker’s notion of 
the hero project, New Cosmopolitans are at a disadvantage relative to earlier generations in that 
their pool, or pond, is measured on a global scale.  
 Given the importance of self-esteem as a primary buffer against death awareness and 
existential terror, Strenger’s point about the increasing fragility of the New Cosmopolitans self-
esteem suggests a major deficit in the current cultural paradigm. Elsewhere, Strenger (2011) 
comments on how recent cultural developments have “induced permanent instability of self-
esteem and doubt about the sense of leading a significant life” (pg. 2). Further commentary 
reveals two additional effects of this phenomenon on the character development of many New 
Cosmopolitans. First, Strenger (2013) explains that the gifted but socially awkward character of 
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many New Cosmopolitans breeds formidable isolation owing to an implicit insecurity and off-
putting arrogance frequently demonstrated by these individuals.  
 The tendency to feel isolated or shunned from the larger group, coupled with a sense of 
specialness that comes from significant intellectual talent, “leads most New Cosmopolitans to 
develop a visceral antagonism to mob situations; they see natural groups as a source of danger; 
they are always wary of the tendency of groups to attack those who are different” (Strenger, 
2013, p. 272). This low-level paranoia is an interesting phenomenon that signals a fundamental 
difference in experience compared to traditional models of culture. Groups, rather than serving 
as a source of comfort and safety as they have in all traditional societies, are experienced by the 
New Cosmopolitan as a source of anxiety. 
 The concomitant feelings of specialness and alienation attributed to this “elite” class of 
New Cosmopolitans is a phenomenon reported in other segments of contemporary society, as we 
will see in the following section. In the next section, we will examine a similar phenomenon of 
concurrent isolation and a feeling of specialness from the perspectives of artistic sensibility and 
extreme mental fragmentation. The commonality of experience among these groups lends further 
support to our hypothesis that there is something fundamentally destabilizing about modern life 
for individuals across the spectrum of personal circumstance and experience. 
Schizophrenia and the paradox of modern thought 
 Psychologist Louis A. Sass approaches the theme of reflexivity in modern culture by 
showing how the structural features of schizophrenic illness—primarily its dualities of 
detachment and hyperreflexivity—bear remarkable resemblance to works of modern literature 
and art by figures such as Franz Kafka, Charles Baudelaire, Samuel Beckett, T.S. Eliot, Salvador 
Dali, and others. In his Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature, 
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and Thought, Sass (1992) makes thought-provoking comparisons between schizophrenic illness 
and modernism, primarily to show how culture has adopted to the rapid changes in Western 
society described above. In doing this, Sass takes us into the world of lived experience. 
Translating Giddens’ theoretically-bound notion of reflexivity into a phenomenological 
description of what it means to live the life of a modern individual—albeit at the extreme—Sass 
shows how these experiences have nevertheless become incorporated into the cultural symbols of 
our time through literature and art. 
Sass’ foray into the artistic mindset of the time provides qualitative texture to this historic 
change. What appears most striking is the sense of vertigo that seems to permeate the world of 
the artist and the schizophrenic patient alike. The dizzying groundlessness prominent in the 
thinking of existential writers comes alive when trying to make sense of the experience of the 
schizophrenic patient and the modern artist. We are left feeling lost, askew; moreover, and 
perhaps worse, is the accompanying feeling of isolation rendered by experience that is so 
radically idiosyncratic and ephemeral, adrift from any base of shared knowledge or experience. 
My aim in the following section is to take a step inside the qualitative experience of 
groundlessness and isolation that have come to dominate the lived experience of modernity and 
examine the impact of this remarkable shift on the individual and Western culture-at-large.  
 The doublet of modern thought. Sass argues that modern thought, like schizophrenia, is 
dominated by two features—extreme alienness and hyper-reflexivity. The starting point for Sass 
in his journey to articulate the modern psyche begins with the discovery of consciousness itself 
and the radical shift in philosophical thought that occurred when the human mind became a 
constituting force of reality rather than a passive recipient of external experience (i.e., Kant’s 
Copernican Revolution).  According to Sass, the most immediate effect of this shift in thought is 
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the paradoxical effect it has on our understanding of consciousness itself. He argues that just as 
the status of consciousness was elevated and conscious self-reflection gained prominence as the 
sine qua non of human experience without which nothing could be said to exist, it was 
simultaneously lowered when it became an object of study, something to be observed in a 
detached manner in the empirical tradition: 
Thus the Kantian categories—from one standpoint the transcendental foundation 
of the relevant universe—were also facts in this universe, sometimes understood 
as the product of natural forces, and existing (in some sense) side by side with 
other objects of knowledge, on the same plane with other empirical phenomena 
such as atomic structures, pancreases, and bird migration patterns. (1992, p. 329, 
emphasis in original).  
In other words, that which we know (because our conscious mind perceives it) can be 
called into question because the process by which we perceive it (consciousness) is irrevocably 
part of the natural order which itself is subject to its own sets of laws and constraints and is prone 
to a certain blindness to itself. According to Sass (1992), if consciousness is indeed a “thing 
among things” (p. 332), a requirement if it is to be housed in the realm of objective entities, then 
the modern man’s quest for absolute enlightenment is unachievable. Sass views this modern 
quest for absolute enlightenment as a kind of delusion: 
In Foucault’s view, it is the failure to recognize these impossibilities that is the 
key blind spot at the core of the modern episteme; it is this that dooms modern 
thought to a fundamental instability, a constant shuffling between incompatible 
alternatives. Modern man nevertheless remains obsessed with promises to 
unriddle the universe; yet all the while this prospect of perfect enlightenment, of 
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utter awakening to the truth about the self, is the source of the greatest delusion. 
Foucault compares it to a sleep—a sleep ‘so deep that thought experiences it 
paradoxically as vigilance’ (p. 332). 
Reflexivity means we will never know for certain, because what we know is always 
subject to revision. This knowledge has the effect of making the individual feel small, impotent, 
and lacking an anchor in the world. The uncertainty inherent in this reflexivity can have the 
effect of leaving one to feel groundless; or, alternatively, Sass argues the groundlessness can pull 
for an over-inflation of the self’s importance to the point where it is dislocated from ‘objective’ 
reality. To highlight the ways in which some individuals, and modern Western culture at-large, 
have responded to the destabilizing effects of this reflexivity, we will delve deeper into Sass’ 
description of the schizophrenic experience.   
Duality in schizophrenia. Sass describes the schizophrenic’s internal world as 
oscillating between two seemingly incompatible stances of acute disengagement with the world 
and a heightened sense of self-importance whereby “searching for the self can dissolve it” and 
“the sense of awesome ontological power can devolve into a kind of abject metaphysical terror” 
(p. 325). In the following section, we will address both sides of this detachment and the response 
to reflexivity that give rise to the duality described above. 
Detachment and alienation in schizophrenia. Sass (1992) notes that the onset of 
schizophrenia is often precipitated by a perceptual and emotional experience characterized by 
stages or phases of gradual detachment from the world of social engagement and shared 
meaning, something akin to what is commonly known as the prodromal phase of schizophrenia. 
Sass utilizes the German term Stimmung to capture the process, which he further breaks down 
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into four distinct modes of grappling with the domains of people and objects (unreality, mere 
being, fragmentation, and apophany).  
Broadly speaking, the process is one in which an individual on the verge of a psychotic 
break begins to experience changes in perception whereby individuals and/or objects in the 
world take on an unreal quality (or become hyper-real) and the world itself begins to feel unreal 
and inauthentic; where fragmentation of objects and systems once perceived as belonging to a 
whole “disintegrate into a disunity of parts” (Sass, 1992, p. 50) and the individual feels that he or 
she is “surrounded by a multitude of meaningless details” (p. 50.). The fact that the world exists 
at all can become a focal point for the individual; one that can be saturated with feelings or 
wonder and/or dread. Another essential aspect of the process Sass (1992) describes is apophany: 
“Once conventional meanings have faded away (Unreality) and new details or aspects of the 
world have been thrust into awareness (Fragmentation, Mere Being), there often emerges an 
inchoate sense of the as yet unarticulated significances of these newly emergent phenomena” (p. 
52). At this point, the individual comes to see significance in everything that happens around him 
or her. Everything is a sign, nothing is coincidence.  
According to Sass, this process of detachment marks one of the main features of 
schizophrenia: a kind of radical alienation from the world of shared social and perceptual 
meaning. It is not just that individuals turn away from interactions with others, which they do, 
but their perception of the world becomes so profoundly different and idiosyncratic that it 
becomes unintelligible to others: “One might describe the central feature of the schizophrenic 
mind as a disconnectedness, an unmooring from practical concerns and accepted practices that 
allows consciousness to drift in unexpected and unintended directions, and to come to rest in 
strange orientations” (Sass, 1992, p. 127). This breakdown in shared or consensual meaning 
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occurs as the individual retreats deeper and deeper into his or her internal world. The fact that 
symptoms of schizophrenia are broad, often transient in their presentation, and bizarre, make the 
illness unique. Sass finds these two qualities—heterogeneity and bizarreness—to be equally 
present in the work of modern artists; to my mind they are significant when thinking about what 
it means to live in a culture driven by uncertainty and lacking obvious models of transference-
based authority.  
The heterogeneity of schizophrenia. Sass notes that the symptomology of schizophrenia 
“defies all attempts to bring its features within the grasp of any overarching theory or model” 
(Sass, 1992, p. 26). Instead, what Sass observes is the overwhelming heterogeneity of an illness 
that demonstrates a diverse and often dramatic course: 
Schizophrenics can be hypersensitive to human contact but also indifferent. They 
can be pedantic or capricious, idle or diligent, irritable or filled with an all-
encompassing yet somehow empty hilarity. They can experience a rushing flow of 
ideas or a total blocking; and their actions, thoughts, and perceptions can seem 
rigidly ordered or controlled (exhibiting a ‘morbid geometrism’), but at other 
times chaotic and formless. They will sometimes feel they can influence the 
whole universe, at other times as if they can’t control even their own thoughts or 
their own limbs—or, in what is one of the supreme paradoxes of this condition, 
they may have both these experiences at the same moment (1992, p. 26). 
Sass suggests that the historical vacillation in psychiatry between wider and more narrow 
classifications of schizophrenia is an attempt to impose order on an otherwise order-defying 
heterogeneity of symptoms. Recent changes to the diagnostic framework set forth by the DSM 5 
in 2013 illustrate this point. In this latest version, subtypes of schizophrenia (paranoid, 
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disorganized, catatonic, undifferentiated, residual) were eliminated for reasons of instability of 
their clinical presentation and lack of scientific validity and reliability. Currently, the presence of 
at least one of the following symptoms of psychotic disorder is required to make the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia: delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized speech (in addition one more 
symptom which may include disorganized or catatonic behavior, or negative symptoms). In this 
revision, marked distortions of perception and cognition have been singled out as the basic 
feature of schizophrenic psychosis. Given schizophrenia’s wide range of symptom manifestation 
the medical profession has chosen—perhaps reactively but certainly out of necessity given the 
lack of empirically-supported alternatives—to increase the specificity of its diagnostic criteria. 
Sass argues that psychiatry does not adequately take into account the holistic set of factors that 
contribute to schizophrenic illness. That is not to say he ignores or negates a neurobiological 
contribution to the development of schizophrenia and mental illness in general (he devotes an 
entire chapter to this topic in his considerable appendix); rather, Sass is drawing attention to the 
fact that despite decades of research and theorizing in the fields of psychiatry and psychology, 
strong causal explanations regarding the etiology of schizophrenia are still lacking (though 
corollary evidence for connections between various genetic and environmental factors is widely 
accepted). 
Schizophrenia and the bizarre. In addition to the heterogeneity inherent in schizophrenia, 
Sass notes one other striking feature of the illness – the bizarreness of its symptoms. Unlike other 
forms of psychotic mental illness such as mania, the speech and behavior of schizophrenic 
patients are often unintelligible to the observer. In Sass’ view, the “alienness of its characteristic 
signs and symptoms” (1992, p. 27) sets schizophrenia apart from other variations of mental 
illness. Though meaning can be made in the clinical encounter with many individual 
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schizophrenic patients and their treatment providers, no general theory or protocol is available to 
aid clinicians in deciphering the utterances and behavior of the patient with any kind of validity 
and reliability. As a result, there is a kind of incomprehensibility that often impedes the 
clinician’s task of engaging with the patient and constructing a sense of the patient’s experience 
from a place of shared meaning. 
Reflexivity in schizophrenia. The other side of the duality Sass purports is a kind of self-
exaggerated importance or solipsism that makes the world conform to the whims and will of the 
patient, such that the schizophrenic individual often portrays himself or herself as a god or 
capable of total omniscience and/or omnipotence. When one is not anchored, they are free to 
float high above the world and impose their will as they see fit. However, as Sass (1992) notes, 
these states of extreme grandiosity operate in tandem with the detachment and alienness 
described above. The line between “awesome ontological power” (p. 325) and “metaphysical 
terror” runs thin for these individuals. In fact, what Sass’ discussion illuminates the most is the 
seemingly inescapable oscillation between extremes that has come to define modern experience.  
Drawing inferences from these insights, it seems that the modern individual—lacking a 
sense of being anchored to an irrefutable doctrine of meaning, authority, or purpose—is forced to 
turn toward inward and derive meaning, authority and purpose vis-à-vis the self. However, in 
some cases, and perhaps more globally when we expand the discussion to culture, the self is 
either not sufficiently developed, or simply cannot shoulder the burden of such weighty 
existential demands. Sass argues that schizophrenic illness appears to demonstrate heightened 
awareness into the paradox of modern life:  
In the course of this analysis, one of the great ironies of modern thought gradually 
emerges: the madness of schizophrenia—so often imagined as being antithetical 
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to the modern malaise, even as offering a potential escape from its dilemmas of 
hyperconsciousness and self-control—may, in fact, be an extreme manifestation 
of what is in essence a very similar condition (1992, p. 10). 
That is not to say that Sass believes schizophrenic individuals are somehow more 
enlightened or truly reality-oriented than non-schizophrenic persons—he is explicit about the 
fact that schizophrenia constitutes a real illness with neurological underpinnings whose 
impairments in functioning often result in debilitating outcomes for the afflicted individual—
however, he sees the schizophrenic individual as far more complex and self-aware than is 
commonly recognized in the medical literature. From his perspective, the distortions in 
perception and seemingly primitive, often unintelligible modes of speech and behavior observed 
during the course of a schizophrenic illness are important phenomena that warrant description—
not necessarily for etiological or explanatory purposes—but because they say something about 
what it means to be stuck in the paradox of modern thought - unable to find a comfortable 
equilibrium or stable sense of self among seemingly incompatible alternatives. 
An act of volition? Sass suggests that the bizarreness of schizophrenic symptoms and 
their opaqueness is significant and meaningful just as the detachment of the artist is used in the 
service of seeing the world anew. At this point I would like to address a possible motive for the 
bizarreness of schizophrenic symptoms: namely, whether utility to this bizarreness can be found. 
Sass addresses the notion of volition by questioning the traditionally accepted model of cognitive 
deficit in schizophrenic illness: “The patient, it seems, is plagued not so much by diminished 
awareness or ability to concentrate as by hyperawareness, a constant, compulsive need to 
exercise his own consciousness” (Sass, 1992, p. 68). The key here is the word plagued – the 
schizophrenic individual cannot help but attend to stimuli to the point of disruption of other 
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important cognitive processes, regardless of the level of discomfort or distress it causes them. 
Sass acknowledges that this inability to exercise choice in what they attend to may be due, or at 
least reflects, suboptimal neurophysiological functioning (i.e., over-activation in areas of the 
brain responsible for executive functioning, for example, or under-activation in areas that control 
automatic responses).  At the same time, however, Sass notices that the patient’s ability to filter 
his or her attention appears selective in many instances and not necessarily the result of global 
incapacity: 
Schizophrenics, compared to normal individuals, were found to be more easily 
distracted by tape-recorded voices only when these voices were speaking of topics 
related to the patient’s delusions; also, schizophrenics seem less likely to be 
distracted by outer than by inner stimuli—that is, by the normally unnoticed 
workings of their own minds (1992, p. 71, emphasis in original)  
Sass argues there is a certain passivity with respect to action; the schizophrenic 
experiences compulsive awareness but is helpless to redirect or titrate his or her attention, which 
results in a certain loss of agency. The Stimmung experience, Sass concludes, is part strategy and 
part deficit. The schizophrenic’s descent into strangeness and the bizarre “seems to occupy a 
kind of anxious twilight zone somewhere between act and affliction” (Sass, 1992, p. 74). If this 
passivity represents both act and affliction, what utility can we ascribe to it? What purpose does 
a potentially willed loss of agency serve? A thoughtful answer cannot be given without drawing 
culture into the mix.  
Duality in modernism. The first point of contact between schizophrenia and modern 
culture that Sass elucidates is their shared complexity and the problematic task of describing 
either satisfactorily with any kind of unifying framework: 
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If schizophrenia is to be comprehended psychologically, I would suggest that its 
interpretation must be intimately tied to its very diversity and 
incomprehensibility; what better place, then, to seek analogies than in the culture 
of the modernism/postmodernism—that ‘tradition of the new’ where bafflement 
and pluralism are the rule? (1992, p. 27).  
Giving additional context Sass writes: 
What, after all, could dadaist [sic] art—celebrating chaos and mocking all 
aesthetic values—have in common with the ordered neoclassical formalism of the 
later T.S. Eliot? What could the austere rationalism of Mondrian or the Bauhaus 
share with the neoromantic dream-logic of surrealism? (1992, p. 28) 
This brief commentary on the wide-ranging sensibilities and aesthetics that abound in 
modernism suggests it would be nearly impossible to house it all under one roof. But Sass makes 
the effort and arrives at a framework of seven salient characteristics—avant-gardism; 
perspectivism and relativism; dehumanization; derealization; spatial form; aesthetic self-
referentiality; irony and detachment—that bears resemblance to the symptomology of 
schizophrenia to Sass in two meaningful ways: First, each of these seven characteristics can 
manifest in numerous ways; second, they all demonstrate a tendency toward the extreme, which, 
at the extreme, destroys the possibility for shared meaning.  
Alienation in modernism. The second similarity between schizophrenia and modernism, 
according to Sass, is the inward turn required to see the world anew. The process of detachment 
from the world of shared meaning in favor of a heightened awareness and idiosyncratic 
representation is central to the artist. Of Beckett, Musil, Rilke, and Hofmannsthal, Sass writes:  
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Like the schizophrenic in the Stimmung, all of these central modernist writers 
describe objects that seem alien and incomprehensible—stripped familiarity and 
reality, and of any sense of coherence or connectedness, yet bursting with some 
profound inner significance that always lies just beyond the reach of one’s 
comprehension (Sass, 1992, p. 58). 
The loss of unity, the self’s inability to express adequate agency of efficacy of action, a 
sense of groundlessness and detachment from external reality, the smashing of conventional 
devices of temporal and narrative form – these are but some of the characteristics that 
modernism and its works of creative expression share with schizophrenia. The works of art 
described by Sass aim to reimagine, decenter, and replace the individual’s internal experience as 
the only source of truth, and one that itself will be questioned.  
Reflexivity in modernism. Works of modernism demonstrate an adversarial stance 
(avant-gardism) that aims to defy or break down conventional notions of meaning, while 
recognizing that any position taken can and will then be subject to critique by other perspectives. 
That means that no one can be the de facto expert on anything, even the creator, as a multiplicity 
of perspectives is universally accepted while the authenticity of intention itself is called into 
question (in the case of postmodern modes of thinking). 
Sass seeks to understand this evolution in thinking by examining the development of 
Western culture over the past two centuries. From romanticism to modernism and 
postmodernism, the predominant trend he observes is one of a grappling with acceptance of this 
reflexivity. Romantics, he reports, pushed for unity of body and mind, nature and nurture, trying 
to bridge the divide that was rapidly growing, perhaps to deny or mitigate the troubling changes 
afoot in modern life. Postromantic or modernist thinkers shifted tack, hoping to rectify the 
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encroaching feeling of meaninglessness and groundlessness vis-à-vis a call to action, advocating 
for reinsertion into the world of Being or Dasein (i.e., creating one’s sense of meaning through 
intentional engagement in the world). Postmodernists, on the other hand, reject these strategies 
outright and focus on embracing the inevitable lack of meaning. Sass suggests the postmodern 
approach is in-line with a schizoid mode of being that is perhaps the characterological 
consequence of living in a world subject to such “hyper” reflexivity. Of this tendency toward a 
schizoid mode of being Sass writes:  
We might regard the artist as an emblematic as well as ambivalent figure—his 
inward turn providing an image of nonconformist escape or of rebellion against 
modern society while at the same time illustrating, in exaggerated form, 
tendencies that pervade the same society (p. 82, emphasis in original).  
How then does Sass differentiate between artist and patient, culture and illness? 
The central difference that Sass observes lies in the issue of agency. While the artist 
induces a state of detachment and unreality through his or her work product, even making 
use of such a state during the creative process, it is done with a certain amount of 
willfulness and control that is lacking in the schizophrenic patient. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the artist can take part in shared meaning and communal experiences of 
reality (i.e., Dasein) that the schizophrenic individual cannot. Of course, as mentioned 
above, Sass believes that many schizophrenic patients do possess an ability for 
comprehension and action that is far more complex than the binary distinction I am 
suggesting here. Furthermore, it is clear to Sass that the line between art and madness is 
also drawn thin at times. That is not to say, either, that all artists are mad (or even a little 
bit), though some (e.g., Van Gough) clearly were. Rather, perhaps the most appropriate 
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way to think about this is that madness and creativity exist sometimes as reflections of 
the other, but on a spectrum of agency whereby the ability to direct one’s consciousness 
and shift between the internal and external world remains sometimes more and 
sometimes less intact.  
The role of trauma.  I would now like to impose some of my own thoughts on the issue 
of madness, especially as it relates to schizophrenia and modern culture. The schizophrenic 
patient is helpless to direct or titrate his or her attention and experience of consciousness, likely 
(in my opinion) because a trauma of some nature has impinged upon the mind’s ability to make 
meaning of the experience or process information in a way that can be productively assimilated 
into the individual’s personal narrative. They are similarly helpless to repress or sublimate 
because trauma forces continual awareness, hyperawareness even, as it is transformed into 
disguised (i.e., bizarre) form. Like living in a dream. As Sass (and Bass) suggest – denial and/or 
transformation requires a certain recognition of reality, however unconscious. 
My reading of Sass and clinical experience working on an inpatient unit with a variety of 
psychiatric illnesses during internship have given me compelling (if not anecdotal) reasons to 
believe that the issue of trauma is particularly salient when trying to understand the line between 
artful reflection in an arguably insane world, and insanity itself. Like Sass, I fully support the 
medical model’s assumption of neurological deficits and biological predispositions to certain 
psychiatric illnesses. However, the biopsychosocial markers of any individual case must be 
examined in full. Trauma – be it emotional, relational, or concrete (e.g., poverty, physical/sexual 
violence, natural disaster) seems to be a highly correlated factor with the development of severe 
and persistent mental illness. Of course, many individuals who have grown up in environments 
of poverty and had experiences of neglect and abuse do not develop symptoms of psychosis, that 
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is in fact the norm. Moreover, there are some individuals who develop psychotic illness much 
later in life; sometimes not until their seventies (I had one such patient). I also believe that the 
loss of self or the insufficient development of a stable sense of self can be experienced as 
traumatic, especially in the context of other forms of overt trauma.  
Perhaps the most fruitful exploration would be along the nexus of trauma, resilience, and 
biology. Given the constraints of time, space, and the argument at hand, I would like to suggest 
that trauma plays a defining role in the etiology of madness, but that trauma as it is experienced 
by individuals varies greatly in its effects. Like Sass, I cannot purport to provide any new insight 
into the etiology of such a complex illness. However, also like Sass, my belief is that the general 
conditions of Western society in the past few centuries have given way to a situation in which 
the ability to repress existential terror, to defend against its ominous call to nothingness, has 
become increasingly difficult as the defenses against it have been eroded over time. 
Schizophrenia is, perhaps, among other things, a crisis of the self and the environment at once – 
a failure of the self to develop a robustness necessary to flourish in today’s world, and an 
environment that fails to provide containment from external pressures such as the 
psychopathology of the individuals and systems surrounding the patient. In a world that demands 
a stable sense of self that is also flexible to changing conditions, what do we do when that sense 
of self is not available to us? I believe this question plagues individuals and modern culture alike.  
Conclusion. In this chapter, Freud described the elegant solution of religion to the 
problem of existential terror and Rieff illustrated how the loss of religion and communal living in 
Western society marked a fundamental paradigm shift in culture. My review of Giddens, 
Strenger, and Sass has further pointed out the ways in which the reflexivity that has come to 
characterize modernity can engender a loss of ontological security when the social milieu is 
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increasingly abstract, in flux, and the project of the self requires significant effort by the 
individual to give it shape and meaning. Through his descriptive account of modern culture and 
the inner world of schizophrenic patients, Sass provided texture to the notion of what it means to 
live in a world in which repression of existential terror is thinly veiled. Further, Sass has 
highlighted how the incompatible alternatives of modern thought—extreme detachment and 
hyper reflexivity—represent a paradox that does not leave any clear path toward solution or 
integration with other aspects of social change that might provide new modes of being or sources 
of defense to combat existential terror. In the following chapter, I would like to address the 
concept of trauma as a major consequence of the shifts in culture described in this chapter.   
Chapter Three: Traumatic Impact of Erosion of Cultural Defense against Existential 
Terror  
 If transference-based authority—parental, religious, or political—protects us from 
excessive anxiety regarding our mortality and a host of other human vulnerabilities, what 
happens when the defensive function of the authority system becomes so amorphous and largely 
indefensible that it ceases to serve this function effectively? The goal of this next section is to 
address the traumatic impact that the shift in culture described above has had on the Western 
psyche. We will do this by returning to our earlier discussion of existential philosophy and its 
intersection with emotional trauma as described by Stolorow (2011), followed by a detailed 
inquiry into the cognitive process by which emotional trauma impacts the individual and society 
in Terror Management Theory. Finally, we will examine the cumulative impact of centuries of 
cultural change from the perspective of Elizabeth Young-Bruehl (2012), and the rise of tyranny 
in the 20th century as a possible response to this trauma (and a trauma-inducing phenomenon 
itself) as described by Mark Edmundson (2007).  
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 Emotional trauma and existential terror. Merging our earlier discussion of existential 
philosophy with the psychological impact of existential terror, Stolorow (2011) argues in World, 
Affectivity, Trauma: Heidegger and Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis that emotional trauma (e.g., 
loss of loved one), is akin to Heidegger’s description of existential anxiety in that it involves 
“plunging the traumatized person into a form of authentic Being-toward-death” (p. 42). If we 
recall from the first chapter, Heidegger views anxiety (or angst) as a feeling-state that jolts us 
back into awareness of reality as Beings-in-the-world. Anxiety takes us out of everyday 
concerns, of being part of the “they,” and confronts us with the need to shape our existence as 
independent agents, unfettered by the demands or norms of our social world. Stolorow expands 
upon this idea by suggesting that “absorption in the everyday practical world serves as defensive 
evasion of authentic Being-toward-death” (p. 41) – where Being-toward-death “annihilates any 
actualizable potentiality-for-Being that might stably anchor everyday significance” (p. 41). In 
other words, not only does immersion in the “they” inhibit authentic living, it is designed to do 
just that for the sake of keeping awareness of existential concerns from consciousness. Sass’ 
description of the schizophrenic patient in the previous chapter bears remarkable resemblance to 
the point Stolorow makes here, which is that contact with existential terror makes it impossible 
to maintain the guise of everyday living and that events which constitutes emotional traumas can 
trigger this in any individual. When absorbed with the everyday we do not think about death; 
quite the opposite, we derive security through our perceived necessity of daily routine and living 
in accordance with our social environment. Being-toward-death is a state of mind in which the 
meaninglessness of our quotidian preoccupations becomes conscious:  
Trauma shatters the absolutisms of everyday life, which, like the illusions of the 
“they,” evade and cover up the finitude, contingency, and embeddedness of our 
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existence and the indefiniteness of its certain extinction. Such shattering exposes 
what has been heretofore concealed, thereby plunging the traumatized person, in 
Heidegger’s terms, into a form of authentic Being-toward-death and into the 
anxiety—the loss of significance, the uncanniness –through which authentic 
Being-toward-death is disclosed. Trauma, like authentic Being-toward-death, 
individuates us, but in a manner that manifests in an excruciating sense of 
singularity and solitude. (Stolorow, 2011, p. 44) 
 Emotional trauma, then, results when a spontaneous intrusion of this awareness enters 
consciousness. It is traumatic because the ontological security that absorption with the “they” 
provides is wrenched from the individual without warning. Stolorow contributes to our 
understanding of this existential terror in the following way: beyond its potential for 
individuation and authenticity emphasized by Heidegger, it poses a potential trauma response 
because of the intense and painful isolation it evokes. According to Stolorow, the degree to 
which something is experienced as traumatic depends on the “context of an affect-integrating 
relational home” (p. 50) in which disrupting experience can be processed and thus experienced 
as less overwhelming. He writes: “Authentic existing presupposed a capacity to dwell in the 
emotional pain (e.g., the existential anxiety) that accompanies a non-evasive recognition of 
finitude, and this capacity, in turn, requires that such pain find a relational context in which it can 
be held” (2011, p. 50). While Stolorow does not provide an explicit definition of his term 
relational home, I assume that he is referring to the network of human relationships that mollify 
one’s sense of isolation through engagement in empathic comprehension of one’s experience 
(much in the same way an analyst aims to engage with his or her patient), or, adherence to 
doctrines (e.g., religious faith) that provide a solution to the realities of death and nonexistence. 
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To this, I would add the holding function of culture, which, if sufficiently robust, is an effective 
conductor of ontological security as a carrier of the symbolic self. In the next section, we will 
examine what happens when this buffer against existential anxiety is threatened at the level of 
the individual and society.   
 To summarize, Stolorow suggests that emotional trauma has the potential to erode 
ontological security and place us in direct contact with overwhelming existential terror because it 
jolts us out of the repression associated with everyday life and forces us into awareness of our 
finitude. The potential to experience this as traumatic depends in large part on the affect-
regulating relationships, pursuits, or beliefs that one has to ameliorate the effects of such 
emotional dislocations. Stolorow’s description of emotional trauma gives us further cause to 
contemplate how the lack of affect-integrating buffers (what we might consider variations of the 
defense against existential terror) affects not only the individual when one is not sufficiently 
embedded in such social relationships, but how society is affected by the waning, gradual or 
abrupt, of culturally appropriate affect-integrating buffers.  
What happens to individuals and society when the cultural defense against existential 
terror is challenged? 
 In the first chapter, we reviewed literature supporting the TMT hypothesis that cultural 
worldviews provide a meaningful source of self-esteem that act as a buffer against existential 
terror. In this section, we will look more closely at this domain of TMT to understand what 
happens to the individual when the mechanism of cultural defense is threatened and/or 
traumatically breached. To do this, we will revisit the temporal processes by which defense 
against existential terror operates and highlight the mechanics of the defensive process in detail, 
the effects of traumatic experience on an individual’s ability to maintain an adequate defense 
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against death awareness, and the methods for coping with intolerable anxiety when the normal 
defenses are rendered ineffective. 
  Existential terror is primarily experienced at an unconscious level.  TMT researchers 
have determined that “worldview defense following mortality salience can only occur to the 
extent that people are not consciously thinking about death” (p. 218, Arndt, Goldenberg, 
Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2000). Recalling the dual defense model described earlier 
in chapter one, TMT describes a temporal cognitive process of defense against existential terror 
that begins with proximal defenses (i.e., deliberate, conscious attempts to deny death awareness) 
in response to explicit reminders of death; which, when they begin to fade, are replaced by distal 
defenses (i.e., unintentional reinforcement of self-esteem and/or symbolic/cultural worldviews) 
to manage the unconscious resurgence of death awareness that arises when death thoughts are no 
longer in the individual’s conscious mind, yet remain highly accessible (see figure below for 
visual for representation). 
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Figure 1. The terror management dual defense cognitive process (from Pyszczynski & Kesebir, 2011). 
 In other words, when faced with conscious thoughts of death, an individual’s first 
response is to actively expel such thoughts from conscious awareness or diminish their 
frightening effect by utilizing strategies of distraction, denial, or crafting logical arguments to 
relocate the problem of death into the future. Successful concretization and/or dismissal of the 
threat reassures the individual that worrying about death is not necessary in the present moment, 
thereby minimizing death-thought accessibility. However, TMT research demonstrates that 
arousal of thoughts explicitly related to death triggers conscious and unconscious concerns 
regarding death (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Brues, 1994). So, although 
proximal defenses are generally effective at ameliorating conscious awareness of death, concerns 
regarding death linger in the unconscious with high levels of accessibility. If the individual is not 
impeded in his or her efforts to “forget” (e.g., by being continuously reminded of the death 
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related thoughts), TMT research has shown that he or she will evoke a symbolic/cultural 
worldview defense to counteract the impact of these unconscious thoughts. The upshot of this 
process is that “reminders of mortality are most likely to produce their effects in precisely those 
situations in which one is least aware of their impact” (p. 636, Greenberg et al., 1994). 
 Anxiety buffer disruption theory. As described above, an individual’s response to 
ordinary life situations that raise conscious awareness of mortality can be anticipated using the 
temporal cognitive process described by TMT research in which anxiety regarding existential 
terror is buffered by proximal and distal defenses that ultimately lead to reinforcement of cultural 
worldviews. Anxiety buffer disruption theory (ABDT; Pyszczynski & Kesebir, 2011) extends 
TMT by examining the role traumatic life events have on the anxiety-buffer apparatus (which 
they expand to include close personal relationships in additional to cultural worldviews and self-
esteem).  
 ABDT posits that traumatic events disrupt the normal functioning of the anxiety-buffer 
system, potentially putting one in direct contact with overwhelming anxiety regarding death. A 
disruption in the anxiety-buffer system challenges an individual’s worldview defense, which, 
depending on the level of traumatic disruption, can lead to a temporary destabilization or 
absolute collapse of the symbolic defense. In cases of mild to moderate trauma, threats to one’s 
worldview are destabilized temporarily; to prevent total collapse of the defense an individual will 
“double down” on his or her existing worldviews and symbolic sources of self-esteem to 
reinstate psychological equanimity in the face of traumatic disruption. Severe trauma, however, 
leads to a complete breakdown in the symbolic (distal) worldview defense and is more likely to 
have long-term effects on psychological wellbeing: “This collapse might be associated with a 
realization, on either an implicit or explicit level, that nothing – not faith in one’s worldview, not 
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self-esteem, not close relationships – could effectively protect one from vulnerability and 
mortality” (Pyszczynski & Kesebir, 2011, p. 7). In other words, mild or moderate levels of 
trauma do not cause an individual to reevaluate his or her conception of reality in the same way 
that severe trauma does.  
 PTSD: effects of moderate and severe trauma on the anxiety-buffering system. 
Pyszczynski and Kesebir (2011) provide empirical support for ABDT utilizing a series of studies 
conducted to test the anxiety-buffer model described above as it applies to PTSD. The authors 
conceptualize PTSD as a clinical outcome of an anxiety-buffer system that has been 
compromised by trauma, exposing the individual to intolerable existential anxiety that manifests 
in the symptoms described by the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
Although defenselessness against existential terror is the basic premise of ABDT, Pyszczynski 
and Kesebir (2011) acknowledge that a myriad of neurological, physical, and emotional factors 
are involved in PTSD including, but not limited to, a perceived threat to one’s life. Their work 
examines the impact of various types of trauma that span four geographically, ethnically and 
socioeconomically diverse populations: survivors of the 2005 Zarand earthquake in Iran, female 
survivors of domestic violence in Poland, survivors of civil war in Cote d’Ivoire, and American 
college students exposed to trauma.  
 Among the major findings of these studies was the important role of peritraumatic 
dissociation in subsequent development of PTSD (this finding is corroborated by many 
independent, nonrelated studies on PTSD that validate the moderating effect of peritraumatic 
dissociation in relation to PTSD). The results of these studies indicate that individuals who 
scored high on measures of dissociation experienced failure of proximal (e.g., suppression) and 
distal (i.e., symbolic, worldview) defenses, whereas individuals with low scores (lower levels of 
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dissociation) demonstrated intact proximal defenses and displayed enhanced worldview (distal) 
defense. In addition, those for whom the disruption of the anxiety-buffer system was greatest (as 
measured by high levels of dissociation and severity of PTSD symptoms) reported the highest 
frequency and severity of clinical symptoms.  
 The research findings are consistent with the theory; individuals who experience mild-to-
moderate levels of distress (i.e., demonstrated by low levels of dissociation and/or 
symptomatology) can successfully engage proximal defenses to ward off conscious recognition 
of vulnerability and manage the effects on unconscious awareness through intensification of their 
cultural worldview. Severe levels of trauma, however, lead to a total collapse in proximal and 
distal defenses. In these cases, individuals are unable to recover through reinforcement of an 
established worldview defense. Left defenseless, they are overwhelmed by anxiety, which would 
account for the higher levels of symptom severity. Another finding, which speaks perhaps to the 
elements of subjective experience, resilience, and Stolorow’s (2011) idea of a relational home, 
are the differences in how individuals respond to the same instances of trauma. Pyszczynski and 
Kesebir (2011) report that the same instance of trauma can vary in terms of the degree of 
disruption to their anxiety-buffer system.  
 Severe trauma and cultural breakdown. In a similar vein, TMT researchers (Salzman, 
2001; Salzman & Halloran, 2004) set out to understand what happens when cultural trauma 
deprives individuals of important buffers against existential anxiety. Utilizing qualitative 
methods, they reviewed the impact of colonialism on three genetically distinct and 
geographically disperse groups of indigenous peoples: The Native Yup’ik (Eskimo) of Alaska, 
Native Hawaiians, and Aboriginal Australians. In all three cases, European conquerors 
devastated the native populations with disease and violent military action. Those who survived 
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the initial onslaught were subsequently disenfranchised in all realms of life: economically, 
politically, and in terms of maintaining their spiritual beliefs and cultural practices. These groups 
developed high risk for significant impairments in physical health and psychological wellbeing; 
high rates of cancer deaths, diabetes, obesity, infant mortality, congenital diseases, suicide, 
alcoholism and substance abuse, accidental death, incarceration, child abuse, and severe 
psychological disorders were reported among these groups. Salzman and Halloran (2004) 
suggest that the relative frequency and severity of these bio-psycho-social outcomes can be 
attributed to the devastating effects of severe cultural trauma:  
The cultural destruction and trauma experienced by First Nation indigenous 
peoples has undermined their basis of existential meaning and value to the extent 
that they have little protection from basic human anxiety, which has become 
manifest in the extent and prevalence of the psychological ill health and poor 
well-being they suffer. (p. 236) 
 The narrative of Harold Napoleon, whose work was employed by Salzman and Halloran 
(2004) offers a qualitative illustration of the cultural trauma rendered upon the Yup’ik people of 
Alaska. In Yuuyaraq: The way of the human being, Napoleon (1996) provides a retrospective 
account of the loss of traditional Yup’ik culture:  
Their medicines and their medicine men and women had proven useless. 
Everything they had believed in had failed. Their ancient world had collapsed . . . 
The world the survivors woke to was without anchor. They woke up in shock, 
listless, confused, bewildered, heartbroken, and afraid. (Napoleon, 1996, p. 11) 
 This brief statement conveys the profound sense of helplessness and vulnerability that 
arises in the face of complete failure of the worldview defense. The initial loss of life, while 
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undeniably painful, seems to have been less consequential than the loss of cultural meaning. 
Similar to the findings of Pyszczynski and Kesebir (2011) in relation to disruptions in the 
anxiety-buffer system and PTSD, this study suggests that exposure to extreme vulnerability (in 
this case by means of violent assault) can lead to a devastating loss of meaning, leaving members 
of the decimated culture prone to debilitating physical and mental illness outcomes. 
 Salzman and Halloran (2004) tried to make sense of what has the potential to be 
reparative in the situation faced by the indigenous peoples they studied. One option, which the 
authors advocate as being an optimal source of renewal, is to revive the “ontological 
prescriptions” (p. 236) of the traditional culture and integrate them into the fabric of daily life to 
reconstruct the cultural buffer against existential anxiety. The second is to adopt a new 
worldview consistent with the (newly) dominant culture. There are, of course, difficulties with 
both options. First, conquered and/or persecuted peoples are commonly forbidden from actively 
practicing their religious and cultural heritage, often by threat of discrimination, severe 
punishment or death. Second, in the face of severe traumatic disruption, one’s cultural heritage 
may cease to offer a compelling worldview that is believable following such absolute destruction 
in meaning (as illustrated in the case of Yup’ik culture). Another difficulty inherent in this 
second option—embracing or “joining” the dominant culture—is that conquered and persecuted 
peoples are often barred from meaningful engagement with the dominant culture by systematic 
discrimination and marginalization by the newcomers. These difficulties are summarized below:  
For many indigenous people, the Western worldview, while overwhelming, was 
never compelling enough to attract the faith required to establish an adequate 
cultural anxiety buffer. For others, the overwhelming power of the colonizers may 
have made its worldview compelling, but racism and other structural barriers 
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made the achievement of its standards extremely difficult. The result in both cases 
is anxiety. (Salzman & Halloran, 2004, pp. 236-237) 
 As we have seen with Becker, the strength of a cultural hero system or transference 
paradigm lies in its believability; to be effective, the story one tells oneself to reconstitute old 
ways of being or forge new a new identity must be convincing, not simply convenient or 
nostalgic. As Salzman and Halloran (2004) aptly point out, the discrimination indigenous 
peoples faced in the wake of colonization made it difficult to adopt new cultural transference 
paradigms because believability requires a certain amount of self-deception to work; a 
worldview that promotes active oppression of a particular group can be impossible to embrace, 
or, alternatively, can only be incorporated at the cost of an injurious loss of authenticity, which 
does not bode well for building a sustainable worldview defense. 
 A third and perhaps more uplifting alternative for surviving cultural devastation is 
proposed by Jonathan Lear (1969) in his compelling account of the survival of the Crow Nation 
following their cooperation with the United States government in the mid-1800s. In his Radical 
Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation, Lear investigates the “ontological 
vulnerability” (p. 50) shared by all human beings; namely, that at any time, the concepts that 
give meaning to our lives and thereby motivate our actions and strivings in the world, are at risk; 
a kind of existential tension that underlies our attempts to make meaning of the world and our 
place in it. His goal is to understand the psychological transformation or flexibility required to 
respond courageously in the face of cultural collapse. Lear defines cultural collapse broadly as a 
situation in which there is “no conception of the good life to provide a larger context for the 
significance of one’s acts” (p. 57) and courage as “the ability to face up to reality, to exercise 
good judgment, and to tolerate danger in doing so” (Lear, 1969, p. 133).   
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 After the buffalo were gone and the Crow could no longer maintain their nomadic life 
due to confinement to the reservation, and war with rival tribes was forbidden, all the things that 
gave life meaning to the Crow vanished. Combined with the brutal treatment by the United 
States government that resulted in massive loss of life and meager living conditions, it does not 
take much in the way of empathic identification to contemplate a response in which one either 
gives up hope (submits to despair) or maintains a rudimentary existence. Lear’s investigation is 
focused on the way in which the Crow’s leader, Plenty Coups, responded to the annihilation of 
his peoples’ way of life:  
Plenty Coups responded to the collapse of his civilization with radical hope. What 
makes this hope radical is that it is directed toward a future goodness that 
transcends the current ability to understand what it is. Radical hope anticipates a 
good for which those who have the hope as yet lack the appropriate concepts with 
which to understand it. (1969, p. 103, emphasis in original) 
 Radical hope is not faith because faith is a belief predicated on a concept, such as the 
existence of god or a higher power, which ceases to have meaning in the circumstance we are 
describing. Radical hope is the ability to maintain an optimistic perspective while staying attuned 
to the reality of the traumatic loss as it is unfolding. For this alternative to bear fruit, Lear makes 
clear that the loss incurred must be recognized and metabolized. This I believe is where the 
kernel of courage lies, in allowing oneself to bear the weight of such profound loss while finding 
a way to move forward with an attitude of optimism that has no concrete aim.   
 Lear contrasts Plenty Coups approach of radical hope with the ostensibly more pragmatic 
one taken by a rival tribe’s leader, Sitting Bull. Chief of the Crow’s mortal enemy, the Sioux, 
Sitting Bull famously resisted the United States government for decades to maintain the 
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authenticity of the Sioux way of life. In the end, Lear suggests that the outcome for the Sioux – a 
brutal defeat that stripped them of their land – was suboptimal in that fewer material (e.g., land) 
and psychological resources were available for the Sioux to navigate the future and flourish as a 
culture again (albeit in modified form). Rather than recognizing the futility of resistance in the 
face of a technologically superior opponent, Lear asserts that Sitting Bull turned away from 
reality, choosing to focus on symbolic rituals (i.e., Ghost Dance), the significance of which had 
already been rendered ineffectual given the military and political dominance of the American 
settlers. Sitting Bull allowed the dance to continue even though its meaning had already been 
lost.   
 What makes Plenty Coups’ approach courageous is that it allowed him to avoid despair 
by responding well to the new reality his people faced. In other words, Plenty Coups did not bury 
his head in the sand. Instead, Plenty Coups found a way to recalibrate the notion of what it 
meant to be a Crow in the context of a reality that he could not have envisioned for himself or his 
people. According to Lear, Plenty Coups’ courage derived from his ability to utilize existing 
Crow tradition, specifically his adaptation of the notion of wisdom in the form of the 
‘Chickadee-person’—someone devoted to continuously developing his mind and learning how to 
succeed by paying close attention to the experiences of others— in ways that would benefit his 
tribe in the changing landscape. Recognition of his people’s defeat allowed Plenty Coups to 
negotiate and renegotiate treaties with the U.S. government and encourage future generations of 
Crow to develop their minds by incorporating formal education in the European tradition so that 
future generations of Crow would be able to flourish in the new reality and minimize further 
oppression. 
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 Obviously, the Crow’s survival of cultural destruction was not a happy affair. Serious 
damage was done, the effects of which are undoubtedly still felt in their community. What stands 
out about Lear’s notion of radical hope is its inherently optimistic perspective that suggests 
survival is possible if one is psychologically adroit enough to endure the cultural transformation 
of ideals. Lear claims that this kind of agency has roots in early experience: 
We instinctively reach out to parental figures for emotional and nutritional 
sustenance that, in the moment, we lack the resources to understand. This is the 
archaic prototype of radical hope: in infancy we are reaching out for sustenance 
from a source of goodness even though we as yet lack the concepts with which to 
understand what we are reaching out for. (Lear, 1969, p. 122) 
 Although Lear recognizes the potential for despair that is a natural response when one is 
confronted with the destruction of meaning, he makes the point that the very young infant, as of 
yet unable to grasp the notion of symbolic meaning, reaches out to its caregivers with the 
expectation of receiving something good, something that will nurture and sustain it. Lear 
suggests that part of this goodness includes an introduction into the symbolic world of meaning:  
Part of the sustenance our parenting figures will give us is the concepts with 
which we can at least begin to understand what we are longing for. This is a 
crucial aspect of acquiring a natural language: inheriting a culture’s set of 
concepts through which we can understand ourselves as desiring, wishing, and 
hoping for certain things. It is because of our finite, erotic natures that we come to 
conceive of ourselves as finite erotic creatures. (Lear, 1969, pp. 122-123) 
 Whereas Becker’s interpretation of the symbolic emphasizes its defensive function 
(against the fear of annihilation of being), Lear’s highlights the inherently life-affirming aspect 
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of culture’s symbols and their necessity for assimilating our meaning-making nature. Per Lear, 
“the emphasis here is not on some mysterious source of goodness, but on the limited nature of 
our finite conceptual resources” (1969, pp. 121-122). In other words, just because we do not 
possess a satisfactory conceptual paradigm for making sense of a new situation does not mean 
that one will not present itself, just as the old one may have unexpectedly crumbled or showed 
itself to be insufficient in some way.     
 Conclusion. As Stolorow (2011) suggests, the impact of overwhelming and emotionally 
traumatic experience exists on a continuum. ABDT (2011) explains how this continuum works at 
the level of the individual, with its mild to severe disruption in the anxiety-buffering system, 
while Salzman and Halloran (2004) illustrate the catastrophic impact that severe disruptions in 
culture can have on entire groups of people and Lear (1969) shows that psychological adaptation 
to cultural devastation in the form of radical hope is possible as an alternative to despair. In the 
next section, I would like to examine this spectrum of trauma at the level of society; that is, I 
would like to explore the idea that the erosion of the cultural worldview of religion in the face of 
modern developments and reflexivity was experienced as a trauma at both ends of the spectrum: 
as a gradual but nonetheless significant series of micro traumas, that, due to culture’s inability to 
construct a meaningful and affect-regulating narrative to make meaning of the transition, 
developed into a tension that ultimately found expression through a series of catastrophic 
traumas that have decimated generations of individuals through war and cyclical geopolitical 
conflict.  
 Cumulative social trauma. My argument in this section is that our gradual (but 
dramatic) ability to manipulate nature, expressed through myriad economic, political, scientific, 
technological and social changes that define early modernity, represents not only a series of 
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tremendous achievements but a social cumulative trauma which slowly weakened any 
sustainable cultural worldview defense against existential terror.  
 In a posthumously published paper, Elizabeth Young-Bruehl (2012) draws parallels 
between the development of individuals and society in what she calls the microcosm-macrocosm 
trend, a cycle of incremental evolution and growth that individuals and society (as elements of 
nature) are bound up in the service of eudaimonia, an Aristotelian notion of human flourishing. 
Hers is a distinctly positive perspective regarding the development of humankind, which, in 
many ways, serves as an interesting and even stark counterpoint to the views of existential 
philosophy, which negates absolute systems and efforts to order the chaos, as well as Freud’s 
notion of the death instinct and its attendant focus on the aggressive tendencies of civilization. 
Young-Bruehl’s adaptation of Masud Khan’s (1963) concept of cumulative trauma—itself a 
synthesis of Freud’s (1920) concept of the ‘protective shield’ and Winnicott’s (1952a) notion of 
the good-enough holding environment—contributes to our understanding of the role social 
institutions play as a protective barrier against existential concerns. Young-Bruehl defines the 
protective shield of society as “a relational network of people and institutions that grows up to 
enwrap basic social units—like families, but also states—in customs, programs, and ideas of 
eudaimonia that prevent the units’ failure and remedy their ills medically and 
psychotherapeutically” (2012, p. 550) 
 According to Khan (1963), cumulative trauma is the result of slight but frequent 
impingements on the anaclitic (dependency) needs of the infant, which as occasional occurrences 
would be harmless, but that over time - in their repetitive sum - constitute a trauma. Central to 
the notion of cumulative trauma is the mother’s role as a protective shield: The mother provides 
auxiliary ego-support for the child and protects it from internal and external overstimulation by 
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managing its physical environment and comfort and protecting the infant from “the mother’s 
subjective and unconscious love and hate, and thus allows her empathy to be maximally 
receptive to the infant’s needs” (Khan, 1963, p. 48). When the mother performs the protective 
shield function successfully, she helps the child reach ego maturity in a developmentally 
appropriate fashion. Cumulative trauma results from the strain of ongoing breaches in the 
protective shield function the mother provides: 
It is only when these failures of the mother as protective shield are significantly 
frequent and have the rhythm of a pattern, and lead to impingements on the 
infant’s psych-soma, impingements which he has no means of eliminating, that 
they set up a nucleus of pathogenic reactions. (Khan, 1963, p. 48) 
 Khan points out that this process is qualitatively and quantitatively different from other 
(potentially more catastrophic) forms of trauma such as loss or separation from the mother, 
intrusion of her acute psychopathology (break-in) into the mind of the child, or trauma that 
occurs due to some uncontrollable factor related to the infant’s constitution such as debilitating 
illness. These forms of trauma are akin to the severe forms of trauma discussed earlier, that are 
more likely to overwhelm the individual with anxiety, whereas cumulative trauma represents a 
process rather than an event, of gradual and incremental chipping away at a protective agent, in 
this case, the mother’s auxiliary ego function as a protective shield. Another defining 
characteristic of cumulative trauma is that it can only be identified in hindsight, typically during 
the clinical encounter when the analyst observes a “bias in ego and psychosexual development” 
(Khan, 1963, p. 57, emphasis in original) that has shaped the adult personality. 
 Adopting Khan’s theory to understand the role of society in protecting the individual, 
Young-Bruehl (2012) writes:  
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A society provides the individuals who constitute it with a protective shield or 
shields, and there are traumas that breach these shields of existential belonging 
and social care or service and political union. A social shield can be broken 
through in many ways and degrees that are analogous to traumas of rupture, of 
break-in, and—perhaps the most common—of cumulative social erosion and 
deterioration and failure over time (p. 552). 
 Young-Bruehl’s adaptation of cumulative trauma to society is meant to provide support 
for her view that “humankind has been united in and by common terror, shared traumatization” 
(2012, p. 545) of the mass violence and genocide unleashed during the first half of the 20th 
century. She attributes the advances in modern technologies of transportation, communication 
and modes of warfare as laying the groundwork for the break-in (catastrophic) trauma of the 
Second World War. She argues: 
The profound—unprecedented—rupture and break-in trauma cluster of the 
Second World War became a cumulative trauma as the generation suffering it 
transmitted it to their children, and as the events it set in train continued to 
traumatize both the adults and their children and grandchildren—thereby setting 
off more traumatic events (p. 552).  
 Young-Bruehl understands the wars and emergence of terrorism in the mid-20th –early 
21st centuries (e.g., Vietnam, 9/11) as a compulsive repetition as survivors of the WWII 
generation transmitted the trauma and suffering they endured to the next generation (and then the 
next, and so on) by the defensive mechanism of identification with the aggressor.  
 Young-Bruehl’s insight regarding cumulative social trauma is well placed in the sense 
that it frames our thinking about how the cultural worldview defense of religion can be likened to 
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a protective shield, much in the same way TMT describes the distal defense function of cultural 
worldviews in the anxiety-buffer system. My position differs from hers in that I locate the 
cumulative social trauma in the centuries leading up to the 20th century, in which gradual but 
repeated strain was placed on the primary cultural defense against existential terror (e.g., 
religion, communal life), ultimately leading to its rather catastrophic collapse (i.e., break-in 
trauma) in the first half of the 20th century, shaking the bedrock of pre-modern versions of 
ontological security to their core (on this I am in agreement with Young-Bruehl).  
Young-Bruehl is correct in the sense that what has transpired since the Second World 
War can be seen as a collective retraumatization from one generation to the next. However, this 
fails to account for the formative cultural antecedents that inspired the catastrophic trauma she 
describes. I think a stronger argument can be made by acknowledging the psychological distress 
that accompanied centuries of cultural flux as central to the erosion of ontological security in the 
shift from traditional society to modernity, which was eventually lived out as a series of 
catastrophic traumas when the reflexivity of modernity (as described by Giddens, 1990, 1991) 
came to bear its fullest force upon the world, most notably during the First and Second World 
Wars.  
Tyranny as a response to ontological insecurity. With greater insight into the insidious 
effects of cumulative social trauma on the Western psyche in recent centuries we can begin to 
examine what happens when individuals and society repeatedly fail in their efforts to find relief 
from existential anxiety. The project of the self is, if not by design than by default, the only new 
paradigm of meaning that has come about in past centuries to replace religion and communal 
life. At this time, however, the self as a paradigm of cultural defense against existential terror is 
not sufficiently robust to shoulder the task. It remains unclear whether the failure of the self as a 
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paradigm of defense is best attributed to its nascent stage of development (religion had thousands 
of years after all to develop, and did so in the crucible of prolonged periods of violence), an 
inherent inadequacy, or, is simply doomed to fail (per the existential view). The effects of this 
failure, however, are painfully present in the turmoil of past decades and centuries. In this 
section, we will contemplate the rise in totalitarian regimes in the 20th century from the 
perspective of culture’s response to the erosion of ontological security in the modern era.  
In his book The Death of Sigmund Freud, Mark Edmundson (2007) chronicles Freud’s 
interest in the problem of authority and the parallel rise of National Socialism in Germany that 
eventually forced Freud and his family to flee Austria. According to Edmundson, after decades 
exploring the unconscious dynamics of desire, Freud “hit upon a fundamental difficulty in 
human life: the problem of authority” (2007, p. 54) in 1914 and spent the next 25 years writing 
about the human need to submit to a greater power, especially in the form of tyranny. In 
Edmundson’s interpretation of Freud, his earlier works that focused on the unconscious 
(including his case studies) demonstrated an optimism that insight could lead to a reduction in 
neurotic psychological distress, but over time this view gave way to a darker, less optimistic 
perspective on the human condition that Freud begins to explore in his question regarding 
authority, and most concretely, his proposal of the death instinct.  
The question of authority is posed utilizing Freud’s structural theory of a psyche in which 
its three components (id, ego, and super-ego) are in perpetual conflict. The super-ego acts as the 
agent of authority and becomes unduly harsh toward the ego when id impulses press for 
discharge (in real or imagined form). The result, as Edmundson points out, is psychic tension, 
and ultimately, emotional pain. To dull the pain, individuals seek intoxicants such as love and 
alcohol, which provide a modicum of relief by relaxing the super-ego’s harshness, however 
106 
 
 
 
temporarily, from the unpleasant and often unbearable pain of psychic conflict. Leaders, then, 
also function as a kind of intoxicant in that they provide relief, but do so by co-opting the 
individual’s super-ego. An absolute leader, like Hitler (or Stalin, or Pol Pot, or Mao Zedong), 
provides a super-ego substitute that is at once decisive and permissive – the values he upholds 
are clear and the means for achieving them are equally transparent. The absolute leader 
eliminates difference and is associated with ideals of permanence: god, destiny, equality, 
absolute truth. Edmundson (2007) summarizes the characteristics of the absolute leader: 
We want a strong man with a simple doctrine that accounts for our sufferings, 
identifies our enemies, focuses our energies, and lets us indulge our forbidden 
desires with the best of conscience. This sort of man, appearing at the right 
moment, mouthing the right deceptions, rams life full of meaning and gives us, 
more enduringly than wine and even than love, a sense of being whole. Suddenly 
we are not at war within ourselves. The sense of anxiety departs and we feel free. 
(p. 103) 
Edmundson notes that the absolute leader provides an illusion of oneness and gives 
individuals permission to discharge the tension related to psychic conflict.  
For Freud, aggressive energy has two alternatives: it can be repressed, in which case it 
comes under the purview of the individual’s super-ego (causing tension); or, it can be 
discharged, which releases tension but causes destruction. Freud’s hope for humankind was to 
foster the development of an alternative to destruction that did not allow the super-ego to unduly 
punish the ego (i.e., sublimation) while embracing the notion that some amount of psychic 
tension is both unavoidable and in certain ways, desirable.  However, as we saw earlier in our 
discussion of Future of an Illusion, Freud realized that at our core, we all seek internal peace, or 
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freedom from conflict, and will thus do what we can in pursuit of that goal. The upshot of this 
reality is that we are willing to submit to forms of authority that promise to organize our lives, to 
reduce tension, and allow us to feel connected to a power greater than ourselves.  
Edmundson approaches Freud’s attention to the problem of authority from the 
perspective of modernity and the changing social/political climate of the early 20th century. From 
this perspective, the rise of Hitler, while reflecting the specific circumstances of Germany 
following her defeat in the First World War, is representative of a much deeper struggle over the 
advent of modern life and the psychological need for merger and containment of anxiety that 
resulted from the loss of stability when traditional modes of authority crumbled. Describing 
Hitler and the Nazis, Edmundson (2007) writes, “Their way was to bring the present under 
control through the triumph of one leader, one party, one race, and one nation. They insisted on 
oneness in a world that seemed to be flying apart into unmanageable fragments” (p. 42). While 
the introduction of liberal democracy provided many freedoms and benefits, Edmundson 
suggests it was also disorienting as it created fertile ground for dissenting perspectives and lack 
of order. For Edmundson, the 20th century was plagued by an uncertainty that created more 
anxiety and tension than most individuals could bear. This laid the groundwork for the rise of 
fascism in Europe and the subsequent revival of religious fundamentalism across the world:  
From the Freudian perspective, authoritarian religion and authoritarian politics are 
two sides of one debased coin. They feed off each other, borrow techniques, 
modes of persuasion, iconography. They traffic in the same sorts of miracle, 
mystery, and authority. And they are the most plausible form of human destiny: 
they are where humanity will go without potent efforts of resistance. Freud’s 
work suggests that no one should ever think that fascism and fundamentalism are 
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gone and done with. There is no such thing as an eternal triumph over them. 
Because they are so integral to what it is to be human, no one should even think 
that humanity has defeated them once and for all. This was the error of the liberal 
nineteenth century. (Edmundson, 2007, pp. 240-241) 
When the lack of order becomes too anxiety-provoking, as it undoubtedly did in the 
political and economic turmoil of the early 20th century, individuals became more willing to 
forgo personal liberty for the sake of security. Feeling that old ways of life and their attendant 
symbols of authority and security were on the verge of annihilation, individuals looked to 
absolute leaders who sanctioned the release of pent-up tension and aggression that could not be 
adequately repressed.  
  Chapter Four: Psychoanalysis Fails to Provide Relief from Existential Terror 
 In the preceding chapters, we have seen how advances in science and technology rapidly 
changed the social order of the Western world. In the final chapter, I would like the address the 
place of psychoanalysis in this cultural transition. Psychoanalysis, as Rieff pointed out, 
developed in response to the crisis of authority engendered by the rapid shifts in technology and 
society that define the last two centuries. Religious faith and communal forms of living ceased to 
function as adequate buffers against existential terror while the role of the individual and the 
project of the ‘self’ became increasingly prominent in the nineteenth century. Freud, having 
recognized how traditional forms of authority had become sickness-inducing to modern 
individuals, sought to emancipate his patients from the tyranny of oppressive symbols of 
authority. In its place, he offered psychoanalytic theories and praxis as a means of working 
through our need for authority so we could invest our energies in the world in a more satisfying 
way. 
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Following the “medicalization” of psychoanalysis in the mid-twentieth century in the 
United States, psychoanalysis was the primary treatment model available to mental health 
professionals and its practitioners enjoyed tremendous academic and material resources in 
addition to social prestige in professional circles and popular culture. However, in recent 
decades, the star of psychoanalysis  has faded.  No longer the gold standard of psychological 
treatment, psychoanalysis has been eschewed by the medical establishment in favor of biological 
psychiatry and the study of the brain. The institutional and social prestige that psychoanalysts 
(initially only medical doctors ) once enjoyed dwindled with the shift to psychopharmacology 
and the inclusion of psychologists in psychoanalytic training institutes. Currently, psychoanalysis 
has become marginalized within American psychology despite its growing contribution to the 
evidence-based treatment literature and other forms of empirical research in the field, as well as 
its ability to attract creative thinkers who continue to revolutionize psychoanalytic theory in 
keeping with changes in contemporary culture. How do we make sense of this radical reversal of 
fortune?  
 Strenger (2015) suggests that psychoanalysis is not poised to make a comeback in the 
realm of academic psychiatry due to the entrenched nature of cognitive neuroscience in the 
university setting. However, he believes that psychoanalysis can reinvigorate its standing in the 
public domain by engaging with the “third culture”: a space where experts in their field connect 
directly with the public via articles in prominent newspapers, books written with a lay audience 
in mind, and various internet-based forums (e.g., TED talks) that allow ideas from the scientific 
and academic communities to reach a wider audience of educated lay individuals. Why does 
entree into this third culture matter for psychoanalysis? 
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Strenger argues that the globalized nature of our economic and social worlds challenges 
the notion of cultural superiority:  
Cultures can only survive if the ontological status of its objects of belief and the 
source of its values is not questioned, whether these be prophets, saints, canonical 
works of art, or the rituals that hold a culture together. But this is becoming 
progressively more difficult when the reach of the global infotainment system 
intrudes everywhere, and even traditional forms of life realize that they are but 
specks within a global system immensely more powerful than any particular 
cultural form of life. (2015, p. 296) 
In a world in which value has become a subjective matter, the only way to know who is 
truly ahead is to quantify that which matters to us. The “craze of quantification” (Strenger, 2015, 
p. 295) can be seen everywhere: Countries are ranked by the statistics of their GDP, debt levels, 
mortality rates, etc.; individuals by their wealth, celebrity and influence (determined by number 
of views, likes, comments on a feed, friends/followers, etc.). Strenger makes the point that the 
subjective experience of quality becomes meaningless when numbers dictate value, which is a 
potential problem when the value of the self is cast in these terms. Strenger sees considerable 
suffering implicit in the trend toward simplification and quantification of meaning (2015). 
Human beings have not become any less complex than in previous periods, if anything, the 
barrage of social and economic demands we contend with and the myriad roles we play in life 
make our identities more complex than in previous eras.  
According to Strenger (2015), the most important message psychoanalysis has to offer 
modern individuals is validation of their complexity. The self, he contends, is meaningful owing 
to its depth and complexity and should resist the push to one-dimensional form. His hope for 
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psychoanalysis is that it can find a way to participate in mainstream society (he advocates for 
inclusion in the third culture) so that it can communicate ideas that are desperately needed. 
Doing so will not only help to keep psychoanalysis relevant but allow it to do its ultimate job, 
which is to use its concepts to help people make sense of their experience of the world: “We 
should see reaching out to the wider culture as our duty, as an integral part of our professional 
ethos and mission—of deciphering human experience and alleviating suffering through 
understanding” (Strenger, 2015, p. 304). The validation of the self’s complexity as a valuable 
source of meaning is no small task in a world that pushes for simplification of meaning in the 
service of quantifying the value of an experience. Per Strenger, the message psychoanalysis has 
to deliver is as important today as ever, and in order to deliver its message psychoanalysis must 
find its way back into mainstream culture. To do so, psychoanalysts must learn to connect 
emotionally with an audience that has little or no background in psychoanalytic theory, and make 
a compelling case for their ideas by winning over hearts and minds in 18 minutes or less. 
Needless to say, this is not small task for anyone, let alone a tradition of people who 
stereotypically find themselves most comfortable behind the couch.  
Psychoanalysis fails 
 Beyond the manifest reasons for the diminished status of psychoanalysis in academia and 
medicine, and its as-of-yet inability to integrate itself into current cultural milieu, psychoanalysis 
faces other challenges to its longevity. What do we mean when we say psychoanalysis fails? In 
my view, psychoanalysis fails at various levels. First, psychoanalysis fails because all systems of 
meaning are doomed to fail. Psychoanalysis cannot eradicate the anxiety inherent in living, and 
thus will always be limited, as all systems are, by its ability to turn diffuse anxiety about human 
vulnerability into a concrete problem that can be addressed. The paradox of modernity is that we 
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live in a cultural paradigm based on reflexivity that defies certainty yet demands the symbolic 
possibility of omnipotence at the same time to manage existential anxiety.  
 This leads to the second reason why psychoanalysis fails: it does not provide an effective 
enough buffer against existential terror. The premise of the “analytic attitude,” per Rieff, is that 
there is no one standing behind the analyst. In other words, psychoanalysis does not assume a 
role of omnipotence and thus leaves the individual, albeit with tools to manage life in a 
successful way, without the promise of authority. This is by design. Freud, having recognized 
how traditional forms of authority had become sickness-inducing to modern individuals, sought 
to emancipate his patients from the tyranny of oppressive symbols of authority. In its place, he 
offered psychoanalytic theories and praxis as a means of working through our need for authority 
so we could invest our energies in the world in a less stultifying way. Although Freud recognized 
that the need for authority stemmed from contact with vulnerability, he thought that with the 
right form of treatment people could rise above this need and assume a stance of “maturity.” 
What he failed to recognize, for reasons we will discuss shortly, is that even successful 
attainment of the mature attitude with respect to authority and successful investment in the 
world, while monumental achievements in their own right, do not extinguish the fundamental 
human need to feel connected to an external source of authority.  
 There is also the third issue of how difficult this stance of maturity is to achieve, both at a 
practical level and a psychological one. As clinicians know, there is no expedient route to 
psychological growth and maturity. It often requires prolonged periods of emotionally painful 
and monetarily draining effort. The “prize” for one’s hard-won “maturity” is not the fulfillment 
of one’s potential, or self-actualization, though these things are within the realm of possibility. If 
anything, psychoanalytic treatment might make these things possible, but it does not procure 
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them as a matter of course. In fact, one critique of the therapeutic persuasion that has grown out 
of psychoanalytic treatment is the idea that it creates sick individuals who search for a cure that 
will forever elude them, thus turning the therapeutic modality into a form of tail-chasing that 
generates more misery than it solves.  
 Psychoanalysis is a system. In his concise but robustly argued Terrors and Experts 
(1995), psychoanalyst Adam Phillips draws our attention to the human need for “experts” or 
authority figures to help manage the basic fears of existence. Like many authors we have 
reviewed thus far, Phillips suggests the need for experts derives from the infant’s earliest 
experience of helplessness, defined in terms of overwhelming and/or uncontrollable somatic 
sensation. He argues that the pain and suffering of this early experience ruptures the infant’s 
fantasy of self-sufficiency and prompts him or her to seek relief through contact with others - 
others who know something about the world and can protect him or her from recurrent pain. 
Thus, the instillation of one’s parents as the first figures of authority (vis-à-vis the child’s 
dependence) is achieved and becomes the prototype for all future objects of transference 
(Phillips notes with some irony the futility of such a project in light of the fact that adults are not 
in possession of superior knowledge regarding the grand mysteries of life but are nevertheless 
endowed with the power to decide what constitutes an explanation in relation to the child).  
 Psychoanalysis and fear. Following Freud, Becker, and others, Phillips asserts that the 
second fear to arise in early childhood is the fear of loss of the parents, which is compounded by 
the issues dependency engenders, including the fear of loss of the caregiver’s attention (i.e., 
abandonment), fear of misrecognition of the infant’s needs (i.e., retraumatization), and the strong 
ambivalent feelings dependency inevitably evokes. The third fear that shapes human experience, 
according to Phillips, is the resultant tension of dependence and agency:  
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Fear is clearly linked in Freud’s writing with dependence, and the related question 
of agency; fear becomes both a recognition of its absence, and a relative 
limitation: our fantasies of autonomy are circumscribed by fear. But fear also 
initiates the child into the question of agency. The evolving question for the infant 
and child is: What capacity do I have to secure a future? (1995, p. 51) 
Phillips asserts that all human beings suffer from fear; fear being the foundation of 
religion and neurosis. It should be noted that in accordance with our earlier discussion of Becker 
and Bass in chapter one, Phillips recognizes that the ego’s defensive structure (and by extension 
symptom formation) is established in response to this earliest fear and maintained for the very 
purpose of regulating fear associated with helplessness. In this light, our most primitive defenses 
are, as Bass iterated in his work, derived to protect us not only from the object of fear itself (the 
concretized form of infantile terror), but from awareness that the object of fear exists.  
The developmental origins of fear, however, are not the focal point of Phillips’ 
discussion. He is primarily concerned with what human beings do with this fear vis-à-vis 
authority, and the implications this has for psychoanalysis. Fear, Phillips notes (in a vein similar 
to existential philosophy), is a fear of something; by concretizing an unpleasant experience that 
happened in the past, by making it something we can (potentially) know about, we can actively 
construct ways of protecting ourselves from re-experiencing the same unpleasant experience in 
the future. The goal then, is to take nebulous feeling of anxiety, and turn it into fear by creating 
an object that can then be dealt with, consciously and unconsciously. In this way, as we have 
already discussed, fear and anxiety differ in that fear is concrete, it has an object, whereas 
anxiety is diffuse. 
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One of the aims of psychoanalysis is to turn anxiety back into fear, to locate the 
object that the ego uses anxiety to conceal from itself. Fear is the real thing – 
which implies a human subject secure in its capacity for knowledge; anxiety is a 
terrible skepticism, an unknowing full of ominous expectation. Fear has an object, 
anxiety has a vague location. (1995, p. 59) 
Phillips suggests that Freud’s notion of the repetition compulsion can be understood in 
terms of fear that has developmental roots – the fear of infantile helplessness and the possibility 
of loss (of the love object).  The way one constructs his or her defenses with respect to these 
fears can also be cast in the light of desire: one finds a way to maintain a tie to the fear in the 
defense itself; while simultaneously creating the future out of the past with the promise that 
mastery (i.e., protection) is possible, the feared thing can be laid to rest. A Freudian 
psychoanalysis would aim to uncover the object of fear, and through decathexis—the process of 
mourning and working through—diminishing the need for compulsive repetition of the original 
trauma, and subsequently enlarging the patient’s ego. In the Freudian version, repetition is a 
form of self-protection related to the past.  
Returning to the issue of anxiety that lacks an object, Phillips wonders about another 
defensive function of repetition: “Perhaps the most difficult thing to acknowledge, to bear, is that 
there is a feeling called fear that has neither a cause nor an object” (1995, p. 59). Following 
Sartre, Phillips argues that fear is also fear of freedom - the idea of agency means there is nobody 
and nothing (e.g., parents, instincts, developmental trauma) to guide (or control) us. Repetition, 
then, serves to keep the future predictable. Predictability is comforting, especially relative to the 
unknown, even if it is tinged with the possibility of unwanted pain. According to Phillips, 
repetition can be viewed as a form of Sartre’s ‘bad faith’ – an obstacle to authenticity that is 
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reinforced through our deference to authority and preference for a predictable (if potentially 
painful) future over an unknowable one. On the other hand, fear in the context of freedom can 
also represent the route to authenticity. By acknowledging that there is no knowable future, no 
knowable self even – other than the one that will make choices about how to be at a future time – 
there are no constraints on the future; a situation that is likely to put us in contact with incredible 
dread. 
 We become ‘serial experts,’ according to Philips (1995), continuously expanding our 
store of knowledge in an attempt to turn anxiety into fear of something and finding a solution for 
the concrete problem through knowledge. All designed to keep awareness of death, isolation, 
meaninglessness and angst still abound. In this light, psychoanalysis is a system of ideas that 
transforms the nebulous fear associated with basic human vulnerability into something concrete 
– the human psyche.  
 Conclusion. Like other systems that attempt to manage the anxiety associated with 
human vulnerability, psychoanalysis is focused on transforming this elusive anxiety into 
something that can be dealt with (such as medicine does with aliment of the body and technology 
does with control of our environment). The unique contribution of psychoanalysis is that it deals 
with the realm of subjective emotional experience. As a system, psychoanalysis is limited in its 
ability to cure in the absolute sense of the word because it cannot alter the nature of the human 
condition and its attendant vulnerabilities. In this vein, psychoanalysis is surely doomed to fail, 
as are all systems of meaning. Culture changes as the demands of individuals and communities to 
manage the derivative contents of the basic human vulnerability evolve over time. The very 
changes that led to a rise in the prominence of subjective experience and the struggle for self-
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determination in the transition from traditional culture to modernity may require a novel set of 
tools to navigate future changes in culture.  
Freud’s disavowal of helplessness. 
In his recently published Freud: An Intellectual Biography, Joel Whitebook (2017) 
makes the case that Freud’s theories are well-formulated for the challenges posed by modernity, 
namely a theory of mourning for the illusions of traditional culture, but are limited by two issues: 
the first is Freud’s inability to fully grasp the maternal dimension of early psychic development; 
the second is that because of this blind spot, Freud’s prescription of “maturity” as the project of 
modernity is a sobering experience that lacks mass appeal. Let us unpack this before proceeding 
further.  
Acceptance of finitude.  According to Whitebook, Freud’s psychoanalysis was primarily 
concerned with the “disenchantment” of traditional systems of meaning and “de-idealization” of 
authority figures – beginning with one’s parents – in the service of greater maturity, as defined 
by mourning the loss of the omnipotent other(s), acceptance of one’s finitude, and willingness to 
invest in the world despite these facts. In fact, Freud saw the entire project of modernity as the 
overcoming of infantilism - “being at the mercy of one’s helplessness” (Whitebook, 2017, p. 
394). Freud’s interpretation of religion, which was discussed at length in chapter two, sought to 
expose the infantile origins of religious faith and advocated for a more rational approach to 
living based on the acquisition of rational self-knowledge.  
Reflecting on Freud’s experience living through “the break with tradition”—the “massive 
social and cultural dislocations that accompanied the process of modernization in Europe” (p. 
10)—and his relationship with Jung, whose pull to the occult and “irrationalism” challenged 
Freud to articulate the end to which psychoanalysis should aim, Whitebook (2017) writes: 
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Jung sought to dismantle modernity and somehow “re-enchant” the world in order 
to escape what he experienced as “the banality of [modern] life.” To this end, he 
wanted psychoanalysis to become a new counter-religion. Freud, by contrast, 
sought to complete “the unfinished project of modernity” and the 
“disenchantment of the world,” understood as the struggle to reach maturity by 
overcoming “magical thinking” and achieving “the omnipotence of thoughts” (p. 
238). 
Jung and Freud responded to the breakdown in traditional culture to opposing ends. Jung 
advocated for a revival of the “irrational” in novel form, while Freud struck out on a new path 
emphasizing the need to mourn the loss of the same irrationalism (i.e., to accept the reality that 
omnipotent forms of authority were illusions whose losses needed to be mourned). Ultimately, 
Freud felt that Jung’s interpretation of psychoanalysis (and personal behavior) posed a threat to 
the movement, prompting Freud to break ties with his protégée.   
Whitebook notes that Freud’s preoccupation with rationality had just as much to do with 
his own psychology as with his prescience for the changing times. If Jung was guilty of 
“dismissing modern science as positivist” and ignoring “its epochal achievement: emancipating 
theoretical curiosity” (Whitebook, 2017, p. 255), then Freud was guilty of eschewing the 
irrational, infantile aspects of psychic experience to the detriment of a fuller, integrated 
psychoanalytic theory. 
Failure to engage with the maternal.  The second major theme of Whitebook’s 
biography addresses “the missing mother” and how Freud, owing to the traumatic experiences of 
his early childhood—especially the emotional absence of his mother—was not able to 
incorporate the irrational, preverbal dimension of psychic experience into his theory of 
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psychoanalysis. Whitebook reports that Freud experienced several traumatic losses in early 
childhood that closed him off to exploring the significance of the child’s early relationship with 
his mother, and with it, the urge for symbiosis or ‘limitless narcissism’ retained in the psyche of 
every individual. As a result, Freud’s work privileged the notion that the acknowledgement of 
one’s finitude demonstrated a triumph over omnipotence, failing to recognize the human need for 
merger as a pervasive human experience: 
Freud’s inability to engage with the figure of the early mother and his repudiation 
of the symbiotic wish in himself prevented him from acknowledging that the 
desire to restore “limitless narcissism” is one of the strongest sources of energy in 
psychic life (2017, p. 414). 
In other words, Freud’s overvaluation of independence and autonomy superseded the 
human yearning for merger that comes earlier in development as a response to infantile 
helplessness.  
Freud’s unconscious need to reject feelings of passivity and helplessness blinded him to 
the fact that human beings are programmed to seek merger for the sake of relief from this 
vulnerability. Although Freud acknowledges the terror that infantile helplessness evokes, his 
Oedipal-driven theory miscalculates the degree to which the urge to fuse in symbiotic 
relationship with the “breast-mother” is embedded in our unconscious. At its extreme, this 
“psychotic core” exists in all of us, says Whitebook. Furthermore, the ability to effectively 
mourn the loss of objects, primarily the infantile fantasies of our omnipotent parents, requires an 
ego that has successfully navigated earlier phases of separation from said objects and developed 
the capacity to symbolize loss. Freud’s theory thus jumps the gun by assuming the successful 
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evolution of psychological processes that, in the case of borderline and psychotic patients, are the 
first focus of treatment.  
  Conclusion. According to Whitebook, Freud’s “project of modernity” consists of 
mourning the loss of early authority figures that first shielded us from contact with our 
vulnerability. Freud, due to his personal history, was eager to distance himself from his own 
vulnerability, which he recast as infantilism.  Although Freud recognized human vulnerability at 
an intellectual level and addressed the role of helplessness in his theories, Freud’s inability to 
confront the feelings of early helplessness within himself prevented him from articulating a 
theory to address the earliest prototype of authority or omnipotence – the mother. The primary 
issue that Freud was reluctant, perhaps incapable of confronting, was the ubiquitous human need 
to feel connected to a source of comfort outside itself.   
 Freud’s failure to see this reflects not only his personal limitations, but the limitations of 
psychoanalysis as a whole. Breaking down the oppressive nature of traditional forms of authority 
does not definitively squelch the yearning for a master. As we will see in the next section, the 
attitude of maturity that Freud believed would free modern individual from oppressive forms of 
authority can be viewed as an oppressive form of control in itself.  
 The suffering self. I would like to conclude by examining a critique of the therapeutic, 
delivered from the perspective of sociologist Eva Illouz, in her book, Saving the Modern Soul: 
Therapy, Emotions, and the Culture of Self-Help (2008). Illouz maps the emergence of the 
‘therapeutic discourse,’ a cultural structure that sprang from Freud’s conception of the self in the 
first half of the 20th century and evolved into a therapeutic narrative of self-help that views the 
self as a suffering entity that must locate the origin of its pain (most often in early development) 
and actively work towards understanding the initial source of suffering and working through its 
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impact on one’s life to achieve higher levels of emotional competence. Emotional competence—
the ability to communicate effectively and manage relationships successfully—is based on the 
post-Freudian idea that emotions, more prominent in the lives of modern individuals than in any 
other era, must not only be understood, but controlled. Emotions have been co-opted not only for 
understanding the self and its intrinsic needs and desires, but to advance one’s self-interest and 
goals in the domains of work and personal relationships. Illouz (2008) contends that the 
therapeutic narrative as it has developed in the global capitalist culture does not liberate the self 
as much as transforms the self into a site for everything that ails it, creating a locus for the 
“diseases” of modern life that, “Far from actually helping manage the contradictions and 
predicaments of modern identity, the psychological discourse may only deepen them” (p. 246).  
 The Americanized Freud. According to Illouz (2008), Freud’s ideas claimed their stake 
in modern consciousness because they addressed the radical changes in the private spheres of life 
including sexuality, family life, and gender relations while providing cognitive tools for 
managing an increasingly complex set of competing identities. The self was understood to 
originate in the emotional crucible of the family of early childhood, and normality (as opposed to 
pathology) was only possible following a long and arduous process akin to the work of loss and 
mourning described by Whitebook in the previous section.  
Illouz (2008) asserts that Freud’s theories were significantly simplified and his “bleak 
determinism” (p. 157) was transformed into a theory emphasizing its positive and constructive 
elements that was better suited to American Protestant values. This transformation, in 
conjunction with the rise of the professional and social status of psychology in the United States 
and the institutionalization of psychological frameworks within the government (especially 
following the Second World War), corporations, and the health insurance and pharmacological 
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industry, solidified the place of therapeutic discourse in contemporary society, which over time 
morphed into the phenomenon of self-help psychology. Detailing Erickson’s and Rogers’ impact 
on the integration of Freud’s psychoanalysis into mainstream American psychology, Illouz 
(2008) writes: “These developments made psychology increasingly compatible with the values 
of the self-help ethos, for they suggested that growth and maturity were inherent components of 
the life course and that they were obtainable by conscious acts of will and volition” (pp. 158-
159). The result of such modification of Freud’s theory is that the self, while not responsible for 
the trauma or crisis that created the psychological distress (or pathology), is responsible for 
bringing about its remedy.  
While this stance clearly places the individual in a place of agency with respect to the 
sources of his or her psychological discomfort, Illouz argues that this model inadvertently 
propagates an image of the self that is inherently sick and maladjusted. The outcome of such a 
stance is problematic, according to Illouz, because it assumes that suffering always has a source, 
one that can be investigated and corrected if one has the conviction to do so. “In the therapeutic 
ethos, there is no such thing as senseless suffering and chaos, and this is why, in the final 
analysis, its cultural impact should worry us” (Illouz, 2008, p. 247). 
Therapeutic narrative and emotional maturity. The therapeutic narrative of self-help 
suggests that psychological maturity is possible, desirable, and the culminating feature of a self-
realized individual. Illouz (2008) believes that, on the contrary, the self-help narrative, by 
promoting the idea of a “sick” self that must be cured initiates a vicious cycle of psychological 
suffering:   
The therapeutic narrative posits normality as the goal of the narrative of self, but 
because the goal is never given a clear positive content it in fact produces a wide 
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variety of un-self-realized and therefore sick people. The narrative of self-help is 
thus not the remedy to failure or misery; rather, the very injunction to strive for 
higher levels of health and self-realization produces narratives of suffering. 
(Illouz, 2008, p. 176, emphasis in original) 
Thus, the notion of emotional maturity, initially posited by Freud as the project of 
modernity, has become a cultural model of selfhood that is problematic for several reasons.   
A reasonable aim? First, it suggests that individuals should be capable of achieving some 
finite level of emotional maturity with a single endpoint that marks fulfillment of a specific goal. 
While the process of therapy does aim toward greater levels of mastery in emotional and 
practical functioning, the complexity of this process—which mirrors the complexity of the 
individual’s inner life—does not fit well with the results-oriented culture that measures success 
in terms of number of pounds shed, dollars earned, dates secured, etc. (Strenger, 2015). If one 
gages success by a finite and quantifiable goal, what happens to morale when these goals go 
unmet, or prove unsustainable over long periods of time? Rather than viewing the path to 
maturity and personal growth as a lifelong process with ups and downs and detours along the 
way depending on how the events of one’s life unfold, the therapeutic culture that Illouz (2008) 
describes is based on the model of mass consumption in which what works for one person should 
work for all persons, and failure to achieve the desired goal is a failure of the self, not a failure of 
the system or its inability to comprehend the complexity of one’s inner life and external life 
circumstance (past and present). The fact is that failure, or setbacks, are much more probable 
than a linear path to success. This calls to mind the proliferation of motivational interviewing and 
harm reduction strategies in the realm of addiction treatment that recognize the likelihood of 
relapse and the need to keep the client engaged by anticipating the tremendous difficulty one is 
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likely to encounter when trying to modify deeply entrenched behaviors. Similarly, the 
psychoanalytic act of coming to know oneself, getting closer to oneself, is never complete.  
Maturity as a form of social control. This brings us to the second problem with the 
therapeutic ideal of maturity. The assumption that emotional maturity is desirable is culturally 
constructed, beginning with Freud. As the demands of public and private life became more 
complex and the lines between them blurred in the 20th century, Illouz (2008) shows how 
emotions came to occupy a central position of importance in late modernity and how mastery of 
one’s emotions has become the sine qua non of professional and personal success in this age: 
To the extent that emotions point to the entanglement of the self in a social 
relation, they also point to one’s dependence on others. Emotional control thus 
points to a model of sociability in which one must display the ability to remove 
oneself from the reach of others in order to better cooperate with them. The 
emotional control of the type propounded by the therapeutic persuasion is at once 
the mark of a disengaged self (busy with self-mastery and control) and of a 
sociable self—bracketing emotions for the sake of entering into relations with 
others. (p. 104, emphasis in original) 
In this context, Illouz suggests that emotions are not only a source of information about 
the self, but a tool to be deployed for the sake of personal gain. In the workplace, Illouz (2008) 
describes an “emotional capitalism” at work in which the “emotional self” (p. 82) has become a 
tool to promote one’s self interest by directing or curtailing the expression of emotion for the 
sake of getting what one wants out of a situation (for example, managing one’s anger at work to 
avoid conflict with the boss). In contrast, nonstrategic expression of emotion is considered 
uncouth and betrays a kind of emotional immaturity that is likely to have negative consequences 
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on one’s professional and personal relationships. Using words to describe our internal 
experience, the medium of psychoanalytic therapy, while immensely important and designed for 
this purpose to allow for reflection on the emotional experience, is nevertheless a process of 
detachment from the lived experience of emotion. Illouz (2008) wonders what is given up when 
we focus almost exclusively on verbalized expression of our perceptions and emotional 
reactions: “I would argue that culturally the therapeutic persuasion may have been responsible 
for a vast process of verbal overshadowing that makes linguistic self-introspection a substitute 
for nonverbal ways of functioning in social interactions” (p. 245). The devaluation of nonverbal 
aspects of experience and communication appears to be a common theme in the emotional 
awakening of modernity,  
Ironically, the more aware of and reliant on emotions we have become in the modern era, 
the more control society demands of us in managing them. This brings up the issue of freedom 
and authenticity (and the false self, which Strenger, 2015, similarly touched upon in the context 
of delivering a lecture in which he described the potential effects of denying the complexity of 
the self in contemporary society). Regarding these issues, I would only like to add that the idea 
of using emotions for the sake of achieving one’s socially-constructed goals of personal and 
professional success leaves much to be desired in the way of authentic living. This of course 
raises the issue of whether therapeutic endeavors, such as psychoanalysis, function in service of 
maintaining oppressive cultural norms or are subversive to them. On its face, the social demand 
to curb expression of emotions has merit: order must be maintained for the sake of smooth 
functioning of society. However, the cultural goal of emotional self-sufficiency denies our co-
dependence as a species and denies “irrational” but meaningful emotional states from finding 
expression. The denial of such emotional states does not eradicate them from our psyche and 
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may in fact lead to an “acting out” of such emotions that can be detrimental to the individual and 
society. If we are to be fully human and not cultural automatons, we must have some relief from 
the stifling and distance inducing aspects of modern culture, which means having access to the 
full range of our emotional repertoire.  
Overestimation of personal agency. The third assumption, that emotional maturity is 
solely within the purview of the self is problematic because it endows us with perhaps too much 
agency. The self-help narrative causes individuals to believe that they alone are responsible for 
their success in life, emotional and material, and that failure to achieve their goals is indicative of 
a failure of the self, a failure of the will; and thus, the individual alone is responsible for his 
suffering. I agree with Illouz (2008) that the ethos of the self-help narrative, by locating the 
source of suffering in the individual, suggests that there is no senseless suffering. The need to 
rationalize or reverse the inequitable distribution of resources on this planet is a reasonable 
endeavor; the alternative is to contend with the fact that bad things do happen and that suffering 
does not always have a silver lining.  
 Conclusion. I believe the psychoanalysis fails not because it lacks value, indeed I see 
tremendous value in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis and psychodynamic 
psychotherapy. Psychodynamic treatment has the potential to revive developmental processes 
that have stalled and repair maladaptive patterns of relating that generate considerable 
intrapsychic pain and impede productive and relational functioning in the world (i.e., impairment 
in professional and personal relationships). Gabbard and Westen (2003) report that 
psychoanalysis as a treatment model evokes change from multiple avenues – that the acquisition 
of insight (through free association and interpretation) goes hand-in-hand with elements of the 
therapeutic relationship that foster personal growth and maturity. Through internalization of the 
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analyst’s affective attitudes, interpretive function, and experience of the analyst as a new yet 
familiar object, the patient is able to modify various cognitive and emotional pathways to 
perception of experience in the service of greater autonomy and connectedness to others:   
A principal mode of therapeutic action involves the patient's increasing ability to perceive 
himself in the analyst's mind while simultaneously developing a greater sense of the separate 
subjectivity of the analyst (Gabbard & Westen, 2003, p. 825). In doing so, the patient becomes 
more free to explore his or her subjective desires and forge a path toward authentic living, which 
includes greater emotional maturity and flexibility, which often have meaningful implications for 
the improvement of personal relationships and professional and creative pursuits.  
 So, while psychoanalysis is limited in its ability to quell existential terror, it is a valuable 
project that should be recognized for its ability to help individuals mourn whatever individual 
loss(es) are required to find a modicum of pleasure and engagement in the world. The failure 
then of psychoanalysis is not a failure to deliver on its promise to help individuals become better-
adjusted to life, rather a failure to provide relief from existential terror itself. This of course is not 
a claim that psychoanalysis has ever made, if it exists at all it would be the result from its success 
in the early half of the last century, and the disappointment would be from its inability to live up 
to this impossibility (just as psychiatry is experiencing today). If “the fulfilled life is not one in 
which the existential equation is solved, but a life in which the existential equation is lived out 
fruitfully and creatively,” (Strenger, 2011, p. 80) then psychoanalysis as an intellectual and 
professional movement reflects a lived experience of existential struggle. 
Summary 
This project has aimed to show how the presence of existential concerns are woven into 
the fabric of culture. The focus of my inquiry has been on the defensive function culture plays 
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vis-à-vis existential terror, and analyzing the effects on individuals and society living through a 
period of significant cultural change, namely the shift from traditional culture to modernity, and 
how symbols of authority have changes and as a result, the efficacy of the cultural defense has 
been weakened.  
In chapter one, we explored the concept of existential terror by way of existential 
philosophy beginning with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, unpacking various elements of human 
vulnerability – namely: conscious awareness of our mortality, the inevitability of freedom and 
our responsibility for creating meaning and living authentically, the separateness from others that 
cannot be bridged, and the knowledge that absolute systems of meaning are a necessary illusion.  
Then we examined the theories of Yalom and Becker (aided by Bass), who suggest that 
extreme and prolonged dependence in infancy sets up a developmental trajectory whereby the 
cognitive process of disavowal allows for denial of separateness from the primary caregiver to 
manage intolerable feelings of helplessness that result from overwhelming sensory stimulation. 
The affective consequence of this process is an unconscious desire to merge with a powerful 
other that remains active in the psyche over the course of one’s lifetime to varying degree, 
depending upon the individual’s navigation of the separation/individuation phase of development 
and exposure to external stressors. In this context, transference can be understood as a 
psychological mechanism for managing the anxiety associated with basic human vulnerability. 
As development progresses, the child begins to develop a symbolic identity that is based on 
transference to one’s parents and subsequent identification with their authority through culture. 
Cultural symbols of authority generate feelings of safety and agency as they provide meaningful 
ways of engaging in the world and represent the primary vehicle by which self-esteem is 
constructed and maintained.  
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Our review of Terror Management Theory provided the empirical substantiation for the 
notion that culture serves a defensive function against awareness of existential terror. 
Specifically, the studies we reviewed showed how human beings respond to conscious and 
unconscious reminders of their mortality: conscious reminders of death were met with proximal 
defenses of denial and avoidance, whereas unconscious (i.e., subliminal) reminders of mortality 
promote symbolic modes of transcendence, cultural worldviews being one of the most effective 
forms of defense against awareness of existential concerns.  
In chapter two, we investigated how existential terror operates at the level of culture. 
Specifically, we examined how radical changes in technology and science, the rise of a capitalist 
economy, and with it, a reshuffling of social values newly focused on the nuclear family, 
impacted the individual’s psyche and culture with respect to existential terror. The transition 
from a cultural defense based on the paradigm of religion in which god functions as an 
externalized figure of authority to the self, an internalized form of authority, generated 
tremendous existential anxiety in Western culture.  
Amidst the massive shift from traditional culture to modernity, Freud posited a notion of 
the self as a knowable, if not enigmatic, entity, that governed human behavior at the level of the 
individual and society. Freud explained how religion kept the terror associated with infantile 
helplessness at bay by recreating the illusion of protection based on the child’s earliest 
relationship with its primary caregivers, and that the development of the intellect and pursuit of 
knowledge was a preferable alternative to the oppressive nature of religious authority because it 
is amenable to the reflexivity that characterizes scientific/reason-based knowledge. While Freud 
acknowledged the deep-rooted human need for authority to maintain psychic equilibrium in the 
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face of its inherent vulnerability, he viewed culture as a container for human aggression, rather 
than existential terror, which I argue is a derivative of the latter.  
Rieff described how changes in the eighteenth-and-nineteenth-centuries culture gradually 
necessitated a new therapeutic paradigm to suit the emerging individualism of modern society in 
the West. Rieff credits Freud for articulating the cultural shift from the traditional paradigm of 
faith to the modern paradigm of the self.  
Giddens showed us how the conditions for ontological security have undergone radical 
transformation in response to its inherent reflexivity. It is no longer achieved, as in traditional 
society, through participation in communal forms of life; rather, it depends upon development of 
a sense of self that is simultaneously stable and capable of adaptation to the inevitable changes in 
context that define our contemporary social world. The continuous revision of our collective 
knowledge base and social institutions means that we can no longer take any meaning for 
granted, which represents the greatest departure from traditional culture. Furthermore, because 
the social milieu is increasingly abstract and constantly evolving, the project of the self requires 
significant effort by the individual to give it shape and meaning. Thus, the threat of personal 
meaninglessness has become a pervasive feature of modern life.  
Strenger took this feature of modernity and brought our discussion into the realm of 
contemporary social experience.  His ideas validated a core tenant of this project, that 
contemporary individuals, despite having been given the opportunity to express their subjectivity 
through their personal and professional lives, nonetheless seek the “illusion of omnipotence” in 
the form of limitlessness, which, rather than freeing them, gives rise to a nagging feeling of 
inadequacy that throws doubt on the meaningfulness of a life that does not actualize the deepest 
levels of one’s talents and contribute to the advancement of one’s chosen field in a significant 
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way. The elite of contemporary society, New Cosmopolitans—those who were born with or 
acquired the privilege to fuse their professional interests and identity with the creative expression 
of their inner selves—are, despite their talents and successes, plagued by an instability of self-
esteem and isolation that further distances them from feeling grounded in the social context of 
meaningful relationships.   
Sass’ work showed how those living on the less fortunate side of the social spectrum 
cope, or fail to cope, with the complexity of the self in the modern social milieu. Interweaving 
the psychological predicament of the schizophrenic patient and the sensibilities of the modern 
artist, Sass argued that modern thought itself is plagued by a paradox of extreme alienness in 
which the individual experiences detachment from shared social meaning and a hyper-reflexivity 
that defies stable meaning. The modern individual—lacking a sense of being anchored to an 
irrefutable doctrine of meaning, authority, or purpose—is forced to turn toward inward and 
derive meaning, authority and purpose vis-à-vis the self. However, the self is either not 
sufficiently developed, or cannot shoulder the burden of such weighty existential demands. Sass 
concluded that schizophrenic illness appears to demonstrate heightened awareness into the 
paradox of modern life and that the schizoid personality is the characterological consequence of 
modernity.  
In chapter three, Stolorow expanded our understanding of the traumatic impact existential 
terror can have on the individual. He argued that emotional trauma, such as the loss of a loved 
one, puts the individual in direct contact with existential anxiety, which can be experienced as a 
trauma owing to the sudden loss of ontological security it engenders. The degree of traumatic 
effect depends in large part on the affect-regulating relationships, pursuits, or beliefs that one has 
to ameliorate the effects of such emotional dislocations. TMT research supported this idea with 
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empirical evidence which demonstrated how mild-to-moderate levels of traumatic life events 
allowed individuals to keep proximal and distal modes of defense against death awareness intact, 
and in fact led to a reinforcement of the individual’s cultural worldview, whereas severe trauma 
decimated both and resulted in a complete breakdown in the worldview defense.  
Salzman & Halloran explored this work in the context of cultural collapse through their 
qualitative study of the impact of colonialism on three genetically distinct and geographically 
disperse groups of indigenous peoples. Their study confirmed the findings demonstrated by 
ABDT and expanded their relevance from the individual to the scope of culture by showing that 
severe trauma as it is directed to a cultural system can result in devastating loss of meaning for 
the cultural group in addition to individual psychological suffering.  
Lear offered a more optimistic perspective through his analysis of the survival of the 
Crow nation during the settlement of North America. Lear demonstrated the positive element of 
modernity’s reflexivity in his elaboration of the notion of radical hope, in which survival is 
possible if one is psychologically adroit enough to endure the cultural transformation of ideals. 
For new symbols of meaning to arise and take root, loss of the previous ones must be recognized 
and metabolized.  
Young-Bruehl’s concept of social cumulative trauma likened the role of culture to the 
protective shield of the good-enough mother, and allowed us to posit a cumulative social trauma 
that occurred over the eighteenth-and-nineteenth centuries in which gradual but repeated strain 
was placed on the primary cultural defense against existential terror (i.e., religion, communal 
life). I argued that the psychological distress that accompanied centuries of cultural flux was 
central to the erosion of ontological security in the shift from traditional society to modernity, 
which was eventually lived out as a series of catastrophic traumas when the reflexivity of 
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modernity came to bear its fullest force upon the world, most notably during the First and 
Second World Wars.  
Edmundson chronicled Freud’s interest in the issue of authority, noting a shift in his 
perspective from one of optimism that emphasized the individual’s agency in promoting psychic 
change through insight to a darker view of the human condition in which individuals willingly 
submit to oppressive forms of authority to reduce psychic tension and feel connected to a 
powerful other. Edmundson postulated the rise in totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century as 
the West’s response to the erosion of ontological security in the modern era. According to 
Edmundson, the twentieth century was plagued by intolerable levels of uncertainty that created 
more anxiety and tension than most individuals could bear, laying the groundwork for the rise of 
fascism in Europe and the subsequent revival of religious fundamentalism across the world.  
In chapter four, we tried to make sense of the diminished status of psychoanalysis in 
contemporary culture. Offering practical advice for a disciple losing ground in mainstream 
society, Strenger advocated for inclusion in the “third culture” modality of idea sharing to 
reinvigorate psychoanalysis’ standing in the public domain. He argued that today more than ever, 
psychoanalysis has an important message to deliver about the complexity of the self as a source 
of meaning for individuals who feel lost and objectified by the cultural trend toward 
simplification and quantification of the self.  
Finally, I argued that psychoanalysis fails as a conduit of the cultural paradigm of the self 
for three reasons: First, psychoanalysis fails because all systems of meaning are doomed to fail. 
Psychoanalysis cannot eradicate the anxiety inherent in living, and thus will always be limited, as 
all systems are, by its ability to turn diffuse anxiety about human vulnerability into a concrete 
problem that can be addressed. The paradox of modernity is that we live in a cultural paradigm 
134 
 
 
 
based on reflexivity that defies certainty yet demands the symbolic possibility of omnipotence at 
the same time to manage existential anxiety. Phillips argued that psychoanalysis created the 
psyche to have a concrete location to act out its solutions to existential anxiety.  
The second reason psychoanalysis fails is that it does not provide an effective buffer 
against existential terror in the form of externalized authority. Freud, having recognized how 
traditional forms of authority had become sickness-inducing to modern individuals, sought to 
emancipate his patients from the tyranny of oppressive symbols of authority. In its place, he 
offered psychoanalytic theories and praxis as a means of working through our need for authority 
so we could invest our energies in the world in a less stultifying way. Although Freud recognized 
that the need for authority stemmed from contact with vulnerability, he thought that with the 
right form of treatment people could rise above this need and assume a stance of “maturity.” 
Whitebook helped us see the limitations of Freud’s “project of modernity;” namely, that its 
preoccupation with rationality does not allow for the very human striving for merger with an 
external source of authority, however irrational and potentially destructive it may be.  
The third reason psychoanalysis fails has to do with the difficulty associated with 
achieving a state of “maturity,” and the question of whether such an accomplishment is desirable. 
Illouz provided a critique of the therapeutic narrative of self-help that evolved out of Freud’s 
articulation of the self as a subjective and knowable entity. She argued that the simplified, 
Americanized version of therapy has become synonymous with a self that is sick, and that failure 
to be cured is a failure of the self. The notion that emotions are to be tightly controlled and used 
for the advancement of self-interest suggests that freedom from the tyranny of oppressive 
authority is no longer the primary objective of the therapeutic endeavor. The question whether 
therapy works in the service of maintaining oppressive cultural norms or freeing the individual 
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from them. This has been a question asked myriad of times since Karl Kraus suggested 
psychoanalysis is the disease it purports to cure.  
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